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ABSTRACT 
WILLIAM JAMES’S UNDIVIDED SELF AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
IMMORTALITY 
 
 
Anthony G. Karlin, B.F.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
The dissertation explores William James’s conception of the self and his belief in 
the possibility of immortality.  In The Divided Self of William James, James scholar 
Richard M. Gale argues that James unwittingly advanced two incompatible types of 
selves:  a self-assertive “Promethean” self who maximizes desire-satisfaction and a 
passive mystic self who favors conceptless, mystical intuition.  I argue that Gale’s 
dichotomy of James is incorrect and that James’s conception of the self is better 
understood through his growing belief in the possibility of immortality.  I develop this 
idea by considering relevant aspects of both James’s personal and philosophical 
development.  I discuss the personal crises of James’s youth as well as the dilemmas he 
encountered as his philosophy evolved.  I argue that one of the keys to understanding 
James’s conception of the self was his long-term involvement with psychic research and 
his association with the psychic medium Leonora Piper.  These interactions compelled 
James to envision possibilities for the self beyond this life.  In the final analysis, I believe 
my alternative account to Gale results in a more accurate and unified understanding of 
James, i.e., one in which the possibility of immortality played a central role in James’s 
evolving vision of the self. 
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Introduction: The Divided-Self and Possibility 
In The Divided Self of William James, Richard M. Gale argues that James “was a 
highly divided self throughout his life,” and throughout “his career James was of several 
minds about everything.”1
Since Gale’s book came out in 1999, two noteworthy attempts to re-unify James 
and his philosophy have already appeared.  In The Unity of William James’s Thought, 
published in 2002, Wesley Cooper attempts what Gale would later characterize as a 
“doctrinal integration” of James’s thought.
  According to Gale’s analysis, James unwittingly advanced 
two incompatible types of selves:  a bold, creative “Promethean” self who maximizes 
desire-satisfaction and a mystic self who renounces the self-assertive Promethean quest in 
favor of a passive state of conceptless, mystical intuition that results in an intimate union 
with the universe.  Gale suggests that these two selves are incompatible because of how 
they interact with the world and, more importantly, because of how each self conceives 
the nature of reality, i.e., their ontological commitments.  The Promethean self, on this 
account, has an active will and is committed to ontological relativism, while the mystic 
self has a passive will and is committed to some form of absolutism.  Consequently, so 
long as one attempts to realize both types of selves (which Gale claims James attempted 
to do), self-integration will remain impossible.  Thus, concludes Gale, James and his 
philosophy remained perpetually divided. 
2
                                                          
1 Richard M. Gale, The Divided Self of William James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 258. 
  In brief, Cooper’s main idea, what he calls 
his “Two-Levels View,” is that James’s philosophy is not divided into two incompatible 
 
2 Richard M. Gale, “The Still Divided Self of William James: A Response to Pawelski and 
Cooper,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society XL, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 159. 
 
2 
 
worlds, but, rather, reflects two different perspectives or dimensions of the same world.3  
James O. Pawelski followed Cooper’s attempt to unify James in 2007 with his work, The 
Dynamic Individualism of William James.  Unlike Cooper, Pawelski is primarily 
concerned with what Gale refers to as an “existential integration” of James.4  That is, 
Pawelski attempts to unify not only James’s philosophy, but also his mind by arguing that 
his ideas became increasingly more integrated as his thought developed.5
Like Cooper and Pawelski, I do not accept Gale’s divided-self thesis, but my 
attempt to re-unify James is unlike either of theirs.  The thesis that I will argue for and 
defend in this paper is that James’s understanding of the self was shaped and unified by 
his desire for and growing belief in the possibility of immortality.  Like Pawelski, 
therefore, my account may be labeled “existential” insofar as I argue against a “several 
minds” interpretation of James.  However, my account will differ from Pawelski’s insofar 
as the unity I identify in James is not the success of reconciling competing beliefs, but, 
rather, a unity of vision and ambition, so to speak, for a conception of the self compatible 
with the possibility of immortality.   
   
In order to present this account my task will be two-fold, part critical and part 
constructive.  First, I will begin in Chapter 1 with a critique of Gale’s claim that James 
was himself a mystic.  In particular, I will consider Gale’s claim that James had a number 
of mystical experiences which licenses him to attribute a mystical self to James.  Using 
the examples Gale provides, I will then evaluate each experience according to the criteria 
                                                          
3 Wesley Cooper, The Unity of William James’s Thought (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
2002), 6.  
 
4 Gale, “Still Divided,” 159. 
 
5 James O. Pawelski, The Dynamic Individualism of William James (Albany, NY: State  
University of New York Press, 2007), chap. 5. 
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for mystical experience which James set out in The Varieties of Religious Experience.6
                                                          
6 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to works by William James refer to The Works of 
William James, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis, 19 Vols. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975-1988); The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1897. 
  I 
will argue that only one of these experiences comfortably meets the criteria and, thus, 
Gale’s portrayal of James as mystic is unwarranted.  Following this initial critique, 
Chapters 2-5 will be used to construct my positive thesis that James rallied his views of 
the self around his desire for and growing belief in the possibility of immortality.  The 
development of this idea will not only encompass the entire range of James’s 
philosophical works, but it will additionally take into consideration relevant aspects of his 
personal life.  More specifically, Chapter 2 will consider important aspects of James’s 
biography such as the personal crises of his mid-20’s and his subsequent interest and 
involvement in psychical research.  It will be shown how James’s interest in immortality 
was largely borne out of these events.  Next, in Chapter 3, I will wholly turn to James’s 
philosophical writings beginning with his magnum opus, The Principles of Psychology.  
There I will argue that, despite surface appearances, his novel conception of the self in 
Principles is compatible with and favors the possibility of immortality.  In the fourth 
chapter I will examine James’s discussion of the self in his Ingersoll Lecture, “Human 
Immortality,” and The Varieties of Religious Experience.  I will contend that in these two 
works we once again find James concerned with immortality as he defends the doctrine 
against popular objections and advances a field-theory of consciousness which 
substantially expands the notion of the self found in Principles.  In Chapter 5, I will turn 
to James’s later, more explicitly metaphysical works, namely, Essays in Radical 
Empiricism, A Pluralistic Universe, and Some Problems in Philosophy.  James’s interest 
4 
 
in the possibility of an afterlife becomes even more apparent in these works as indicated 
by his rejection of dualism in favor of a metaphysics approximating panpsychism.    
With my interpretation of James in place, in the final chapter I will be able to 
more sharply critique Gale’s claims regarding the clash between selves he believes exists 
in James’s philosophy.  There I will argue that Gale’s characterization of the mystical self 
runs against the current of James’s thought and, in addition, directly conflicts with 
James’s claims regarding mystical experience.  In the end, with Gale’s supposed clashes 
diffused and my alternative account in place, the result will be a more accurate and 
unified understanding of James, i.e., one in which the possibility of immortality played a 
central role in James’s evolving vision of the self. 
Until now, although there have been a handful of publications that touch on the 
issue of immortality in James’s thought, no one has made a case for the pervasiveness of 
the idea in James’s life and work.  For example, in Self, God, and Immortality: A 
Jamesian Investigation, Eugene Fontinell draws upon James’s work in order to formulate 
a plausible conception of the self that is open to the possibility of personal immortality.7  
Fontinell makes it clear from the outset that he is not concerned with explicating James’s 
metaphysics “but rather to utilize his language and ideas, as well as that of others.”8
                                                          
7 Eugene Fontinell, Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation (New York:  
 
“What is of primary importance is not whether I present a fundamentally correct 
interpretation of James,” writes Fontinell, “but whether there emerges from my reading of 
James, supplemented by a number of other thinkers, an intrinsically reasonable doctrine 
Fordham University Press, 2000). 
 
8 Ibid., xi. 
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of the self that is open to personal immortality.”9
Nonfiction science writer Deborah Blum’s recent work, Ghost Hunters: William 
James and the Search for Scientific Proof of Life After Death, is another work that calls 
attention to James’s concern with the afterlife.
  Indeed, Fontinell utilizes James’s 
language about the self as a “field” in order to construct his own model of a self fit for 
personal immortality but neither attempts to connect the issue to James’s personal life nor 
to his work as a whole.  Unlike Fontinell, I will not be using James’s writings as a means 
to personally advocate for personal immortality.  Rather, what I want to argue is that 
William James hoped for and believed in the possibility of immortality and this led him 
to novel theorizing about the nature of the self and reality. 
10  Blum very informatively chronicles 
James’s collaboration with members of the American and British Societies for Psychical 
Research, providing a compelling narrative of his dedication to psychical research, as 
well as the professional risks that arose as a consequence of such interests.  Unlike the 
task of this paper, Blum’s narrative stays near the surface of James’s life, focusing on 
James’s unrelenting quest to legitimize psychic research in the scientific community.  
Blum does not (and did not intend to) connect the issue of immortality to James’s 
philosophy in a comprehensive or systematic way.  Rather, her goal she says, was to 
“explore the supernatural” from the perspective of a “career science writer anchored in 
place with the sturdy shoes of common sense.”11
                                                          
9 Fontinell, op. cit., xii. 
 
 
10 Deborah Blum, Ghost Hunters: William James and the Search for Scientific Proof of Life  
After Death (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
 
11 Ibid., 323. 
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Michel Ferrari’s article, “William James and the Denial of Death,” states that 
James believed in a personal afterlife but Ferrari finds it surprising that he rarely 
addresses the issue directly in his popular writings.12
Religious narratives embody hopes about subjectivity and about the 
afterlife that deny death in ways that satisfy our ideals for this life.  This 
explains why stories denying death, or trying to deny it, stories of 
Gilgamesh failing the test to remain awake forever and being forced to 
return to the land of the living; Orpheus losing his love to death because at 
the last moment he doubted Eurydice’s full return; Jesus being buried and 
his resurrection after three days; living on in a computer or a clone—are 
so perennial and powerful reshaping themselves in every culture for every 
new generation.
  As mentioned above, James’s 
Ingersoll Lecture, “Human Immortality,” is one of these rare writings which explicitly 
takes up the issue and Ferrari dutifully summarizes James’s responses to objections to 
immortality advanced in the lecture.  As my paper will argue, although James directly 
addresses the issue of immortality only a handful of times in his writings, the topics he 
does repeatedly address, e.g., the self, the nature of consciousness, religious belief, free-
will, and metaphysics in general, reflect this concern and have immediate bearing on the 
issue.  Ferrari does not treat these issues in any significant detail, opting, instead, to argue 
that belief in an afterlife as a useful fiction--a story we create for ourselves in order to 
deny what may be psychologically devastating:  
13
 
 
These types of death-denying stories persist, according to Ferrari, because they “embody  
memes that sustain themselves by giving us hope.”14  Thus, Ferrari uses James as a foil, 
more or less, to expound upon what he calls “the tragedy of death.”15
                                                          
12 Michel Ferrari, “William James and the Denial of Death,” Journal of Consciousness Studies,    
No. 9, (2002): 117-141. 
 
 
13 Ibid., 133. 
 
14 Ibid., 133. 
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Sami Pihlström presents a more sympathetic interpretation of James in his article 
“William James on Death, Mortality and Immortality.”16  Unlike Ferrari, Pihlström 
argues that James did not firmly believe in personal immortality, only feeling the 
practical need for such a belief.17  Thus, James, in Pihlström’s view, only empathized 
with the need for life after death, himself uncommitted to such a belief.  Pihlström places 
James within the Kantian project of “drawing limits to reason in order to make room for 
faith.”18  According to Pihlström’s reconstruction of James, the ethical demand for 
immortality grounds his metaphysics.  Pihlström claims that, “death, for James, is 
ultimately something that ought to be overcome in our moral struggles that aim to make 
the world a better place to live a genuinely human life.”19
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 Ferrari, op. cit., 127. 
  In his view, James’s 
pragmatism warrants our belief in either mortality or immortality--whatever best fits our 
vital needs and purposes.  In this paper I will take issue with Pihlström’s interpretation on 
two different fronts.  First, although I wouldn’t refer to James with the loaded label of 
“believer,” I wouldn’t label him as a “nonbeliever” either—James, as revealed to us 
through his letters and other biographical evidence, firmly believed in the possibility of 
immortality.  Admittedly, I wouldn’t characterize James as absolutely assured of his 
personal immortality but James would also admit that the issue is inherently vague and 
mysterious, not allowing for air-tight, logical proofs.  Thus, James’s beliefs and 
 
16 Sami Pihlström, “William James on Death, Mortality, and Immortality,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society, XXXVIII, No. 4 (Fall 2002): 605-628. 
 
17 Ibid., 606. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid., 607. 
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philosophical posturing on the subject fittingly reflected these qualities.  Second, I don’t 
believe James’s concern with immortality arises out of an ethical demand.  Instead, I see 
the belief becoming better grounded as James continued to explore the nature and 
possibilities of consciousness largely suggested to him by mystical experience and 
psychical research.  By focusing on the moral or ethical angle of immortality, Pihlström 
fails to consider the connection with James’s conception of the self and his metaphysics 
in general.  Thus, although Pihlström presents an interesting juxtaposition of James and 
Kant regarding the practical need of believing in immortality, I don’t believe he does 
justice to the issue. 
In “The Religious Dimension of Individual Immortality in the thinking of William 
James,” Laura Westra looks to James in her search for a conclusive proof that human 
beings can survive bodily death.20
It is not immortality in general we want to believe in, or immortality of the 
species, or indestructibility of material or non-material components, in 
whatever form the might enjoy their respective continued existence.  It is 
personal immortality we seek, the survival of you and me and the people 
we know and love.
  According to Westra, such a proof requires an account 
of a person or self that will allow it to subsist--in a meaningful way--once separated from 
the body.  Westra insists on the importance of personal immortality: 
21
 
 
Westra believes James fails to achieve this in his discussions of human immortality.  She 
views James’s varying accounts of the self in The Principles of Psychology as 
irreconcilable and unable to guarantee a personal afterlife.  Specifically, Westra claims 
that the individual stream of consciousness initially described in Principles as “thoughts 
                                                          
20 Laura Westra, “The Religious Dimension of Individual Immortality in the Thinking of William 
James,” Faith and Philosophy Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996):  285-297. 
 
21 Ibid., 286. 
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doing the thinking,” is irreconcilable with a willing, creating self, which is both knower 
and known, which James also wants.22  Further, she argues that James’s speculation 
about an all-encompassing anima mundi is just as unhelpful regarding her goal of proving 
personal immortality.  Westra wonders how individual integrity is preserved once we 
revert back to our original source, the anima mundi.23  In the end, she concludes that 
James’s positing of “something larger than ourselves” is the best hope we have for 
salvation insofar as the higher probability that there is a God, the likelier our chance to 
survive bodily death.24
In sum, the secondary literature that recognizes James’s interest in immortality 
either misrepresents the matter or simply fails to offer a complete account of it—which is 
one of the main tasks in this paper.  But before I begin setting out my interpretation of 
James, a couple of issues concerning James’s belief in the possibility of immortality 
should be discussed at the outset.   
  I agree with Westra that James does not present a detailed or 
systematic account of personal immortality.  However, I will argue that James goes much 
further than Westra gives him credit for.  Particularly, Westra fails to appreciate James’s 
rejection of dualism in his later metaphysics.  Additionally, she claims that James’s belief 
in a wider reality, “God,” is grounded purely on faith, but, as we shall see, such a reality 
was suggested to James by his investigations into religious and mystical experience.  In 
short, Westra raises legitimate concerns and I agree that James does not strictly prove the 
truth of personal immortality; however, I will argue that his thinking on the topic is more 
sophisticated than Westra acknowledges.   
                                                          
22 Westra, op. cit., 290-91. 
 
23 Ibid., 292-93. 
 
24 Ibid., 295. 
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First and foremost, for obvious reasons, I will not be able to nor do I intend to 
strictly prove that James’s developing views of the self were a direct result of his growing 
belief in immortality.  If introspection into my own psyche is liable to error, as James 
believed it was, so much the worse it must be when one attempts to decipher the 
underlying motivations of others.  Ralph Waldo Emerson, a friend of James’s father and 
one of James’s intellectual influences, begins his essay “Pray Without Ceasing” with the 
following remark: “It is the duty of men to judge men only by their actions . . . Our 
faculties furnish us with no means of arriving at the motive, the character, the secret self 
[of others].”25
The second issue which needs to be addressed is more significant and concerns 
the very notion of “possibility.”  That is, what does it mean to claim that James had a 
growing belief in the possibility of immortality?  The issue of possibility was, William 
Gavin argues, a challenging one for James.
   By offering my interpretation of James I am supposing Emerson has 
slightly overstated the case.  Indeed, I do believe that my interpretation of James will 
reveal some of the motives and character behind his philosophy.  Nonetheless, I offer my 
interpretation as a hypothesis which, to use one of James’s favorite phrases, must “run the 
gauntlet” of James’s life and work.  The extent to which my account comports with the 
available evidence, offers new insights, and enriches our understanding, will be, in 
Jamesian fashion, the extent to which it proves its worth. 
26
                                                          
25 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Essays, Lectures, and Poems, ed. Robert D. Richardson, (New 
York: Bantam Dell, 1990), 59. 
  Gavin suggests that there are two problems 
concerning possibility which James could have dealt with more satisfactorily--one 
 
26 William J. Gavin, William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992), 35-55. 
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regarding the range of applicable use and another which concerns whether it is logically 
coherent.27
The first problem, according to Gavin’s analysis, involves making a distinction 
between “possible possibility” and “actual possibility.”
 
28  This is a problem that arises 
whenever one denies the fundamental reality of generals or universals and, instead, 
adopts some type of “particularist” position.  Due to what Ralph Barton Perry calls his 
“taste for the particular and concrete,”29 James often appears to adopt such a position.  
The consequence of denying the reality of universals, notes Gavin, is that “all 
generalizations are, as such, mere empty concepts.  They deal only with abstract 
possibility, not with reality.”30  Therefore, any statement that is made about future 
tendencies or possibilities must “deal only with the possible possibility—about the 
logical probabilities of something that might happen.”31
Actual possibility, on the other hand, writes Gavin, is exemplified by scientific 
laws that accept universals and thus involve statements “concerning what would happen 
if such and such were to be done,” i.e., contrary-to-fact conditionals.
   
32
                                                          
27Gavin, op. cit., 36. 
  In other words, if 
one does not believe that there are regular and fixed aspects of reality which are 
accurately accounted for and described by scientific laws, then it seems impossible to 
predict what is actually possible.    
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston:  
Little, Brown and Company, 1935), I:287. 
 
30 Gavin, 36. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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Although James does not explicitly mention this issue, Gavin argues that James 
“somewhat” acknowledges the difficulty and resolves it, “at least to his own 
satisfaction.”33
To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only 
consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may 
involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we 
must prepare.  Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or 
remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as 
that conception has positive significance at all.
  Obviously, James does want to deal with actual possibility, viz., he wants 
an understanding of possibility that is rooted in and reflective of reality.  Thus, James’s 
approach to possibility involves connecting it to actuality through subjecting the idea to 
the pragmatic test which he famously describes as follows: 
34
In short, James believes that in order to understand possibility, it is necessary to consider 
the practical effects of conceiving something as “possible.”  James asks, “When you say 
that a thing is possible, what difference does it make?” and answers:  “It makes at least 
this difference that if any one calls it impossible you can contradict him, if any one calls 
it actual you can contradict him, and if any one calls it necessary you can contradict him 
too.”
 
35  Gavin observes that James’s response here only spells out the “logical meaning 
of the term ‘possible.’”36
When you say a thing is possible, does that not make some farther 
difference in terms of actual fact? 
  So far, then, James has not conceived possibility in a way that 
brings it into contact with concrete actuality or a factual state of affairs.  James, himself, 
realized this shortcoming and pushed the analysis further:   
                                                          
33 Gavin, op. cit., 37. 
 
34 James, Pragmatism, 29. 
 
35 Ibid., 136. 
 
36 Gavin, 37. 
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     It makes at least this negative difference that if the statement be true, it 
follows that there is nothing extant capable of preventing the possible 
thing.  The absence of real grounds of interference may thus be said to 
make things not impossible, possible therefore in the bare or abstract 
sense.37
In this passage, as he works out his conception of pragmatic possibility, James does make 
reference to an actual state of affairs, i.e., the absence of particular conditions, which has 
moved the analysis beyond what is simply logically possible.  Thus, Gavin writes, “Just 
being logically possible is insufficient for an idea to be pragmatically possible. . . . 
Pragmatic possibility thus entails more than logical meaningfulness; it entails a factual 
situation.”
   
38
This means not only that there are no preventive conditions present, but 
that some of the conditions of production of the possible thing actually are 
here.  Thus a concretely possible chicken means:  (1) that the idea of 
chicken contains no essential self-contradiction; (2) that no boys, skunks, 
or other enemies are about; and (3) that at least an actual egg exists.  
Possible chicken means actual egg—plus actual sitting hen, or incubator, 
or what not.  As the actual conditions approach completeness the chicken 
becomes a better-and-better-grounded possibility.  When the conditions 
are entirely complete, it ceases to be a possibility, and turns into an actual 
fact.
  And yet, according to James, most of the things that we believe are possible 
are not bare possibilities, but, rather, they are concretely grounded or well-grounded 
possibilities.  Using the example of a chicken and an egg, James illustrates the idea of a 
grounded possibility:  
39
Pragmatic possibility therefore requires, according to James’s account, both negative and 
positive conditions which are actual or reflect the factual state of affairs. In this way, 
through his pragmatic methodology, James moved from possible possibility or logical 
 
                                                          
37 Pragmatism, 136. 
 
38 Gavin, op. cit., 40. 
 
39 Pragmatism, 136. 
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possibility and into the realm of actual possibility. But doesn’t James’s example of the 
chicken and egg depend upon law-like generalizations regarding the conditions under 
which actual chickens come into being?  In his account of pragmatic possibility, James 
seems to have betrayed the “particularist” position. 
I believe a partial answer to this concern lies in identifying a faulty assumption--
that James was a “particularist,” i.e., a nominalist who didn’t recognize the reality of 
concepts, abstract objects, universals, etc.  According to Perry, James “never became a 
nominalist.  In one way or another he always found a way to provide for universals, 
generals, and concepts, however much he might disparage them.”40   Gerald Myers 
makes the same observation, pointing out that James, at the end of his life, argued against 
nominalism.41
What I am affirming here is the platonic doctrine that concepts are 
singular, that concept-stuff is inalterable, and that physical realities are 
constituted by the various concept-stuff of which they “partake.”  It is 
known as “logical realism” in the history of philosophy; and has usually 
been more favored by rationalists than by empiricist minds.
  In Some Problems of Philosophy, a work intended to be a widely 
distributed introduction to philosophy, James writes: 
42
Using his pragmatic methodology in order to determine what counts as “real,” James 
draws the conclusion that concepts should be considered just as real as percepts:   
   
The best definition I know is that which the pragmatist rule gives: 
‘anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged to take account in any 
way.’  Concepts are thus as real as percepts, for we cannot live a moment 
without taking account of them.43
                                                          
40 Perry, op. cit., 2:407 
 
 
41 Gerald E. Myers, William James (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 286. 
 
42 Some Problems of Philosophy, 58. 
 
43 SPP, 56. 
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Thus, according to James, because concepts figure into our experience so prominently, 
we must acknowledge their reality.  James fully appreciated the fact that concepts play an 
essential and irreplaceable role in shaping human experience: 
The universal and the particular parts of the experience are literally 
immersed in each other, and both are indispensable.  Conception is not 
like a painted hook, on which no real chain can be hung; for we hang 
concepts upon percepts, and percepts upon concepts interchangeably and 
indefinitely. . . . The world we practically live in is one in which it is 
impossible, except by theoretic retrospection, to disentangle the 
contributions of intellect from those of sense. . . . 
     The two mental functions thus play into each other's hands. Perception 
awakens thought, and thought in turn enriches perception. The more we 
see, the more we think; while the more we think, the more we see in our 
immediate experiences, and the greater grows the detail, and the more 
significant the articulateness of our perception.44
Yet, although James grants that concepts are real and important for human experience, he 
fundamentally disagrees with the view of rationalism which maintains that “concept-stuff 
is primordial and perceptual things are secondary in nature.”
 
45  Unlike the rationalist 
position, James admits to holding the “somewhat eccentric” view that concrete percepts 
are primordial and concepts are secondary.  James describes this as an “attempt to 
combine logical realism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought.”46
Concepts have a secondary status, James argues, because of the “‘eternal’ kind of 
being which they enjoy is inferior to the temporal kind, because it is so static and 
schematic and lacks so many characters which temporal reality possesses.”
   
47
                                                          
44 SPP, 58-59 
  However, 
this “does not mean that concepts and the relations between them are not just as ‘real’ in 
  
45 Ibid., 58. 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 Ibid., 56. 
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their ‘eternal’ way as percepts are in their temporal way.”48
Properly speaking, concepts are post-mortem preparations, sufficient for 
retrospective understanding; and when we use them to define the universe 
prospectively we ought to realize that they can give only a bare abstract 
outline or approximate sketch, in the filling out of which perception must 
be invoked. 
  Simply put, James was 
convinced that reality was too profuse for words and outstripped all possible conceptual 
schemes: 
49
As James suggest here, concepts can only provide us with an “abstract outline” or 
“approximate sketch” of reality and are, as Myers puts it, “only substitutes for the 
original flux-reality from which they have been abstracted.”
 
50  Again, this is not to say 
that concepts are not genuinely real or useful.  Concepts are “useful but not sovereign,” 
James writes, “Philosophy, like life, must keep the doors and windows open.”51  
Regarding the use of concepts or universals in science, James accepted the validity of 
laws which have proved “potent for prediction;”52
Science thinks she has discovered the objective realities in question.  
Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses and velocities expressible 
by numbers, and paths expressible by analytic formulas, these at last are 
things over which the mathematic-logical network may be flung, and by 
supposing which instead of sensible phenomena science becomes more 
able to manufacture for herself a world about which rational propositions 
may be framed.  Sensible phenomena are pure delusions for the 
 yet, at the same time, he continually 
stressed the limited and fallible nature of science.  In The Principles of Psychology, 
James had already highlighted some of these perceived shortcomings: 
                                                          
48 SPP, 55-56. 
 
49 Ibid., 54-55. 
 
50 Myers, op. cit., 286. 
 
51 SPP, 55. 
 
52 Ibid., 102. 
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mechanical philosophy.  The “things” and qualities we believe in do not 
exist.  The only realities are swarming solids in everlasting motion . . . 
whose expressionless and meaningless changes form the history of the 
world, and are deducible from initial collocations and habits of movement 
hypothetically assumed.53
 
 
Commenting on this passage, as well as James’s general attitude towards science, Myers 
writes:   
In James’s eyes, scientists talk as if they have discovered thing in which 
the ideal and real coincide, and they often act as if their laws and 
hypotheses are rational propositions, knowable a priori, about which only 
an imbecile could harbor doubts.  But their knowledge applies to such a 
stripped-down world, describable in abstract, quantitative terms but 
lacking qualitative content. . . .54
In sum, although he did not believe that science had the ultimate say in defining reality, 
James did respect the empirical method and verifying procedures of science.  He believed 
that the laws discovered and utilized by science were real and useful to the extent that 
they tapped into some aspect of reality.  Thus, insofar as James believed that concepts 
were able to capture some particular aspects of reality, however limited, he could 
legitimately use them to speak meaningfully about actual possibility.    
 
Setting aside the issue of actual possibility, Gavin suggests one other problem for 
James regarding the issue of possibility.  As Gavin rightly observes, subjunctive 
conditionals, at least for empiricists, seem to lead to a dilemma in which they are 
construed as either self-contradictory or repetitive.55
The problem which they [subjunctive conditionals] present to a Humean is 
the following dilemma.  The constant conjunction analysis leaves two 
  The problem, according to Gavin, is 
succinctly summarized by R.B. Braithwaite in his essay “Laws of Nature and Causality”: 
                                                          
53 James, The Principles of Psychology, 2:665 
 
54 Myers, op. cit., 289. 
 
55 Gavin, op. cit., 42. 
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choices open for the analysis of “If a thing is A, it is B.”  One choice is 
“Every A is B” taken, as traditional logic would say, “existentially,” i.e., 
understood in such a way as to assert the existence of at least one thing 
which is A.  The other alternative is “Every A is B” taken non-
existentially, i.e., understood as not to assert the existence of an A.56
A subjunctive conditional is defined by Braithwaite as “an assertion of the form: 
‘Although there are no A’s, if there were to be any A’s, all of them would be B’s.’”
 
57  
Consequently, if we understand “If a thing is A, it is B” existentially, i.e., as asserting that 
“Something is A,” then it contradicts with the very definition of a subjunctive conditional 
which states that there are no A’s.  Conversely, if we understand “If a thing is A, it is B” 
non-existentially, i.e., as asserting that “There is nothing which is A,” then it follows that 
“Nothing is both A and non-B”—since, after all, there is nothing which is A.  But the 
statement “Nothing is both A and non-B” is logically equivalent to the subjunctive 
conditional “If a thing is A, it is B;” thus, it is simply repetitive.  Therefore, says Gavin, 
“we have at least an apparent dilemma: subjunctive conditionals are either self-
contradictory or repetitive.”58
I believe that James, acting as empiricist, did not reject the contrary-to-fact 
conditional but did reject that interpretation of it which viewed subjunctive 
conditionals as repetitive.  In other words, James gave up logic as being 
completely capable of dealing with possibility. . . . James chooses the self-
contradictory. . . .
  He concludes: 
59
I agree with Gavin’s assessment.  James account of pragmatic possibility and his 
assessment of logic as insufficient is evidenced by his description of the “faith ladder” in 
   
                                                          
56 Gavin, op. cit., 42; R. B. Braithwaite, “Laws of Nature and Causality,” in Readings in the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. Baruch Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), 57. 
 
57 Braithwaite, 57. 
 
58 Gavin, 42. 
 
59 Ibid. 
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A Pluralistic Universe.  James claims that the faith ladder is a description of how we 
come to choose one conceptual theory over another:   
A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is it true 
or not? you ask. 
 
It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self-contradictory. 
It may be true, you continue, even here and now. 
It is fit to be true, it would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you 
presently feel. 
 
It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then—as a 
 final result— 
 
It shall be held for true, you decide; it shall be as if true, for you. 
 
And your acting thus may in certain special cases be a means of making it 
securely true in the end.60
  
 
Immediately following this account, James admits:  “Not one step in this process is 
logical. . . . It is life exceeding logic, it is the practical reason for which the theoretic 
reason finds arguments after the conclusion is once there."61  According to James’s 
ladder, logical possibility is just the incipient stage of practical reasoning; it leads one to 
ask whether it may be true, which leads one to further ask if it is fit to be true, etc., etc.  
Gavin points out that when James writes, “it would be well if it were true,” he is dealing 
with actual possibility, i.e., at that point one is making a claim about the current factual 
state of affairs.62  “It shows that participation, response to a situation, can take place only 
if actual possibility is affirmed.”63
                                                          
60 A Pluralistic Universe, 148. 
   James illustrates these points in his discussion of the 
 
61 Ibid., 148. 
 
62 Gavin, op. cit., 53. 
 
63 Ibid., 53. 
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possibility of salvation in Pragmatism, where he conceives salvation as contingent upon 
each person doing their “level best” within a “social scheme of co-operative work.”64  
James argues that “In the end it is our faith and not our logic that decides such questions, 
and I deny the right of any pretended logic to veto my own faith. I find myself willing to 
take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out 
and crying ‘no play.’”65
Concerning James’s “faith” and his rejection of logic as the final arbiter of belief, 
much more will be said in later chapters; consequently, I wish not to belabor the point at 
this time.  The important point to make here is that I will be using the term “possibility” 
in the same pragmatic sense as James.  Therefore, when I speak of James’s growing 
belief in the possibility of immortality, I am suggesting that the more James believed in a 
reality that was suited for personal immortality, the better grounded the possibility 
became for him.  Of course, due to our obvious limitations in determining whether all the 
right conditions for immortality are in place, James was never absolutely certain about 
the final truth of the matter.  With these important preliminaries out the way, let us now 
turn to Gale’s account of James’s mystical self.
  Thus, James comes to view logic in the same way he views 
science--both have their legitimate uses, but, insofar as each relies on abstract or 
conceptual schematization, compared to primordial reality, they are of only secondary 
importance. 
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Chapter 1 
William James’s Non-Mystical Self 
 
 
In this chapter I want to challenge Gale’s basic assumption that James was 
himself a mystic.  I will argue that, based on what we know about James’s life, there is 
not enough evidence to support Gale’s claim.  In particular, I will contend that nearly all 
of the so-called mystical experiences which Gale cites do not fit James’s own criteria for 
mystical experience.  Moreover, whatever mystical experiences James might have had 
were so few and far between that these types of experiences should not be considered 
characteristic of James’s life.  I will conclude that, although he had an intense interest in 
mystical experience and will develop a conception of the self open to mystical 
experiences, James himself was not a mystic.  In order to demonstrate this, let us first 
consider Gale’s account of James’s mystical self.   
According to Gale, James’s mystical self desires to “achieve a deep intimacy, 
ultimately a union, with the inner life of other persons, both natural and supernatural, 
even with the world at large.”1  James’s approach, Gale claims, involves experiencing the 
other person as a Thou rather an It.  Although James does speak of religion as turning the 
“dead blank it of the world into a living thou” in his 1881 essay “Reflex Action and 
Theism,”2
                                                          
1 Gale, Divided Self, 246. 
 Gale principally utilizes the language and ideas of Martin Buber.  What Gale 
finds particularly useful is Buber’s distinction between an I-It and an I-Thou relation.  
What distinguishes these two types is that in an I-Thou relation, rather than the two relata 
remaining apart, the two relata are understood to exist within the relation in the sense of 
 
2 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 101. 
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entering into each other.3  As Buber describes it, within an I-Thou relation a partial 
fusion of two originally separate consciousnesses is achieved upon their entering into 
“relational processes and states.”4  Gale suggests that an example of an I-Thou-ing 
process occurs in James’s essay “What Makes a Life Significant.”  In this essay, James 
describes the process by which two lovers, Jack and Jill, become aware of each other’s 
special uniqueness.  In what Gale describes as possibly his most profound passage, James 
writes:5
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms and perfections to the 
enchantment of which we stolid onlookers are stone-cold.  And which has 
the superior view of the absolute truth, he or we?  Which has the more 
vital insight into the nature of Jill’s existence, as a fact?  Is he in excess, 
being in this matter a maniac?  Or are we in defect, being victims of a 
pathological anaesthesia as regards Jill’s magical importance?  Surely the 
latter; surely to Jack are the profounder truths revealed; surely poor Jill’s 
palpitating little life-throbs are among the wonders of creation, are worthy 
of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame that the rest of us cannot 
feel like Jack.  For Jack realizes Jill concretely, and we do not.  He 
struggles towards a union with her inner life, divining her feelings, 
anticipating her desires, understanding her limits as manfully as he can, 
and yet inadequately, too; for he also is afflicted with some blindness, 
even here.  Whilst we, dead clods that we are, do not even seek after these 
things, but are contented that that portion of eternal fact named Jill should 
be for us as if it were not.  Jill, who knows her inner life, knows that 
Jack’s way of taking it—so importantly—is the true and serious way; and 
she responds to the truth in him by taking him truly and seriously, too. 
May the ancient blindness never wrap its clouds about either of them 
again!  Where would any of us be, were there no one willing to know us as 
we really are or ready to repay us for our insight by making recognizant 
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4 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,  
1970), 70. 
 
5 Gale, op. cit., 247. 
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return?  We ought, all of us, to realize each other in this intense, pathetic 
[empathetic or sympathetic], and important way.6
James’s main point here, according to Gale, is that “there are features of another person’s 
consciousness that can be known in the full-blooded existential sense only through an act 
of sympathetic intuition.”
 
7  That is, to really know someone, to know what-it-is-like to be 
Jill, one must enter into her inner life and experience the world as she does; consequently, 
one must love her.  Gale, channeling James, remarks, “To miss the joy of this inner 
consciousness in another person is to miss all, for it is this that makes her life significant. 
. . .”8
Assuming that an act of sympathetic or empathetic intuition is the means by 
which James’s mystical self forges a partial union with another, how exactly is this 
accomplished?  Because James finds the inner life, the object of the intuition, to be 
mysterious and ineffable, Gale argues, so is the act of intuition; thus, James is prevented 
from giving a straightforward account.
  Thus, on Gale’s account, James’s mystical self craves this sympathetic union with 
another because it is the only way to genuinely know and appreciate another human being 
as they really are.  
9
Maybe the best that can be done is to write a novel or play or, better yet, a 
typical Tin Pan Alley song.  Jack takes one look at Jill and “Whammo! 
Zing Went the Strings of His Heart.”  As he peers deeply into her eyes he 
feels as if he has known her all his life.  His focus of orientation has 
radically altered so that now he perceives the whole world through her.  
  Gale suggests that what is required is a type of 
indirect communication, the kind of communication used by mystics.  As Gale puts it: 
                                                          
6 James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, 150-51. 
 
7 Gale, op. cit., 248. 
 
8 Ibid., 248. 
 
9 Ibid., 250-51. 
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He locks in on her inner joy and tingles, which is what bestows meaning 
and value on her life.  Jack’s I-Thou-ing of Jill is reciprocated by Jill, thus 
bringing about a mutual partial merging of their consciousnesses.10
According to this description, when an individual makes a concerted attempt to connect 
with another consciousness, there can occur something like a mystical-union-at-first-
sight.  Gale suggests that this is no more mysterious than Sartre’s experience of the 
“glance” in Being and Nothingness.  In both cases a mysterious sort of direct awareness 
of one conscious being by another is involved, the crucial difference being that Sartre 
perceives this as an intrusive threat and restriction on his freedom whereas James views 
the merger as an opportunity to expand his consciousness.  As Gale succinctly puts it, 
“James likes people and Sartre doesn’t.”
 
11
According to Gale’s account, in addition to wanting to I-Thou other people, James 
also desired to I-Thou non-human animals.
 
12
Sight of elephants and tigers at Barnum’s menagerie whose existence, so 
individual and peculiar, yet stands there, so intensely and vividly real, as 
much as one’s own, so that one feels again poignantly the 
unfathomableness of ontology, supposing ontology to be at all.
  In support of this claim, Gale cites the 
following lines from a letter James wrote in 1873: 
13
What James finds so alluring during the circus is the “unfathomableness” of these 
animals’ being—if only he could catch a glimpse into what it is like to be an elephant or a 
tiger.  As any pet owner will attest to (James himself was very fond of dogs), the desire to 
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13 The Letters of William James, vol. 1, ed. Henry James (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press,  
1920), 224. 
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know what these creatures are thinking as they stare back so marvelously is a recurring 
curiosity.  Going even further than our animal friends, Gale claims that James expressed a 
desire to I-Thou the entire universe when he writes: “The Universe is no longer a mere It 
to us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to 
person might be possible here.”14  Gale proposes that James’s own mystical experiences 
of personality throughout the universe should be conceived as less heightened or intense 
forms of I-Thou types of mystical experience.  What is involved in these mystical 
experiences is a direct, nonsensory awareness of what James calls a “More” or “Unseen” 
supernatural reality.15  It is just these extraordinary experiences that, for James, form the 
basis of institutional religion, theology, and personal religious feelings and beliefs.16 
These are the types of personal experiences that James famously chronicles in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience.  James claims that through such experiences the 
subject typically receives “an assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relations 
to others, a preponderance of loving affection.”17
Given James’s description of the foregoing experiences as religious and Gale’s 
claim that James was a religious mystic, one would expect to discover that James himself 
had such experiences.  However, in The Varieties of Religious Experience James denies 
having mystical experiences.  James reports that “my own constitution shuts me out from 
  Accordingly, as a result of having such 
experiences, many believe they have identified a source of personal redemption beyond 
our ordinary awareness. 
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their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand.”18
First, Gale argues, even if it were true that James did not have any mystical 
experiences, he could still have had a deep sensitivity to and appreciation of them.  Gale 
compares this kind of situation to someone who can appreciate an Eroica Symphony 
without having the requisite talent to compose one.
  Thus, 
the obvious question arises:  Can James be counted as a religious mystic without having 
mystical experiences?  Gale answers the question affirmatively and gives a two-fold 
reply. 
19  Additionally, Gale recommends 
that we consider someone like Walter Stace, who was “a virgin to mystical experience” 
but was “nevertheless one of the great expositors and defenders of mysticism.”20  Stace, 
according to Gale, would agree with James’s claim that “we all have at least the germ of 
mysticism in us.”21
Gale’s second response to James’s disavowal of mystic experience is that the 
author is simply not being honest with his readers.  Gale explains: 
  Thus, on Gale’s account, having a mystical experience is not a 
necessary condition for being a religious mystic. 
Mystical experiences for [James] cover a broad spectrum of cases, ranging 
from the relatively undeveloped experiences of a heightened sense of 
reality, an intensification of feeling and insight such as occurs under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs, nitrous oxide, art, and even the raptures of 
                                                          
18 VRE, 301 
 
19 Gale, op. cit., 254;  
 
20 See Stace, Walter T. Mysticism and Philosophy. (London: MacMillan, 1960); Gale, Divided 
Self, 254. 
 
21 For example, in Mysticism and Philosophy, Stace writes: “It has often been suggested that all 
men, or nearly all men, are in some sense or other rudimentary or unevolved mystics, although in most of 
us the mystical consciousness is so far buried in the unconscious that it appears in the surface levels of our 
minds merely in the guise of vague feelings of sympathetic response to the clearer call of the mystic,” p 21; 
James, Pragmatism, 76. 
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nature, to the fully developed monistic experience of an undifferentiated 
unity in which all distinctions are obliterated.22
Although, admits Gale, James never had mystical experiences of the fully developed 
kind, he did have many of the less developed kind, namely, a number of episodes in 
which he experimented with nitrous oxide and mescal.  Additionally, in a letter James 
wrote to his wife in 1898, he reported a mystical experience he had during an evening he 
spent in the Adirondack Mountains.
 
23  Furthermore, in his 1910 essay, “A Suggestion 
about Mysticism,” James relates an episode involving a series of dreams in which he 
apparently became aware of some experiences not his own.  James reported that he could 
not tell whose experiences they were, only that they were utterly foreign and not his 
own.24
As Gale correctly notes, James’s interest in mystical experiences and psychic 
research was, on the whole, considered disreputable by the wider academic and scientific 
community.   Such contempt caused James to be especially sensitive to how his “tough-
minded” colleagues would perceive and receive him.  In particular, James sometimes 
seems to make a concerted effort to appear as cold-bloodedly scientific and unaffected as 
they, commonly downplaying his lively interest in religion, mystical experience, 
paranormal psychology, and the like in order to gain a more receptive hearing as well as 
to protect his reputation.  For example, in his 1898 Ingersoll Lecture, “Human 
Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine,” James tries at the outset to 
  Thus, concludes Gale, in denying having had mystical experiences, James was 
less than forthright---and for understandable reasons.   
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distance himself from “individuals with a real passion for the matter”--only then to 
proceed to counter two objections to immortality and make a case in support of its 
possibility.25  Suffice it to say that James never failed to take the predispositions of his 
audience into account when he was pitching his ideas, thus giving credence to the 
duplicity Gale identifies in James’s testimony regarding mystical experience.  All of this 
considered, Gale concludes that “James had every right to be a sympathetic expositor and 
defender of mysticism.”26
I think Gale’s conclusion, that James had the right to exposit and defend 
mysticism, is entirely correct.  However, whether James had the right to exposit and 
defend mysticism is not what is directly at issue.  What is at issue is whether or not James 
himself was a mystic.  As a student of psychology and psychical researcher, James was 
familiar with a wide variety of abnormal and paranormal states of consciousness which 
qualified him to speak on the subject—irrespective of whether or not he had mystical 
experiences himself.   But the question remains:  Was James himself a mystic?  This 
question is important because if James was not a mystic, then we must reject part of 
Gale’s divided-self thesis which claims that James had a mystical self.  
  
In order to answer this question we must first determine, as Gale attempts to do, if 
James had any mystical experiences.  Recall that Gale’s first response to the question was 
that it doesn’t matter if James had mystical experiences or not as long as he had a deep 
sensitivity to and appreciation of them.  Gale compares this to someone who can 
appreciate an Eroica Symphony but lacks the talent to compose one.  However, if Gale 
wants to argue that James had a mystical self, it certainly does matter whether he had 
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mystical experiences.  We wouldn’t call someone who merely appreciates a symphony a 
composer nor would we call someone who merely appreciates mysticism a mystic.  What 
may be helpful here is a distinction James sometimes draws between knowledge-about 
and knowledge-by-acquaintance.   For example, one may have conceptual knowledge 
about symphonies without ever having a direct acquaintance with the composing of a 
symphony.  That is to say, I can conceptualize and appreciate a certain activity or a way 
of life, but this is no substitute for being genuinely conditioned through a direct 
experience of it.  Thus, to establish whether James had a mystical self we need to 
determine if he had mystical experiences.  Gale believes James did. 
According to Gale, James’s description of Jack and Jill in “What Makes a Life 
Significant?” his experimentation with drugs and alcohol, his unusual experience in the 
Adirondack Mountains, and even his report of having a dream not his own, all belong to 
the category of mystical experience.  If one were to attribute mystical experiences to 
James, I believe, following Gale, these are the best candidates.  The next question to be 
addressed, then, is whether these were in fact genuine mystical experiences.  Curiously, 
though Gale uses these examples to press the claim that James was a mystic, he adds, 
“Whether these experiences should be called ‘mystical’ will be broached later.”27
Unlike some of the other supposed mystical experiences cited by Gale, the 
description of Jack and Jill in “What Makes a Life Significant?” is obviously not a direct 
  But 
Gale never returns to these examples for the purpose of determining whether or not they 
warrant classification as mystical experience.  No further doubts about whether James 
was a mystic are raised within the book.  In any event, I will broach the topic now. 
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reporting of some particular experience in James’s life.  Still, I take it to be a generic 
account of a relatively common bonding experience between two people that surely 
James was familiar with:  love.  As James describes it, through love we struggle to forge 
a union between our consciousness and the consciousness of another, and only through 
this process do we really come to understand and appreciate the “magical importance” of 
another person.   This sympathetic or empathetic process of understanding is not 
something reserved exclusively for romantic couples, but, rather, “We ought, all of us, to 
realize each other in this intense, pathetic [empathetic or sympathetic], and important 
way.”28
So, assuming that there are these Jack and Jill instances of two partially merging 
consciousnesses, are they to be counted as mystical experiences for the subjects 
involved?  Clearly we are in need of some criteria in order to determine what 
differentiates a mystical experience from any other type of experience.  Since we are 
trying to determine if James had any mystical experiences, it seems fair to use his own 
  Thus, Gale’s description of this event as the Tin Pan Alley song “Whammo! 
Zing Went the Strings of His Heart,” overlooks the egalitarian aspect of James’s account.  
The union James describes in the Jack and Jill example is not confined to romantic love.  
James is more concerned with describing and championing a universal, agape-type of 
love rather than the romantic type which hardly needs promoting.  That is, James wants 
to promote the idea that every individual possesses a “magical importance” that is worthy 
of some degree of reverence and can only be discovered through a process of intense 
sympathetic or empathetic attention.   More than likely, James used romantic love as an 
example because it is the most common occasion for this kind of sustained attention and 
is an example his readers could readily relate to.   
                                                          
28 James, Talks to Teachers, 151. 
31 
 
criteria in Varieties.  According to James, there are at least four distinguishing marks of 
mystical experience: ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity.  I will briefly 
recapitulate what James means by these qualities, then I will return to the experiences in 
question and determine the extent to which they successfully meet or fail to meet the 
criteria. 
James claims that the first two qualities listed, ineffability and noetic quality, are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for classifying an experience as mystical.  He 
writes, “These two characters will entitle any state to be called mystical, in the sense in 
which I use the word.”29  By “ineffability,” James means that the experience “defies 
expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. . . . It follows 
from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or 
transferred to others.”30
                                                          
29 VRE, 302. 
  Thus, a mystical experience for James was not only a “you had 
to be there” type of experience, but, an even more particular “you had to be me” type  of 
experience.  To put it another way, if you weren’t the subject undergoing the mystical 
experience, then you can never adequately know what that experience was like.  The 
second distinguishing mark, “noetic quality,” refers to the fact that mystical experiences 
seem to be states of knowledge to those who have them.  James describes these 
experiences as, “. . . states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive 
intellect. . . They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all 
inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of 
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authority for after-time.”31
According to James, the other two qualities of mystical experience, transiency and 
passivity, are “usually found” but are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of 
mystical experience.
  All James is claiming here is that, despite their inherent 
opaqueness, mystical experiences, at minimum, seem like a direct intuition of some truth 
or knowledge to the person having the experience.  For James, then, a mystical 
experience is always felt to be a “teachable moment”--even though what is being taught 
isn’t entirely clear.   
32 That is, transiency and passivity are very common in mystical 
experiences but James does not view either as essential for mystical experience.  
Regarding “transiency,” James points out that mystical states usually do not last long:  
“Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit 
beyond which they fade into the light of common day.”33  As for “passivity,” James 
explains how it is common for someone in a mystic state to “feel as if his own will were 
in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior 
power.”34  He adds that even if one is able through voluntary behavior to induce a mystic 
state, once one is in such a state, one usually becomes passive.35
Now, with these four distinguishing marks of mystical experience in hand, let us 
return to the experiences from James’s life we were previously considering and determine 
to what extent they may be categorized as mystical.  In the case of Jack and Jill, does the 
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act of sympathetic or empathetic intuition that James describes meet both of the 
necessary criteria?  Let us first consider ineffability.  Is Jack’s experience of getting to 
know Jill and what-it-is-like to be Jill an ineffable experience?  If someone were to ask 
Jack what happened during his date with Jill that left him so smitten with her, would he 
be forced to respond, “I can’t really say,” and shrug his shoulders?  Or would Jack be 
more likely to begin describing Jill—that she grew up in Texas, she was raised by her 
grandparents, she speaks fluent Spanish, she has a great sense of humor, she loves 
cooking, she doesn’t like big cities, she knows a lot about sports, she’s learning to play 
the piano, etc., etc.?  I am not claiming that any one of these seemingly prosaic facts 
about Jill would, by themselves, begin to capture the uniqueness or “magical importance” 
of her, but I am suggesting that one can begin to enumerate the unique combination of 
qualities she possesses which directly speaks to the uniqueness of Jill’s self.  Consider, 
for the sake of comparison, how Walt Whitman attempts to communicate the uniqueness 
of New York in his poem “Mannahatta”:  
Numberless crowded streets, high growths of iron, slender, strong, light,          
           splendidly uprising toward clear skies,  
Tides swift and ample, well-loved by me, towards sundown,  
The flowing sea-currents, the little islands, larger adjoining islands, the    
     heights, the villas,  
The countless masts, the white shore-steamers, the lighters, the ferry-  
     boats, the black sea-steamers well-modelled,  
The down-town streets, the jobbers’ houses of business, the houses of  
      business of the ship-merchants and money brokers, the river-streets,  
Immigrants arriving, fifteen or twenty thousand in a week,  
The carts hauling goods, the manly race of drivers of horses, the brown- 
     faced sailors,  
The summer air, the bright sun shining, and the sailing clouds aloft,36
Of course, Whitman cannot completely capture the unique experience of New York in 
poetry; however, by highlighting some of the remarkable aspects of the city, one can 
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begin to get a feel for the city’s singularity.  The same can be done, I am suggesting, in 
the case of describing those with whom we have a personal or intimate relationship.  It 
would seem rather strange, after all, if we are supposed to discover the “magical 
importance” of other people, but have nothing substantial to say about them when asked 
why we hold them so dear.   Again, this is not to say that Jack’s description of his 
experience of Jill would be exhaustive of their encounter but I would argue that it is 
possible to give an adequate report of it, viz., I believe it is possible to adequately 
communicate what one finds special about someone.  Surely, there is no shortage of love 
letters or poetry that could attest to this.  If I am correct, this is all that is needed for the 
Jack and Jill example to run contrary to James’s ineffability condition.   
The objection I am dealing with here is the idea that maybe, at least in the case of 
romantic love, something indescribable is experienced that flies over and above all the 
usual facts of life--something indescribable which mysteriously marks out another person 
as “different,” or “special,” or as my “soul mate.”  Even if this were the case, in the Jack 
and Jill example James describes this union as something all of us should seek with each 
other.  Thus, to repeat, James does not appear to have romantic love exclusively in mind 
but, rather, something more generally applicable when he speaks of this sympathetic 
union.  James writes that “as a matter of fact, certain persons do exist with an enormous 
capacity for friendship and for taking delight in other people’s lives; and that such 
persons know more of truth than if their hearts were not so big.”37
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  Put in proper context, 
James’s description of Jack and Jill is meant to be a practical remedy to social, religious, 
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and political intolerance, human injustice, and cruelty--not a reporting of an elusive 
mystical experience.  James writes: 
Our inner secrets must remain for the most part impenetrable by others, 
for beings as essentially practical as we are necessarily short of sight.  But, 
if we cannot gain much positive insight into one another, cannot we at 
least use our sense of our blindness to make us more cautious in going 
over the dark places?  Cannot we escape some of those hideous ancestral 
intolerances and cruelties, and positive reversals of the truth?38
 
 
Accordingly, the point of the Jack & Jill example was meant to encourage sensitivity to 
the inner life of others, not to seek a mystical union with them.  In sum, ineffability 
doesn’t seem to belong to the Jack and Jill experience and thus would disqualify it as a 
mystical experience.   
Even if the ineffability condition did not disqualify the Jack and Jill experience, 
the noetic quality requirement surely would.  To be brief, although we do gain knowledge 
in a Jack-and-Jill type of experience, nowhere in the description does James refer to 
either person becoming aware of some inarticulate revelation or truth unavailable in 
normal states of consciousness.  Through his effortful attention Jack deepens his 
knowledge of Jill and begins to understand what-it-is-like to be Jill, but he is not in an 
unspeakable confrontation with some completely mysterious reality (like perhaps we are 
with our pets).  If this were not the case, i.e., if we are being encouraged to make 
judgments about others on the basis of some esoteric and inarticulable intuition, it seems 
to follow that we would also be permitted to devalue another person in the event we 
experience something like a “bad vibe.”  I don’t believe this is what James was 
suggesting or encouraging in his example.  Therefore, it seems safe to say that James had 
a Jack-and-Jill type of experience, probably many, but this type of experience, according 
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to his own criteria, fails to qualify as mystical and was likely never thought to be such by 
James himself. 
The next type of experience in line for evaluation is James’s experimentation with 
drugs and alcohol.  Gale, following James, considers the effects of drugs and alcohol as 
falling somewhere within the wide range of mystical experiences.39
The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to 
stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth 
by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour.  Sobriety 
diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and 
says yes.  It is in fact the greater exciter of the Yes function in man.  It 
brings its votary from the chill periphery of things to the radiant core.  It 
makes him for the moment one with truth.  Not through mere perversity do 
men run after it. . . . The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic 
consciousness, and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion 
of that larger whole.
  In a memorable 
passage James writes: 
40
Along with alcohol, James also attested to the effectiveness of nitrous oxide and ether for 
stimulating mystical consciousness.  Regarding nitrous oxide James proclaims:   
 
Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. . . . This truth 
fades out, however, or escapes, at the moment of coming to; and if any 
words remain over in which it seemed to clothe itself, they prove to be the 
veriest nonsense.  Nevertheless, the sense of a profound meaning having 
been there persists; and I know more than one person who is persuaded 
that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical 
revelation.41
If we are to believe James’s description, the use of certain drugs and alcohol induce 
altered states of consciousness that apparently meet James’s necessary criteria for a 
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mystical experience.  These experiences are unable to be adequately expressed through 
language which counts them as ineffable.  Additionally, “truth seems revealed” during 
some of these experiences only to “fade out” when one becomes sober (which also speaks 
to their transiency).  Thus, insofar as the experienced effects of drugs and alcohol 
involved these specific mystical qualities, James had a genuine mystical experience.   
But the notion that getting drunk or high counts as a mystical experience seems to 
us somewhat absurd.  Today, if one were to seriously inquire into the reality of mystical 
experiences, I assume they would be highly skeptical of the accounts given by people 
who were under the influence of mind-altering drugs.  With the benefit of modern 
science, we now know more about the influence of particular drugs on the brain and how 
our perception of reality can be artificially distorted by physically interfering with normal 
brain functioning.  Thus, if one is looking for reliable accounts of mystical experience, 
one would prefer those accounts which took place during normal brain functioning--
which drug use tends to impede.   The very notion of being “under the influence” or 
“intoxicated” suggests that one’s experiences are being manipulated by the physical 
effects of the drug as opposed to naturally occurring mystical experiences, assuming they 
exist.  Of course, the precise way in which drugs distort consciousness will depend upon 
one’s theory of mind/body interaction.  Still, assuming that human consciousness requires 
normal brain functioning to most reliably experience the world and that drugs such as 
nitrous oxide interfere with normal functioning, then consciousness will be unreliable as 
it will be prone to error.  Thus, I believe James was simply but understandably naïve, 
given the science of his day, in his overestimation of the potential benefits of drug use, 
38 
 
particularly their ability to supply us with an unhampered, more objective view of reality 
through mystical experiences.   
For the sake of argument, even if one were to grant that drug and alcohol use 
produced genuine mystical experiences, this was not a theme in James’s life, i.e., James 
did not have a habit of using drugs or alcohol in order to have mystical experiences and 
so it would still be erroneous to call him a mystic on this basis.  In fact, James was fully 
aware of the deleterious effects of alcoholism as his youngest brother, Robertson “Bob” 
James, struggled with the disease.  Moreover, in 1895 James gave a lecture to the 
Harvard Total Abstinence League on the effects of alcohol.  In his notes James writes: 
To work on alcohol is a most treacherous business, even where it does 
stimulate, if it does. . . . In most cases it merely masks the fatigue and 
makes the work worse. The best way to wean people from intemperance is 
to fill them with a love of temperance for its own sake. . . . The whole bill 
against alcohol is its treachery. Its happiness is an illusion and seven other 
devils return—So far as it has an appreciable effect. . . . In other words 
replace the drink idol & ideal by another ideal. What is the other ideal?  It 
is the ideal of having a constitution in perfect health that is as elastic as 
cork and never creaks or runs rusty or finds any situation that it can't meet 
by its own buoyancy.42
 
 
Additionally, if James were an advocate of drinking, it would have been tremendously 
ironic, since Bill Wilson, the founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, would later credit 
James’s account of conversion experiences in Varieties for the success of his program.  
But James was no such advocate. 
Unlike the Jack and Jill experience and the drug-induced hallucinations, I believe 
James’s description of his night spent in the Adirondack Mountains in 1898 indicates a 
genuine mystical experience.  In a letter to his wife, James wrote:  
I spent a good deal of it in the woods, where the streaming moonlight lit 
up things in a magical checkered play, and it seemed as if the Gods of all 
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the nature-mythologies were holding an indescribable meeting in my 
breast with the moral Gods of the inner life. . . . The intense significance 
of some sort, of the whole scene, if one could only tell the significance; 
the intense inhuman remoteness of its inner life, and yet the intense appeal 
of it; its everlasting freshness and its immemorial antiquity and decay; its 
utter Americanism, and every sort of patriotic suggestiveness, and you, 
and my relation to you part and parcel of it all, and beaten up with it, so 
that memory and sensation all whirled inexplicably together. . . . In point 
of fact, I can’t find a single word for all that significance, and don’t know 
what it was significant of, so there it remains, a mere boulder of 
impression.43
All the marks of a mystical experience are present.  That James is unable to adequately 
describe his experience speaks to its ineffability.  The undeniable appeal and significance 
he felt indicates a noetic quality.  And the transience of this episode and its ineluctable 
grasp over him rounds out the final two conditions of mystical experience.  As with 
mystical experiences, there isn’t much else that can be said.  To fully comprehend what 
happened we had to be there, we had to be in James’s place, but we weren’t.   
 
The final experience to be considered is an episode in which James had a series of 
three interconnecting dreams that he could not identify as his.  The experience he 
describes as “the most intensely peculiar experience of my whole life” is recounted in the 
1910 article “A Suggestion About Mysticism.”44
The distressing confusion of mind in this experience was the exact 
opposite of mystical illumination, and equally unmystical was the 
definiteness of what was perceived.  But the exaltation of the sense of 
relation was mystical (the perplexity all revolved about the fact that the 
three dreams both did and did not belong in the most intimate way 
  Despite Gale’s suggestion that this was 
yet another mystical experience James had, James largely dismisses the idea: 
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together); and the sense that reality was being uncovered was mystical in 
the highest degree. To this day I feel that those extra dreams were dreamed 
in reality, but when, where, and by whom, I cannot guess.45
As James describes it, the experience was not ineffable due to its definiteness and neither 
did it possess a noetic quality due its propensity to confuse rather than illuminate.  
Therefore, it was some state of abnormal consciousness but not a mystical experience in 
any traditional sense.  James’s worry that his consciousness was being intruded by 
another personality or consciousness connects it with what James considered other non-
mystical phenomena such as prophetic speech, automatic writing, and mediumistic 
trances.  The difference, according to James, is that, “Mystical states, strictly so-called, 
are never merely interruptive. . . . Some memory of their content always remains, and a 
profound sense of their importance.  They modify the inner life of the subject between the 
times of their recurrence.”
 
46
We have now canvassed those experiences in James’s life that seemed best fit to 
qualify as mystical.  It was Gale’s assertion that all of these experiences were in fact 
mystical and supported his claim that James had a mystical self.   However, by applying 
James’s basic criteria for mystical experience we have found that, pace Gale, only one of 
these experiences comfortably meets the necessary requirements.  Clearly, this is not 
sufficient to warrant the claim that James was a mystic or had a mystical self.   Even a 
generous interpretation of these experiences would have to admit that mystical 
experiences in James’s life were few and far between, with the only notable ones coming 
 James’s experience of the three dreams was primarily 
interruptive, not possessing the sense of importance for the subject that is the usual 
upshot of genuine mystical experiences. 
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later in life--hardly enough to form a consistent pattern that would indicate a persisting 
mystical self throughout James’s career.  Thus, it appears that James is not simply 
dissembling when he writes in Varieties that “my own constitution shuts me out from 
their [mystical experiences] enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at 
second hand.”  Consequently, I think Ralph Barton Perry, James’s pupil and 
incomparable biographer, is correct in his final assessment of James’s mysticism: 
It is true that he refused to credit himself with the mystical experience, or 
at most admitted that he had a “mystical germ.”  But in view of all the 
evidence it seems more correct to say that he did in fact have experiences 
of the type called mystical; adding that these experiences were infrequent, 
lacked the character of overwhelming authority with which they are 
commonly invested, and played only a minor role in his philosophy as a 
whole.47
Despite James’s interest in mysticism, his “mystical germ,” and even some mystical 
experiences scattered throughout his life, taken together they still do not give one the 
evidence needed, as Gale claims, to describe James as having a mystical self. 
 
For reasons given throughout this chapter, I don’t believe James had a mystical 
self and therefore he was not divided in the way Gale describes.  What remains to be 
explored and evaluated is James’s apparently conflicting positions regarding the nature of 
the self and reality which encourage extreme interpretations of the sort Gale offers.   
Nevertheless, he was at least convinced enough to encourage others to believe in life after 
death and, at the end of his life, James braced himself for its eventuality--making a pact 
with his friend James Hyslop that whoever died first would attempt to communicate with 
the other.  In the next chapter, we will see how this possibility arises out James’s personal 
life and finds its initial grounding through his interest in psychical research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Death in the Life of James 
William James was not a mystic.  However, his eventual view of the self provided 
a conceptual framework that could account for genuine mystical experiences.  Although 
James never arrived at a systematic or settled theory of the self, he was careful not to 
unnecessarily or prematurely restrict the self to the familiar experiences of ordinary, 
waking consciousness.  James believed that mystical experiences, like other “exceptional 
mental states,” were capable of illuminating hidden aspects of reality, namely, a 
transcendent “mother-sea” of consciousness with which we commune.1
Richard Gale describes James’s philosophy as “deeply rooted in the blues,” a 
“soulful expression of someone who has ‘paid his dues’” and has “been through it all.”
  Such an idea 
suggested to James the possibility of personal immortality, which, as I will argue 
throughout the following chapters, significantly shaped his views of the self.  Although 
some of James’s ideas may seem fanciful, this way of thinking about the self was not the 
result of a mind given to idle speculation or an overindulgent imagination; rather, James 
approached the subject of the self armed with stubborn data yielded from his 
psychological and psychical research.  In this chapter I will address James’s interest in 
psychic phenomena, considering what personally led James to such research, and how it 
affected his attitude towards death.  Once it is understood how pervasive and personal the 
prospect of death was in James’s mind, we shall be in a better position to see how it 
influenced his philosophy.  For James, philosophy was, after all, intensely personal. 
2
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Gale sees James’s philosophy as a way to “keep him sane and non-suicidal” in the short-
term and as a means to achieving physical and spiritual health in the long-term.3  Gale’s 
dramatic characterization of James is fitting given the dramatic nature of the man.  James 
biographer Robert D. Richardson quotes John Jay Chapman, an acquaintance of James, 
as saying:  “There was, in spite of his playfulness, a deep sadness about James.  You felt 
that he had just stepped out of this sadness in order to meet you and was to go back into it 
the moment you left him.”4  Ralph Barton Perry echoes this sentiment, devoting an entire 
chapter to James’s “morbid traits.”  According to Perry, these traits included tendencies 
to hypochondria and hallucinatory experience and abnormally frequent and intense 
oscillations of mood, among other things.5
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life.  I finished the first part of 
Renouvier’s second Essais and see no reason why his definition of free 
will—“the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have 
other thoughts”—need be the definition of an illusion.  At any rate, I will 
assume for the present—until next year—that it is no illusion.  My first act 
of free will shall be to believe in free will.  For the remainder of the year, I 
will abstain from the mere speculation and contemplative Grüblei [A 
brooding over-intellectualization or grubbing over subtleties] in which my 
nature takes most delight, and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral 
freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by acting. . . .  
Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act 
originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external 
world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put 
  The most famous aspect of James’s “morbid 
personality” was his crisis in April 1870 during which he read the French philosopher 
Renouvier’s essay on free-will.  In a diary entry dated April 30, 1870, James describes 
what would be a fundamental turning point in his life: 
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my daring into.  Now I will go a step further with my will, not only act 
with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative 
power.  My belief to be sure can’t be optimistic, but I will posit it, life (the 
real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world.  
Life shall [be built in] doing and creating and suffering.6
Perry diagnoses James’s spiritual crisis as “the ebbing of the will to live, for lack of a 
philosophy to live by—a paralysis of action occasioned by a sense of moral impotence.”
 
7  
For James, “moralism,” the moral life, required one to believe that evil can be overcome 
or, if not overcome, one at least can bravely confront and protest against evil, refusing to 
be subdued by it.  James describes this as having the “vigor of will enough to look the 
universal death in the face without blinking.”8
Although James never asserted, as Albert Camus would, that suicide is the 
only important philosophical issue, he understood from personal 
experience that suicidal fantasies bring forth questions about the meaning 
of life.  Such questions fuel the search for a philosophy of life, and in that 
context the question arises whether we are justified in incorporating 
optimism into a factual description of the universe. 
  Thus, in either case what is required to 
meaningfully deal with evil and preserve the “moral business” is for one to have a free 
will—either to overcome evil or to bravely confront it.  Myers observes: 
James’s reading of Renouvier would have life-long consequences.  James 
dedicated his last book, Some Problems of Philosophy, to Renouvier.  In this work James 
attributes his belief in the superiority of pluralism to his reading of Renouvier in the early 
1870’s.  Pluralism, as James describes it in the chapter “The One and the Many” (which 
first appeared in 1907 as lecture four of Pragmatism), is the view of empiricism which 
claims reality exists distributively insofar as it consists of disconnected parts which 
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collectively constitute the whole.9  The alternative to pluralism is monism. Monism, says 
James, is the view of rationalism which claims “that the whole is fundamental, that the 
parts derive from it and all belong with one another, that the separations we uncritically 
accept are illusory, and that the entire universe, instead of being a sum, is the only 
genuine unit in existence. . . .”10  “Pluralism stands for the distributive, monism for the 
collective form of being,” and represents, in James’s view, “the most pregnant of all the 
dilemmas of philosophy.”11  One of the reasons James remained a pluralist throughout his 
life was because it avoided the problem of evil in a way monism could not.  Monism, as it 
was typically espoused, assumes that the whole or “Absolute” is perfect, which raises the 
obvious question of imperfection, i.e., evil.  James asks, “Why all the inferior finite 
editions of the Absolute?”12  The notion of a universe perfect on the whole, but 
seemingly imperfect in detail, is extremely difficult to reconcile.  On the other hand, in 
the case of pluralism, “evil presents only a practical problem on how to get rid of it.”13  In 
other words, if the Absolute is everything, it must be responsible for evil, but if the 
universe is pluralistic, evil may be construed as a contingent, non-essential outlier that 
can potentially be subdued or eliminated.  Moreover, a monistic universe, according to 
James, is fatalistic in that it doesn’t allow for genuinely novel possibilities.14
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will or novelty.  Thus, for James, the issue of free will and the problem of evil were 
inextricably bound up with the larger dilemma between pluralism and monism--the views 
of empiricism and rationalism, respectively.  In much the same way as James’s desire for 
a moral universe committed him to pluralism, I am suggesting James’s desire for 
immortality would continue to shape his conception of the self.  In any case, as we go 
along we will see more fully how James’s commitment to pluralism is continually borne 
out in his philosophy. 
Returning to the issue of James’s early personal struggles, the resolve to adopt 
Renouvier’s philosophical position and begin asserting his will according to the belief 
that it is free, gave James a temporary reprieve, but was not an immediate cure-all.  James 
continued to struggle throughout the early 1870’s, chronically wrestling with his moods 
and worries about where his life was heading.  It was not until James began teaching at 
Harvard in 1872 that his moods and ambitions became more aligned, resulting in a 
steadier trajectory of recovery.  Recounting this time in James’s life, his son Henry III 
wrote: “After some years Father himself felt and knew he was a man renewed.  He had 
sloughed off the morbid personality of the latter sixties and early seventies.”15
As was stated above, the crisis of 1870 arose partly because of James’s dread of 
insurmountable evil in the world.  This concern became especially compelling to James 
due to two major events that led up to the crisis.  The first event James reported in The 
  The 
consistency and dependability of his teaching career and his marriage to Alice Gibbens in 
1878 surely evened out some of James’s rougher emotional terrain—or at least kept him 
safely away from the precipice.   
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Varieties of Religious Experience and falsely attributes it to an anonymous French 
correspondent.  This important passage must be quoted at some length: 
Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of 
spirit about my prospects, I went one evening into a dressing-room in the 
twilight, to procure some article that was there; when suddenly there fell 
upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, a 
horrible fear of my own existence.  Simultaneously there arose in my mind 
the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-
haired youth with greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on 
one of the benches, or rather shelves, against the wall, with his knees 
drawn up against his chin, and the coarse gray undershirt, which was his 
only garment, drawn over them, inclosing his entire figure.  He sat there 
like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving 
nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human.  This image 
and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other.  That 
shape am I, I felt, potentially.  Nothing that I possess can defend me 
against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him.  
There was such horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto 
solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of 
quivering fear.  After this the universe was changed for me altogether.  I 
awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my 
stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew 
before, and that I have never felt since.  It was like a revelation; and 
although the immediate feelings passed away, the experience has made me 
sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others ever since.  It gradually 
faded, but for months I was unable to go out into the dark alone. 
In general I dreaded to be left alone.  I remember wondering how other 
people could live, how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of that pit 
of insecurity beneath the surface of life.  My mother in particular, a very 
cheerful person, seemed to me a perfect paradox in her unconsciousness of 
danger, which you may well believe I was very careful not to disturb by 
revelations of my own state of mind.  I have always thought that this 
experience of melancholia of mine had a religious bearing. . . .  I mean 
that the fear was so invasive and powerful that, if I had not clung to 
scripture-texts like The eternal God is my refuge, etc., Come unto me all 
ye that labor and are heavy-laden, etc., I am the Resurrection and the Life, 
etc., I think I should have grown really insane.16
                                                          
16 VRE, 135. 
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As James biographer Linda Simon points out, the epileptic patient could not be cured by 
strengthening his will—he was at the mercy of his own biology, i.e., at the mercy of 
nature.17
In the previous year, 1869, James had earned his medical degree from the Harvard 
Medical School.  It was a culmination of eight years of schooling at Harvard, including 
three years spent at the Lawrence Scientific School and fifteen months spent on an 
expedition to the Amazon with the famous naturalist Louis Agassiz.  James was steeped 
in the science of his day and the science of the day was a mechanistic materialism aptly 
described by Jacques Barzun as “the great push-pull system of the physical universe by 
which every event was deemed to be completely determined in an endless chain of 
previous events, with ‘not a wiggle of our will’ taking part.’”
  This is what so shook James to the core of his being, “That shape am I, I felt, 
potentially.”  That James was also experiencing excruciating back pain at the time might 
have also contributed to his increasing feeling of vulnerability.  Up to this point in his 
life, James idealized the heroic attitude of Stoicism—an ideal that now seemed flimsy as 
James was bending under the weight of an imagined fate.   
18
                                                          
17 Linda Simon, Genuine Reality: A Life of William James (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), 125. 
  Thus, if science was 
correct and determinism was true, the epileptic youth was simply a frighteningly dreadful 
and inevitable product of an uncaring universe.  James understood and felt the 
powerlessness and impotency that this “scientific” view of the world implied for him and 
others.  What took place in the asylum seemed to have brought into sharp focus for James 
the issue of evil and whether, given the truth of determinism, the moral life has any 
legitimacy.  James understood the stakes and he made his choice known in that April 30th 
 
18 Jacques Barzun, A Stroll with William James (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 16. 
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diary entry.  He believed that to live meaningfully meant having to deny determinism and 
place his bet on the reality of free-will.  If anything was to be done about evil, James 
thought, it required freedom to do so.  Concerning James’s completion of his M.D. 
degree, Richardson calls attention to a letter James wrote to Henry Bowditch in which 
James describes the accomplishment as “one epoch of my life closed.”19
The vision of the epileptic youth played a major role in cultivating the morbid 
feelings which spun James into his crisis but there was another major event that is less 
well-known though it was probably more responsible for James’s morbid mindset that 
Spring.  On March 8th, 1870 James’s cousin Minnie Temple died.  The following day 
James drew in his diary a tombstone marked with a cross, the initials “M.T.”, and the date 
of her death.  James’s relationship with Minnie, like every aspect of his life, was 
extremely complicated.  Richardson describes their relationship as something more than 
love and something less than love.
  Richardson 
claims that James saw the degree not so much as a beginning but as the end of 
something—and as the crisis of 1870 suggests, it surely was. 
20
                                                          
19 Richardson, op. cit., 103. 
  Both Richardson and Simon portray James as 
deeply in love with Minnie although a typical romance was out of the question since 
James firmly opposed first-cousin marriages, not to mention that Minnie was very ill and 
suffering from tuberculosis during the time their friendship blossomed.  If this wasn’t 
enough to prevent the two from a romantic relationship, James’s habitual self-doubting 
and self-loathing provided him with an ample amount of reluctance and hesitation when 
 
20 Ibid., 109. 
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it came to dating.  Rumor and innuendo aside, Minnie’s death devastated James.  Simon 
goes so far as to say “Minnie would haunt James forever.”21
In what still remains of their correspondence, James and Minnie shared a common 
inability for traditional religious belief as well as an affinity for Stoicism.  When it came 
to Stoicism, both were evidently aware of the somber outlook it can occasion.  In a letter 
James kept tucked behind a picture of Minnie for his entire life, Minnie writes: 
 
The more I live the more I feel that there must be some comfort 
somewhere for the mass of people, suffering and sad, outside of that which 
Stoicism gives—a thousand times when I see a poor person in trouble, it 
almost breaks my heart that I can’t say something to comfort them.  It is 
on the tip of my tongue to say it and I can’t—for I have always felt myself 
the unutterable sadness and mystery that envelop us all—I shall take some 
of your Chloral tonight, if I don’t sleep—Don’t let my letter of yesterday 
make you feel that we are not very near to each other—friends at heart.  
Altho’ practically being much with you or even writing to you would not 
be good for me—too much strain on one key will make it snap—and there 
is an attitude of mind, (not a strength of Intellect by any means) in which 
we are much alike.  Goodbye.22
The comfort “outside of that which Stoicism gives” is the comfort James sought after 
Minnie’s death and after the terror he felt in the face of the epileptic youth.  Ralph Barton 
Perry remarks that, in his youth, James was especially interested in the writings of 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius and preached the “gospel of Stoicism.”
 
23  As Richardson 
reveals, as early as 1863 James was reading and taking notes on Epictetus’s 
Encheiridion.24
                                                          
21 Simon, op. cit., 118. 
 Though obviously enthusiastic about Stoicism early in his life, after 
 
22 Correspondence, 4:401. 
 
23 Perry, op. cit., 2:353. 
 
24 Richardson, op. cit., 53. 
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Minnie’s death James’s enthusiasm would not last long.  In a confession written in 1876, 
James begins to express his dissatisfaction: 
The hardness of my Stoicism oppresses me sometimes.  My attitude 
towards religion is one of deference rather than adoption.  I see its place; I 
feel that there are times when everything else was to fail and that, or 
nothing, remain; and yet I behave as if I must leave it untouched until such 
times come, and I am drawn to it by sheer stress of weather.  I am sure I 
am partly right, and that religion is not an every day comfort and 
convenience.  And yet I know I am partly wrong.25
The inner conflict between religion and the Stoicism James vaguely alludes to here 
eventually becomes more clarified in his mind.  In The Principles of Psychology, within a 
broader discussion about the selective nature of the Self, James quotes Epictetus:   
 
I must die; well, but must I die groaning too? . . . I will speak what appears 
to be right, and if the despot says, 'Then I will put you to death,' I will 
reply, 'When did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your 
part, and I mine: it is yours to kill and mine to die intrepid; yours to 
banish, mine to depart untroubled.' . . .26
Commenting on this passage, James remarks that Stoic renunciation, “though efficacious 
and heroic enough in its place and time, is . . . only possible as an habitual mood of the 
soul to narrow and unsympathetic characters.”
 
27  James explains that it relies on 
“protecting the Self by exclusion and denial” and has the tendency to cause one to treat 
others who are not under one’s control with “chill negation, if not with positive hate.”28
                                                          
25 Perry, 2:353. 
    
Being a sympathetic person, James states that he prefers “the entirely opposite way of 
expansion and inclusion” which affirms and embraces positive goods regardless of the 
 
26 Principles, 1:297. 
 
27 Ibid., 1:298. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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beneficiary.  The magnanimity of such persons, says James, “is often touching indeed.”29  
James repeats this preference for a “mood of welcome” ten years later in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience.  In Lecture II, “Circumscription of the Topic,” James contrasts the 
“drab discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity” with the “passionate happiness of 
Christian saints.”30
If we compare stoic with Christian ejaculation we see much more than a 
difference of doctrine; rather it is a difference of emotional mood that 
parts them.  When Marcus Aurelius reflects on the eternal reason that has 
ordered things, there is a frosty chill about his words which you rarely find 
in a Jewish, and never in a Christian piece of religious writing.  The 
universe is ‘accepted’ by all these writers; but how devoid of passion or 
exultation the spirit of the Roman Emperor is!
 
31
Accordingly, James observes that the anima mundi of the Stoic elicits respect and 
submission, while the “Christian God is there to be loved; and the difference of emotional 
atmosphere is like that between an arctic climate and the tropics. . . .”
 
32   The practical 
effect of these differing postures is the difference between “passivity and activity” and 
“the defensive and the aggressive mood.”  That is to say, the Stoic’s acquiescence and 
“disposal of his own personal destiny” tends to stifle creative and active impulses while 
the Christian God, thought to love and redeem His believers, inspires religious and moral 
striving.  According to Perry, Stoicism could not satisfy James’s deeply felt “longing for 
safety and security,”33
                                                          
29 Principles, 1:298. 
  In sum, Perry remarks, although he “was touched and stirred by 
 
30 VRE, 41. 
 
31 Ibid., 42. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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the uncomplaining fortitude of others” throughout his life, Stoicism became “the least 
characteristic part” of James’s gospel.34
For James, the comfort of religion would never arrive completely and any relief 
was to be hard-earned.  The search process began in earnest with Renouvier, with James 
reasserting himself as a free moral agent--a view of human consciousness that opened up 
previously obstructed possibilities for the human mind.  A mind irreducible to the brute 
forces and laws of nature became infinitely more interesting to James than the mind of 
the scientific community, the mind of mechanistic materialism.  Thus, his dissatisfaction 
with science’s reductionistic account of the mind which denies free-will combined with 
his desire for human redemption takes hold of James after his crisis.  These concerns set 
up a number of issues regarding the nature of reality and the Self which James would 
grapple with for the remaining four decades of his life. 
 
By 1880, James’s life, though never trouble-free, was more settled than at any 
previous time.  That year he was appointed assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard 
after eight years of teaching anatomy, physiology, and physiological psychology.  Two 
years earlier, in 1878, James signed a contract for a book on psychology (what would be 
published as The Principles of Psychology some twelve years later), married Alice 
Gibbens, and, in 1879, had their first child, Henry III.  Although his family life and career 
were largely in good order, unfortunately James suffered the loss of his mother, Alice, in 
January of 1882, followed by the loss of his father in December of the same year, and the 
death of his brother, Wilky, the following year.  Thus, in the span of two years, James 
lost three family members.   
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When his father passed away, James was in London and it was during this time 
that he met Edmund Gurney who had recently founded the British Society for Psychical 
Research with fellow Englishmen Frederic W.H. Myers and the philosopher Henry 
Sidgwick. Gurney and James struck up an immediate friendship and James was easily 
recruited into taking up the Society’s cause of applying modern scientific methods to 
psychic phenomena such as mediums, thought transference, extrasensory perception, and 
even ghost sightings.  This was the beginning of James’s direct involvement with 
psychical research--an involvement that would continue for the remaining twenty-eight 
years of his life.  James and his fellow researchers hoped that psychical investigations, 
though disreputable in the scientific community, would eventually provide novel insight 
into the human mind as well as the order of nature.  By October of 1884 James was 
already working to set up a formal organization of psychical researchers in America and 
on December 18, 1884 the American Society for Psychical Research held its first 
meeting.   
James was insistent that the founding members of the American Society for 
Psychical Research were trained researchers who operated with purely scientific 
methods.35
                                                          
35 Blum, op. cit., 86. 
  For James, the problems with science did not lie in its methods, but in the 
prejudices of scientists who have ruled out the reality of certain phenomena beforehand.  
While James and his colleagues rejected a scientific bias against “spiritualism,” they 
equally rejected the sentimental bias of those who uncritically accepted the phenomenon 
after being “emotionally touched at hearing the names of their loved ones given, and 
 
55 
 
consoled by assurances that they are ‘happy.’”36  James’s circle of psychical researchers 
was fully cognizant of the human-all-too-human temptation to revel in this kind of 
sentimentalism and they self-consciously guarded against it.  They were equally aware of 
the ubiquity of fraud “throughout the range of physical phenomena of spiritism” and 
“false pretense, prevarication and fishing for clues . . . in the mental manifestations of 
mediums.”37  In fact, as a matter of policy, the British Society for Psychical Research 
dismissed as fraudulent mediums who were caught cheating at any time.  James thought 
the “once a cheat, always a cheat” policy was tactically wise, though he acknowledged 
that “as a test of truth I believe it to be almost irrelevant.”38
So, after more than a quarter-century of psychic research what did James 
conclude about the reality of psychic phenomena?  In Confidences of a “Psychical 
Researcher,” written in 1909, James admits: 
  James recognized that 
particular incidents of human deception were insufficient to disprove a larger truth, i.e., 
the reality of psychic phenomena.    
. . . I am theoretically no ‘further’ along than I was at the beginning; and I 
confess that at times I have been tempted to believe that the creator has 
eternally intended this department of nature to remain baffling, to prompt 
our curiosities and hopes and suspicions all in equal measure, so that 
although ghosts, and clairvoyances, and raps and messages from spirits, 
are always seeming to exist and can never be fully explained away, they 
also can never be susceptible of full corroboration.39
                                                          
36 Essays in Psychical Research, 365-66. 
 
 
37 Ibid., 365. 
 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Ibid., 362. 
 
56 
 
James acknowledged that the results of the research were not definitive enough to satisfy 
“your genuinely scientific inquirer.”40  However, that there are “real natural types of 
phenomena ignored by orthodox science,” says James, “I am not baffled at all, I am fully 
convinced of.”41  Among the phenomena ignored by orthodox science, claims James, is 
“the presence, in midst of all the humbug, of really supernormal knowledge.”42
By this I mean knowledge that cannot be traced to the ordinary sources of 
information—the senses namely—of the automatist.  In really strong 
mediums this knowledge seems abundant, though it is usually spotty, 
capricious and unconnected.  Really strong mediums are rarities; but when 
one starts with them and works downwards into less brilliant regions of 
the automatic life, one tends to interpret many slight but odd coincidences 
with truth, as possibly rudimentary forms of this kind of knowledge.
  James 
elaborates: 
43
One of these rare mediums James had in mind, possibly the only one, was Boston 
resident Leonora Piper.  In his 1896 address to both the American and British Society for 
Psychical Research, regarding Mrs. Piper’s authenticity, James stated his position 
unequivocally: 
 
If you will let me use the language of the professional logic-shop, a 
universal proposition can be made untrue by a particular instance.  If you 
wish to upset the law that all crows are black, you mustn’t seek to show 
that no crows are; it is enough that you prove one single crow to be white.  
My own white-crow is Mrs. Piper.  In the trances of this medium, I cannot 
resist the conviction that knowledge appears which she has never gained 
by the ordinary waking use of her eyes and ears and wits.  What the source 
of this knowledge may be I know not, and have not the glimmer of an 
explanatory suggestion to make; but from admitting the fact of such 
knowledge I can see no escape.  So when I turn to the rest of our evidence, 
ghosts and all, I cannot carry with me the irreversibly negative bias of the 
                                                          
40 Essays in Psychical Research, 362. 
 
41 Ibid., 371. 
 
42 Ibid., 372. 
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rigorously scientific mind, with its presumption as to what the true order 
of nature ought to be.44
James’s sittings with Mrs. Piper first began around September of 1885, thirteen years 
prior to this address, three years after his initial meeting with Edmund Gurney.  That 
June, James was busily attending séances and reporting on mediums. On July 9th, James’s 
third son, Herman, died from pneumonia at only eighteen months of age.  Though James 
deeply grieved the sudden loss of his child, he evidently did not seek out mediums for 
supernatural comforts.
 
45  It was only a few months later that word came to James from 
his wife, Alice, who had been hearing remarkable accounts from her sisters and mother 
about a local medium, that James learned about Mrs. Piper.  James was naturally 
intrigued and set up an anonymous sitting for him and his wife.  The sitting would take 
place at the twenty-six year old medium’s home where she lived with her husband and 
year-old daughter.  As James instructed his wife to do, the pair passively listened as she 
went into a trance and began to make out different names of Alice’s family members.  
Eventually Mrs. Piper made out a name that sounded like “Herrin,” which the Jameses 
took to be the name of their recently lost son.  James was naturally skeptical.  It was only 
after several further sittings that winter and a deepened personal acquaintance with her 
that James became convinced of her unorthodox abilities.46
James wasn’t the only believer in his circle.  Mrs. Piper was also supported by 
Frederic Myers and Sir Oliver Lodge who brought her to England on multiple occasions 
in order to be studied under the supervision of the Society.  Along with James, one of 
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Mrs. Piper’s staunchest supporters in America was James Hervey Hyslop, professor of 
logic and ethics at Columbia University.  There was also the British researcher Richard 
Hodgson, who served as secretary of the American Society for Psychical Research, and 
would become a close friend of James.  Nonetheless, I think it is a fair to ask whether 
James should be commended for his open-mindedness in his dealings with Mrs. Piper, or 
whether his involvement was evidence of an embarrassing gullibility and naiveté.   
In his trenchant essay, “How Mrs. Piper Bamboozled William James,” Martin 
Gardner argues the latter, scolding James for being too easily deceived by the wily 
Boston medium.47  According to Gardner, there are a variety of ordinary means by which 
Mrs. Piper could have obtained the information that was used in sittings to convince 
James and others of her supernatural abilities. One of the most obvious techniques she 
used was what James referred to as “fishing” or what is known as “cold reading.”  Cold 
reading, as Gardner describes it, works by making vague statements that “would be 
followed by more precise information based on how the sitters reacted.”48  Gardner 
suggests that Mrs. Piper would make suggestions and then carefully observe the physical 
reactions of the sitters--both by watching through half-closed eyelids and habitually 
holding the sitters hand, feeling for responses.49
                                                          
47 Martin Gardner, “How Mrs. Piper Bamboozled William James,” in Are Universes Thicker than 
Blackberries? (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 252-262. 
  Thus, by reading the body language of 
her clients, Mrs. Piper could tell when one of her suggestions struck a nerve, so to speak, 
which would clue her in as to which direction to take the discussion.  As indicated above, 
James was aware of this tactic, calling it a “vague groping, characteristic also of control-
 
48 Ibid., 255. 
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cunning.”50  Yet, says Gardner, James “argued foolishly,” stubbornly convinced “that 
there must be something to it.”51  As evidence of this “foolishness,” Gardner refers us to 
what he calls “the most stupid remark in all of James’s writings.”52
When a man’s pursuit gradually makes his face shine and grow handsome, 
you may be sure it is a worthy one.  Both Hodgson and Myers kept 
growing ever handsomer and stronger-looking.
  In “The Confidences 
of a ‘Psychical Researcher,’" James writes: 
53
Gardner’s characterization of this passage is unfortunate for a couple of reasons.  First, 
James’s was offering a defense of and paean to his deceased friends in response to the 
allegation that involvement with psychic phenomena “reduces us to a sort of jelly, 
disintegrates the critical faculties, liquefies the character.”
 
54
Such personal examples will convert no one, and of course they ought not 
to. Nor do I seek at all in this article to convert anyone to my belief that 
psychical research is an important branch of science. To do that, I should 
have to quote evidence. . . . 
  James, in his 
characteristically affectionate manner, takes the opportunity to defend his collaborators 
who could no longer speak for themselves.  Second, and more relevant to Gardner’s 
concerns, immediately following the above passage, James writes: 
55
Clearly, pace Gardner, James was not attempting to justify psychic research on the basis 
of whether one grows “handsomer and stronger-looking.”  James realized that to 
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convince scientists it was necessary to use or appeal to their own standards of evidence.  
At any rate, in addition to Mrs. Piper’s technique of cold reading, Gardner claims that 
James failed to appreciate the “other tricks up her sleeves.”56
These other “tricks” actually turn out to be rather mundane.  For example, 
Gardner points out that Mrs. Piper could have acquired personal information about her 
sitters by visiting with their friends and relatives prior to their scheduled meeting.  Also, 
he says, she could have gathered information by listening in to conversations between her 
clients before or even during one of her séances.  Gardner suggests that the sitters, falsely 
assuming Mrs. Piper was in a deep trance, would drop their guard and converse more or 
less freely.
  
57  Moreover, obituaries, courthouse records, and reference books, Gardner 
writes, contain “biographical data that sitters often swear a medium could not possibly 
know.”58  Lastly, Gardner is quick to point out that Mrs. Piper could have received 
information by way of other acquaintances such as house servants, nurses, and other 
mediums in Boston who formed “a network of scoundrels who passed information freely 
back and forth.”59
  Regardless of whether you are sympathetic or unsympathetic with the reality of 
psychic phenomena, I think there is much to be said in response to Gardner on James’s 
behalf.  For instance, every one of the “tricks” which Gardner suggests Mrs. Piper used, 
James was consciously aware of.  In Ghost Hunters, Blum highlights the fact that in 1890 
a how-to manual and exposé of spiritualism was published by an anonymous author 
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calling himself “A. Medium.”60  In this book, Revelations of a Spirit Medium, the author 
painstakingly explains all the tricks of the fraudulent profession of spiritualism--including 
all of the methods Gardner accuses Mrs. Piper of using.  James and his colleagues, 
particularly Richard Hodgson, actively used this book as one of their references when 
trying to expose frauds.  One of the claims the author makes, for instance, is that the 
people who come into a séance believing that they know all of the tricks are the easiest to 
fool.  The reason for this, he says, is that in talking with a client a good medium realizes 
the kinds of things the client is looking to expose and is then able to thwart those 
expectations.61
While in her trance state, Hall and his assistant Amy Tanner would subject Mrs. 
Piper to various physical testing in order to determine if she was, indeed, unawake.  On 
one occasion, after determining that Mrs. Piper’s breathing and pulse had indeed dropped 
significantly, Hall and Tanner put into her mouth a spirit of camphor which they expected 
would startle her awake.  To their amazement, she didn’t respond at all until she later 
gradually awoke from the trance and complained that her mouth was numb.
  Maybe this explains why Mrs. Piper was, curiously, often willing to be a 
test subject by the Society and even outspoken critics such as psychologist Stanley Hall, 
president of Clark University.   
62
                                                          
60 Blum, op. cit., 175; A. Medium, Revelations of a Spirit Medium, ed. Harry Price and Eric J. 
Dingwall (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922). 
  Hall and 
Tanner would continue with these seemingly cruel testing procedures and Mrs. Piper 
would continue to suffer through them--and pass each one.  So, did Mrs. Piper simply 
outfox the “experts” through amazing acts of self-control?  Hall and Tanner didn’t 
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believe so; yet, rather than believing she had psychic powers, they concluded that Mrs. 
Piper had developed a number of secondary personalities.  Thus, they believed her 
condition was pathological, not paranormal.  Commenting on these events, Blum writes: 
“Leonora Piper was weary of being a mystery, most of all to herself.   She clung to the 
hope that this highly respected psychologist would be able to give her some answers.”63
 This is most clearly evident in James’s “Report on Mrs. Piper’s Hodgson Control” 
which he presented to the Society in 1909.  Shortly after Richard Hodgson’s death in 
1905, the discarnate Hodgson supposedly started communicating through Mrs. Piper 
during her trances.  James sat with and reported on Piper during this period until January 
1908.  Some of the information that was communicated by the Hodgson control seemed 
to be things only Hodgson would have known.  In order to rule out any “natural” 
explanation, James lists the possible ways in which Mrs. Piper could have successfully 
communicated this information: 
  
By all accounts, there was indeed something genuinely strange about Mrs. Piper that 
went beyond psychic parlor tricks.  Thus, if James was “bamboozled” it wasn’t because 
he didn’t know all of the “tricks,” but, rather, it was because he believed that it was 
highly improbable that any of these tricks could account for the phenomenon that was 
Mrs. Piper. 
(1) Lucky chance-hits. 
(2) Common gossip. 
(3) Indications unwarily furnished by the sitters. 
(4) Information received from R.H., during his lifetime, by the waking 
Mrs. P. and stored up, either supraliminally or subliminally, in her 
memory. 
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(5) Information received from the living R.H., or others, at sittings, and 
kept in Mrs. Piper’s trance-memory, but out of reach of her waking 
consciousness. 
(6) ‘Telepathy,’ i.e. the tapping of the sitter’s mind, or that of some distant 
living person, in an inexplicable way. 
(7) Access to some cosmic reservoir, where the memory of all mundane 
facts is stored and grouped around person centres of association.64
 
 
From this list, it is readily apparent that James was aware of all of the “tricks” Gardner 
identifies.  James describes the first five of these explanations as “natural.”  The last two 
explanations he describes as “mystical” and comments:  “It is obvious that no mystical 
explanation ought to be invoked so long as any natural one remains at all plausible.”65
The common-sense rule of presumption in scientific logic is never to 
assume an unknown agent where there is a known one, and never to 
choose a rarer cause for a phenomenon when a commoner one will 
account for it.  The usual is always more probable, and exceptional 
principles should be invoked only when the use of ordinary ones is 
impossible.
  
Moreover, regarding the proper attribution of causes, James writes: 
66
James’s eyes were wide open, but so was his mind; and so when some the facts didn’t 
comfortably fit natural explanations, he was open to other, unconventional, mystical 
possibilities.  In the case of the Hodgson control, there was information disclosed that 
caused James to believe that a mystical explanation was in order, though, as Robert A. 
McDermott puts it, James continued to “struggle with the ‘ever not quite’ character of the 
evidence for an independent Hodgson-spirit.”
 
67
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  Because Hodgson and his colleagues had 
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spent so much time with Mrs. Piper, James concludes:  “That case is an exceptionally bad 
one for testing spirit-return, owing to the unusual scope it gives to naturalistic 
explanations.”68
Although this Hodgson-case, taken by itself, yields thus only a negative, 
or at the best a baffling conclusion, we have no scientific right to take it by 
itself, as I have done.  It belongs with the whole residual mass of Piper 
phenomena, and they belong with the whole mass of cognate phenomena 
elsewhere found.  False personation is a ubiquitous feature in this total 
mass.  It certainly exists in the Piper-case; and the great question there is 
as to its limits.
  Thus, James is not willing to draw any definite conclusion from the 
Hodgson control: 
69
McDermott writes that there were “instances of Mrs. Piper’s knowledge that James 
regarded as convincing—that is, he felt that only Richard Hodgson could have been the 
source of these disclosures.”
 
70  If we take James at his word in the Hodgson report, this 
seems incorrect.  James writes that he is “quite ready to admit that my own denials in this 
present paper may be the result of the narrowness of my material, and that possibly 
R.H.’s spirit has been speaking all the time, only my ears have been deaf.”71  
Additionally, should further evidence “corroborate the hypothesis that ‘spirits’ play some 
part . . . I shall be quite ready to undeafen my ears, and to revoke the negative 
conclusions of this limited report,” James writes.72
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  Thus, although he was sympathetic to 
mystical explanations of the Hodgson-control, James realized that there was not enough 
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evidence to rule out the natural alternatives.  Nevertheless, McDermott is correct to point 
out the more general truth that James did believe in the psychic abilities of Mrs. Piper, 
which is plainly evident in the following letter James wrote to Charles Lewis Slattery in 
1907: 
Mrs. Piper has supernormal knowledge in her trances; but whether it 
comes from “tapping the minds” of living people, or from some common 
cosmic reservoir of memories, or from surviving “spirits” of the departed, 
is a question impossible for me to answer just now to my own satisfaction.  
The spirit-theory is undoubtedly not only the most natural, but the 
simplest, and I have a great respect for Hodgson’s and Hyslop’s arguments 
when they adopt it.  At the same time the electric current called belief has 
not yet closed in my mind. 
     Whatever the explanation be, trance-mediumship is an excessively 
complex phenomenon, in which many concurrent factors are engaged.  
That is why interpretation is so hard.73
As this letter makes clear, James’s did believe in Mrs. Piper abilities--though this belief 
did not come as easily or without great reservations as Gardner seems to suggest.  The 
probability of mystical explanations, says James, “depends on the forms of dramatic 
imagination of which his mind is capable.  The explanation has in any event to be 
dramatic.  Fraud, personation, telepathy, spirits, elementals, are all of them dramatic 
hypotheses.”
 
74  “Either I or the scientist is of course the fool, with our opposite views of 
probability here; and I only wish he might feel the liability, as cordially as I do, to pertain 
to both of us.”75
                                                          
73 Letters, 2:287. 
  It is possible that James was the fool; however, as we shall see, given 
James’s conception of reality, we may better understand why he believed that the spirit-
theory is the “most natural” and the “simplest” explanation.   
 
74 Essays in Psychical Research, 284. 
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By the end of his life, James conceded that his conclusions about Mrs. Piper and 
about psychic phenomena in general rely upon “our own instinctive sense of the dramatic 
probabilities of nature.”76   That is, without demonstrative proof either way, “one has to 
follow one’s personal sense, which of course is liable to error.”77
Out of my experience, such as it is (and it is limited enough) one fixed 
conclusion dogmatically emerges, and that is this, that we with our lives 
are like islands in the sea, or like trees in the forest.  The maple and the 
pine may whisper to each other with their leaves, and Conanicut and 
Newport hear each other’s fog-horns.  But the trees commingle their roots 
in the darkness underground, and the islands also hang together through 
the ocean’s bottom.  Just so there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, 
against which our individuality builds but accidental fences, and into 
which our minds plunge as a mother-sea or reservoir.  Our ‘normal’ 
consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our external earthly 
environment, but the fence is weak in spots, and fitful influences from 
beyond leak in, showing the otherwise unverifiable common connexion.
  With the caveat that he 
still remains “a psychical researcher waiting for more facts before concluding” James 
offers up the following vision:  
78
Though James does not overtly raise the issue here, the “continuum of cosmic 
consciousness . . . into which our minds plunge as a mother-sea or reservoir,” gave James 
a probable basis for what Perry describes as his “hopeful half-belief”
 
79 in personal 
immortality—one of the dramatic probabilities suggested to him through psychic 
research.  At the end of Varieties, James more plainly states that “the conscious person is 
continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come.”80
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the psychic phenomena that suggested its possibility, James understood the issue of 
personal immortality as a baffling mystery that seemed almost destined to escape 
scientific corroboration.  In a 1908 letter to his dying friend Charles Eliot Norton, James 
wrote:    
I am as convinced as I can be of anything that this experience of ours is 
only a part of the experience that is, and with which it has something to 
do; but what or where the other parts are, I cannot guess.  It only enables 
one to say “behind the veil, behind the veil!” more hopefully, however 
interrogatively and vaguely, than would otherwise be the case.81
Thus, despite James’s insistence on not knowing what waits for us after death, he was 
convinced that we are, in an essential way, connected to something more.  Twenty-six 
years prior, in 1882, James had expressed a similar sentiment in his letter to his dying 
father.  James’s heartfelt goodbye from London ends: 
 
. . . my sympathy with you is likely to grow much livelier, rather than to 
fade -- and not for the sake of regrets. -- As for the other side, and Mother, 
and our all possibly meeting, I can't say anything. More than ever at this 
moment do I feel that if that were true, all would be solved and justified. 
And it comes strangely over me in bidding you good-bye how a life is but 
a day and expresses mainly but a single note. It is so much like the act of 
bidding an ordinary good-night. Good-night, my sacred old Father! If I 
don't see you again -- Farewell! a blessed farewell!82
The lighthearted tone of James’s letter is seemingly incongruous with the desperate 
condition of his father.  The reason for this is that, on his deathbed, James’s father did not 
believe the situation was desperate.   “He wished to die,” Henry Jr. wrote William ten 
days after their father’s death, “There was no dementia except a sort of exaltation of 
belief that he had entered into ‘the spiritual life.’”
 
83
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  Describing the last days of James’s 
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father, his mother wrote to him: “Unfalteringly he claimed his right to the spiritual life, 
and most characteristically and consistently refused to nourish what he called death, 
saying life is fed by God Almighty.”84
Henry Sr.’s life and death would leave a definite impact upon his son.  Robert D. 
Richardson characterizes James’s father as “imperious” and “mercurial,” “the author of a 
long procession of unwanted and unread books, published at his own expense.”
  Believing in life after death, James’s ill father 
refused food, accelerating the process.  James was cognizant of his father’s convictions 
and his letter indicates a son no longer wishing to challenge those convictions.  
85  Henry 
James Sr. was a follower of the religious mystic Emanuel Swedenborg and was 
consumed with religious questions—or, more accurately, religious answers.  Although it 
is commonly mentioned that Henry Sr. encouraged William to study science and abandon 
his interest in art, the elder James himself had no patience for science--or any type of 
systematic argumentation.  James would call his father a “religious genius” but did not 
consider him to be a metaphysician or philosopher.86  In this vein, James wrote to his 
friend, Shadworth Hodgson, that his father “was like Carlyle in being no reasoner at all, 
in the sense in which philosophers are reasoners.  Reasoning was only an unfortunate 
necessity of exposition for them both. . . . As you say, his world of thought had a few 
elements and no others ever troubled him.”87
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  Although James would become more 
sympathetic to his father’s mysticism, Perry points out a noteworthy difference between 
the two men: 
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[William James] was fundamentally an empiricist, pledging his fidelity to 
given facts, while his father was governed by an equal and opposite 
loyalty to the affirmations of his own inner consciousness. . . . Although 
he took liberties with science, he had scientific scruples.  To the father 
science was anathema . . . 88
In short, says Perry, James felt that “his father did not earn his beliefs, but freely helped 
himself to them.”
 
89  Thus, if James did eventually hold some of the same ideas of his 
father, it was “only after years of painstaking analysis and with their meanings 
scrupulously guarded and defined.”90
Nevertheless, James respected his father greatly.  James said of this father:  “He 
was the humanist and most genial being in his impulses whom I have ever personally 
known, and had a bigness and power of nature that everybody felt.”
  This was the main line of division between 
William and his father. 
91  And right after his 
father’s death James wrote:  “For me, the humor, the good spirits, the humanity, the faith 
in the divine, and the sense of the right to have a say about the deepest reasons of the 
universe, are what will stay with me.”92  Perry writes:  “This insistence on having his ‘say 
about the universe’ is the profoundest motive of William James’s thinking, as well as of 
his filial gratitude.”93
In the letter to his dying father, just days before he was recruited by Edmund 
Gurney into psychical research endeavors, James acknowledges that he “can’t say 
anything” regarding the mystery of death.  Not ruling anything in nor out, James is 
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clearly open to the bare possibility and, very tellingly, claims that if life after death were 
true, “all would be solved and justified.”  James clearly believed much was at stake.  The 
day after his father was buried, James wrote to his wife that he was feeling: 
. . . the sweetest sense of stability and balance . . . at the thought of him & 
Mother being in the same place, apart no longer. . . . [I have come to feel] 
as I never began to do before, the tremendousness of the idea of 
immortality.  If only he could be joined to mother.  One grows dizzy at the 
thought.94
This revelation directly coincided with the beginning of James’s relationship with Gurney 
and recruitment into psychical research.  It’s hard to imagine James not making a 
connection between this new research and “the tremendousness of the idea of 
immortality.”  The possibility of immortality may have been for James only a bare 
possibility at this point, but we know it became more probable to him as the “dramatic 
probabilities” in Confidences of a “Psychical Researcher” suggest.  Perhaps the clearest 
testimony of James’s increasing enthusiasm for the possibility of immortality was his 
letter to his dying sister, Alice, in 1891: 
 
Your fortitude, good spirits and unsentimentality have been simply 
unexampled in the midst of your physical woes; and when you're relieved 
from your post, just that bright note will remain behind, together with the 
inscrutable and mysterious character of the doom of nervous weakness 
which has chained you down for all these years. As for that, there's more 
in it than has ever been told to so-called science. These inhibitions, these 
split-up selves, all these new facts that are gradually coming to light about 
our organization, these enlargements of the self in trance, etc., are bringing 
me to turn for light in the direction of all sorts of despised spiritualistic 
and unscientific ideas. Father would find in me today a much more 
receptive listener -- all that philosophy has got to be brought in. And what 
a queer contradiction comes to the ordinary scientific argument against 
immortality (based on body being mind's condition and mind going out 
when body is gone), when one must believe (as now, in these neurotic 
cases) that some infernality in the body prevents really existing parts of 
the mind from coming to their effective rights at all, suppresses them, and 
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blots them out from participation in this world's experiences, although 
they are there all the time. When that which is you passes out of the body, 
I am sure that there will be an explosion of liberated force and life till then 
eclipsed and kept down. I can hardly imagine your transition without a 
great oscillation of both "worlds" as they regain their new equilibrium 
after the change! Everyone will feel the shock, but you yourself will be 
more surprised than anybody else.95
Here James states a position he would later take up in his 1898 Ingersoll Lecture, 
“Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine,” in which James denies 
the mind’s dependence on the body.  Like Socrates in the Phaedo, except with someone 
else’s life in the balance, James claims that the evidence suggests that the body is an 
obstruction to the mind and the mind is not dependent on the body.  In the Ingersoll 
Lecture, James develops this idea, arguing that the brain has a transmissive function but 
is not necessary for consciousness.  More will be said about this idea in chapter four.  In 
any case, James’s evolving and expanding view of human nature contributed to a stronger 
belief in immortality, but, as he tells his friend Carl Stumpf, other factors were at work as 
well.  James writes, “I never felt the rational need of immortality . . . ; but as I grow older 
I confess that I feel the practical need of it much more than I ever did before; and that 
combines with reasons . . . to give me a growing faith in its reality.”
   
96  Regardless of any 
scientific justification that could be had for human immortality, James reasoned that the 
idea seemed more plausible because, practically speaking, he was “just getting fit to 
live.”97
It should now be apparent that from the time of his crisis in 1870 to the end of his 
life, James was acutely concerned with the prospect of human immortality and, through 
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his interest in psychical research, his belief in the probability of an afterlife became 
quickly and increasingly strengthened.  Ralph Barton Perry remarked that James’s 
interest in ‘psychical research’ was not one of his vagaries, but was central and typical.”98 
Agreeing with Perry, McDermott, in his introduction to James’s Essays in Psychical 
Research, writes, “The interpretation between James’s psychical research and his 
philosophy is so general and pervasive that it can be easily missed, but it seems clear that 
there is a positive relationship between these two early and enduring intellectual passions 
which includes several shared attitudes and positions.”99  For example, McDermott 
suggests that James’s philosophy and psychical research are both committed to 
reconciling science and religion; both attest to James’s commitment to radical 
empiricism; both admit to provisional conclusions on ultimate questions; both emphasize 
the personal and subjective character of knowledge; and, finally, both play a role in 
James’s willingness to reject dualism.100
                                                          
98 Perry, op. cit., 2:155.  
  I couldn’t agree more.  It is the governing thesis 
of this paper that James’s belief in the possibility of immortality was encouraged by his 
psychical research and subsequently pervaded and informed his philosophy of the self 
from Principles onward.  Thus, to fully appreciate James’s writings on the self, one must 
recognize that he had in mind the possibility of immortality the whole time.  James’s first 
and only sustained discussion of the self occurs in Principles, to which we will now turn.
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Chapter 3 
The Passing Thought and Immortality in Principles 
In 1886 James wrote “The Consciousness of Self,” which was published in 1890 
as Chapter 10 of his magnum opus The Principles of Psychology.  This chapter is, 
somewhat surprisingly, James’s only sustained treatment of the self.  This is surprising 
since James was avowedly interested in the nature of the self, but it is also misleading 
because, as Gerald Myers points out, the concept of the self is implicit in discussions of 
human consciousness--a topic that pervades James’s work.1  James’s conception of the 
self is inextricably tied to his theory of the mind, which is an area of intense debate 
amongst James scholars.  In The Unity of William James’s Thought, Wesley Cooper 
suggests that James has been interpreted in almost every philosophically conceivable 
way:  as a neutral monist, a naturalistic physicalist, a pan-psychist, and a 
phenomenologist.2
                                                          
1 Myers, op. cit., 344. 
  Of these various positions, I will be particularly concerned with John 
Dewey’s and Owen Flanagan’s interpretation of James as a naturalistic physicalist, i.e., as 
one who effectively reduced consciousness to the physical world.  For, if a naturalistic 
reading of James’s theory on consciousness is correct, my thesis that James’s work was 
shaped around his desire for immortality would be dealt a mortal blow.  Not surprisingly, 
I will argue that a naturalistic reading of James is fundamentally incorrect.  Specifically, I 
will argue that James was, for all intents and purposes, a dualist in Principles.  Moreover, 
I will argue that his conception of the self turns out to be not only consistent with 
immortality, but better suited for it than traditional philosophical conceptions of the self.  
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By the end of the chapter, although some issues will remain unresolved, we will have a 
more accurate understanding of James’s conception of the self in Principles and how 
some of the main features of his account directly reflect his concerns regarding the 
possibility of immortality. 
John Dewey was a friend of William James and a fellow pragmatist.  In James’s 
writings, especially Principles, Dewey identified a “biological psychology” which he 
adopted for himself, leading him to abandon his early roots in Hegelian philosophy.  
Although laudatory and likely well-intentioned, it appears to be the case that Dewey’s 
interpretation of James was significantly skewed to align with his own philosophical 
project.  According to Dewey’s biological behaviorism, the mental is reducible to 
particular ways in which an organism interacts with its surrounding environment. Thus, 
Dewey’s naturalism rejects mind/body dualism.  In his 1940 essay, “The Vanishing 
Subject in the Psychology of James,” Dewey argues that James, too, was a fellow 
naturalist who similarly rejected mind/body dualism.  Of particular relevance here is 
Dewey’s argument that, within Principles, the concept of self is “whittled down” to the 
“passing Thought,” and eventually vanishes.  Dewey argues that the nature of 
consciousness is, ultimately, no more mysterious than the nature of the physical world: 
In principle there is no difference between discovering the cerebral 
conditions involved in a hallucinatory or a veridical perception and the 
chemical conditions involved in occurrence of water. The difference is one 
of greater complexity. But our comparative ignorance of concrete 
conditions in the case of situations, as matters of experience, does not 
make a "mystery" out of them.3
If Dewey is correct, then James’s conception of the self in Principles—or lack thereof—
would not be one fit for immortality and would directly contradict my interpretation of 
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Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-90), 14:161. 
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James.  Thus, against Dewey, I will argue that James’s self in Principles is not physical 
through-and-through and, therefore, does not vanish.  However, before we directly 
consider James’s positive conception of the self, we need to treat the broader question of 
whether James was dualist. 
One of Dewey’s critical assumptions is that James’s dualism in Principles was 
only methodological.  In Chapter 8, “The Relations of Minds to Other Things,” James 
describes this provisional starting point for the psychologist: 
The psychologist's attitude toward cognition will be so important in the 
sequel that we must not leave it till it is made perfectly clear. It is a 
thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and 
thing known, and treats them as irreducible.  Neither gets out of itself or 
into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. 
They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows, or 
is known unto, its counterpart. This singular relation is not to be expressed 
in any lower terms, or translated into any more intelligible name. . . . . The 
dualism of Object and Subject and their pre-established harmony are what 
the psychologist as such must assume, whatever ulterior monistic 
philosophy he may, as an individual who has the right also to be a 
metaphysician, have in reserve.4
Thus, James intended his methodological dualism in Principles to provide a neutral, 
scientific base for research, remaining committed only to common empirical data and 
unaffiliated with any more basic metaphysical position.  It is, therefore, understandable 
how Dewey could assume James’s use for dualism was only strategic.  According to 
Dewey, the primary motive behind James’s insistence on methodological dualism was his 
sensitivity to familiar traditions of his readers, which made James hesitant “to carry his 
scepticism to an even more radical extreme.”
 
5
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  That is, if James had been concerned with 
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his analyses within Principles, solely, Dewey believed, he would have jettisoned 
methodological dualism.   
In his essay “John Dewey’s Naturalization of William James,” Richard Gale 
rejects Dewey’s dismissal of dualism within the Principles.  Gale argues that, not only 
did James take methodological dualism seriously, but, in addition, James himself was a 
dualist within the work.  According to Gale, what cannot be overlooked are passages in 
which James directly argues for the truth of dualism.6  For example, in Chapter 5, “The 
Automata-Theory,” James writes: “Everyone admits the entire incommensurability of 
feeling as such with material motion as such. ‘A motion became a feeling!’—no phrase 
that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning.”7  Commenting on this 
passage, Gale writes:  “. . . it looks like he is arguing for the nonidentity of the mental and 
physical on the basis of their necessarily not having all their properties in common.”8  It 
does look this way; however, once the passage is considered in its proper context, I think 
James is making a different point altogether.  Immediately following the above remarks, 
James adds:  “Accordingly, even the vaguest of evolutionary enthusiasts, when 
deliberately comparing material with mental facts, have been as forward as anyone else to 
emphasize the 'chasm' between the inner and the outer worlds.”9
                                                          
6 Gale, op. cit., 336. 
  James is making the 
point that even materialistic evolutionary theorists admit the “chasm” between the mental 
and the physical, yet, this only means that an account of the continuity between the two is 
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required—not that an account is in principle impossible.  Thus, regarding James’s 
commitment to dualism, I don’t believe this passage is as conclusive as Gale believes.   
There is, however, another passage Gale cites which I believe is more telling.  In 
Chapter 5, prior to the above passage, James writes: 
The study a posteriori of the distribution of consciousness shows it to be 
exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering 
a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself. The conclusion 
that it is useful is, after all this, quite justifiable. But, if it is useful, it must 
be so through its causal efficaciousness, and the automaton-theory must 
succumb to the theory of common-sense. I, at any rate (pending 
metaphysical reconstructions not yet successfully achieved), shall have no 
hesitation in using the language of common-sense throughout this book.10
Here James is arguing that, given that an evolutionary process did occur (and James 
believed it did), we are justified in concluding that consciousness likely played some 
useful role in sentient creatures.  That is to say, consciousness must be, in some way, 
causally efficacious.  James was tempted to believe that consciousness “loaded the dice,” 
as it were, “bringing a more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of those of its 
performances which make for the most permanent interests of the brain's owner.”
 
11
In James’s eyes Darwin’s theory of evolution not only allows for the 
possibility of free wills, it requires them.  Without the originality and 
spontaneous productivity introduced by free wills, evolution would 
proceed at too slow a pace.  Natural selection alone would take far longer 
to produce organisms as complex as human beings than nineteenth-
century geology could justify.
  
Marcus Ford writes that: 
12
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Evolutionary theory was never threatening to James.  In his youth, James was “carried 
away with enthusiasm”13 for Herbert Spencer’s book First Principles and the 
evolutionary materialism it espoused. “In Spencer’s schema,” Marcus Ford writes, 
“everything physical, biological, and social evolved or is evolving according to a single, 
fixed, progressive pattern.”14 What James came to find deeply problematic about 
Spencer’s theory was that it failed to adequately account for was the emergence of 
consciousness and it denied free will which nullified ethical claims.  Concerning the 
emergence of consciousness, James writes:  “Spencer seems to be entirely unaware of the 
importance of explaining consciousness.  Where he wants consciousness, he simply says, 
‘A nascent consciousness arises.’ . . . Notice the terms ‘incipient’ and ‘nascent.’  
Spurious philosophers of evolution seem to think that things, after a fashion, as it were, 
kind of ‘growed.’”15  The problem here, as Ford points out, is that a “nascent” experience 
is no experience at all if it is not experienced.  And if a “nascent” experience is 
experienced then “one is still left with the problem of experiential actualities evolving out 
of nonexperiential entities.”16  In sum, writes Ford, “Without experience there can be no 
free will or self-determination, and without free will there can be no ethical 
requirements.”17
In his 1876-1877 lecture notes, James writes that Spencer’s account leaves out the 
“active originality and spontaneous productivity” which James conceives as free will.  
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This is why, according to James, the Darwinian model of evolution is superior.  Darwin 
emphasizes “the truth that the regulator or preserver of the variation, the environment, is 
a different part from its producer.”  James argues that free wills produce original and 
spontaneous events which are needed to account for the pace at which evolution has 
occurred.18  James draws out one of the social implications of this view in his 1880 essay, 
“Great Men and Their Environment.”  There James argues, contra Spencer, that 
communities change from generation to generation because of the “accumulated 
differences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and their decisions.”19
James makes a distinction between the causes that produce novelty and 
the causes that maintain novelty after it is produced.  He then uses this 
distinction on two levels: on the individual level it is free will that is the 
cause of novelty and the physical environment that either maintains or 
squelches it; on the societal level it is the “great men” who are the causes 
that produce novelty and the society that either supports it or fails to 
support it.  In both cases, what is affirmed is the openness of the future. 
   As 
Ford succinctly puts it: 
20
As Myers observes, James could “accept apes as ancestors, but he could not abide 
dogmatic extensions of Darwinism which denied free will, the efficacy of consciousness, 
or the value of the individual.”
 
21
What is important to note in all of this is James’s ultimate belief in the efficacy of 
consciousness.  This is an issue that is directly relevant to a larger topic within Principles 
which Gale correctly accuses Dewey of overlooking:  James’s belief in free will.  Like 
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Gale, I believe that once one acknowledges James’s account of free will in the Principles, 
Dewey’s case for a naturalistic reading of James becomes untenable.  
For Dewey, the issue of James being a naturalist “is clinched” by the way James 
handles the specific topic of the “nature of the self and our consciousness of it, in which 
the ‘subject’ of dualistic epistemology disappears and its place is taken by an empirical 
and behavioral self.”22
In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the ' Self 
of selves', when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the 
collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and 
throat.
  The crucial passage for Dewey reads: 
23
Here James, infamously, describes the experience of the self as due to a group of 
“peculiar motions in the head”--clearly an idea Dewey is sympathetic with.  However, 
Dewey fails to consider these comments within James’s broader discussion.  Immediately 
following the above remarks, James adds some important qualifications: 
 
I do not for a moment say that this is all it consists of, for I fully realize 
how desperately hard is introspection in this field. But I feel quite sure that 
these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which 
I am most distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define 
should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other 
men, it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what 
commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities 
whose exact nature is by most men overlooked.24
The first line of this passage makes it sufficiently clear that James was not providing a 
materialistic reduction of the self.  Dewey fails to observe what Gale refers to as James’s 
“phenomenological materialism” which runs throughout the Principles.
 
25
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  In other words, 
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when James describes his “self” as motions in the head, he is attempting to give a 
phenomenological description of the self as he experiences it, which invariably leads to 
the reporting of bodily sensations. Gerald Myers astutely notes that if we find James’s 
descriptions obscure “we should try to verbalize for ourselves the experience of self-
introspection; no simple literal formulation is available.”26
In the chapter on “Attention,” James describes the importance of our ability to 
selectively focus our consciousness: 
  Moreover, given James’s 
medical training, it was typical for him to suffuse his analyses with physiological 
references.  In any case, I think the most conclusive evidence that James refused to 
banish the self were his fervent defenses of free will in the chapters “Attention” and 
“Will.”  
Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which 
never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no 
interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those 
items  which I notice shape my mind—without selective interest, 
experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, 
light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a 
word.27
Without attention or selective interest, we would be in the position of an infant who, 
according to James, experiences the world as “one great blooming, buzzing, 
confusion.”
 
28
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
  For James, that ideas enter our consciousness and that we inevitably pay 
attention to some ideas rather than others, is causally determined.  The role of an 
26 Myers, op. cit., 346. 
 
27 Principles, 1:381-82. 
 
28 Ibid., 1:462. 
 
82 
 
autonomous will, according to James, is to control how much or how little effort is 
expended in attending to an idea: 
The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' 
is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-
doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the 
object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should  
ensue. . . .  Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.29
Thus, according to James, that we attend to ideas is involuntary, we can’t help it; 
however, James wonders if the amount of effort to attend to particular ideas is also 
involuntary.  In James’s view, the answer to this question has momentous consequences: 
 
When we believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends on our 
not being pure effect, but a cause,--we must admit that the question 
whether attention involve such a principle of spiritual activity or not is 
metaphysical as well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains 
we can bestow on its solution. It is in fact the pivotal question of 
metaphysics, the very hinge on which our picture of the world shall swing 
from materialism, fatalism, monism, towards spiritualism, freedom, 
pluralism, —or else the other way.30
Throughout his adult life James believed we possessed this autonomous will--an 
irreducible “spiritual force”
 
31
The whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our 
voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are really being 
decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off 
of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago.
 within consciousness that is not causally determined.  As to 
why he believes, James simply says here that his reasons are “ethical,” and notes how: 
32
As we saw in the previous chapter, what helped James through his emotional crises was 
his belief in free will which he felt allowed him to lead a meaningful moral life.   
 
                                                          
29 Principles, 2:1166. 
 
30 Ibid., 1:429. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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In his article, “William James’s Attitude Toward Death,” William Gavin suggests 
James’s attitude towards death is analogous to his attitude towards the issue of free will.  
That is to say, although James can prove neither that the will is free nor that biological 
death is not final, he vividly perceives the dramatic practical consequences that follow 
from taking one side or the other.  Thus, given that the truth of the matter in each case is 
largely vague and mysterious, Gavin claims James chose to fight the good fight in each 
case.33
When James talks of the need to preserve the vague, he is arguing against 
certainty, that is, against the usurping of the privileged position of center 
stage once and for all by any formulation of the universe.   
  In William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague, Gavin insists that James’s 
use of the “vague” should not be construed pejoratively: 
Gavin contrasts this fallibilistic attitude of James with what he calls “bumbling”:  
“Bumbling” is a term I shall use to refer to a situation wherein on seeks 
certainty, seeks the apodictic, the fundamental Archimedean point as a 
necessary desideratum in life, but fails to find it.  Bumbling, then, refers to 
a depressing state of affairs in which one allows the goal to be defined in 
terms of certainty and then cannot manage to achieve it—or at least to 
pretend to have achieved it.  The vague, in contrast, refers to a situation 
that has not degenerated into an overly false clarity, and to one that does 
not intend to come up with final certainty.34
Thus, vagueness for James, according to Gavin, was not so much a liability as it was an 
opportunity to choose from competing ideas about a reality too profuse for complete 
comprehension—and this makes life ineluctably intense.   “Life presents a challenge to 
which we must respond,” writes Gavin, “To decide not to decide is in itself to make a 
 
                                                          
33 William J. Gavin, “William James’s Attitude Toward Death,” Journal of Thought, 11 (1976):     
202-03. 
 
34 Gavin, Reinstatement of the Vague, 2-3. 
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decision.  In this sense, we are all artists carving out experience.”35
In his 1884 essay, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” James had expounded on his 
moral reasons for accepting free will.
  Thus, for James, free 
will was needed in order to meet the challenges of life.  
36  Though interesting in its own right, it is not 
important to delve into here.  What is important is that, in Principles, James was 
committed to free will as an “original” and “spiritual force” whose “effort seems to 
belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we 
are.”37
Owen Flanagan, twenty-five years after Dewey’s death, revitalized Dewey’s 
naturalistic interpretation of James in his essay “Naturalizing the Mind: The 
Philosophical Psychology of William James.”  In this essay, Flanagan calls James’s 
Principles “the first formulation of the naturalistic position in the philosophy of mind.”
  Thus, far from a materialistic reduction of the self, James insisted that one of its 
distinguishing features is its seeming transcendence of the physical.  To borrow a term 
from Gale, Dewey’s attempt to “despookify” James in the Principles neglects all of this.   
38
                                                          
35 Gavin, Reinstatement of the Vague, 19. 
   
Two points are worth making about Flanagan’s position.  First, at the end of the essay he 
concludes that James’s doctrine of free will is indeed the “snag” that prevents James from 
going all the way with the naturalistic direction of his own thought.  The best Flanagan 
can do is chastise James for not giving up a libertarian conception of free will and going 
 
36 According to James, the “dilemma of determinism” turns out to be a choice between pessimism 
or subjectivism, neither of which he finds satisfactory.  James opts to believe in indeterminism which is 
pluralistic, thus allowing for free will and the possibility of improving the world. 
 
37 Principles, 2:1181. 
 
38 Owen J. Flanagan, The Science of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 24. 
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the route of soft determinism.39
In Principles James was a dualist.  His dualism involved a commitment to 
interaction between the mental and the physical.  It follows that all the 
statements about psycho-physical correlations need to be taken, not as 
support for any kind of parallelism, but as involving the belief that for 
each token mental event, there will be a corresponding brain event 
(probably the other way around).  Finally, the sort of dualistic 
interactionism that James accepts in Principles is ambivalently Cartesian, 
an ambivalent form of substance dualism.
  The second important point is that Flanagan changed his 
mind about James being a naturalist a few years later.  In “Consciousness as a Pragmatist 
Views It,” Flanagan concludes: 
40
Flanagan credits the criticism of Wesley Cooper for his reversal.  Cooper argues that, 
although “James was a naturalist in psychology to the extent that he wanted psychology 
to become a law-seeking natural science,” these laws linked brain states to mental states, 
which James “construed as irreducibly different, as far as psychology is concerned, from 
physical states.”
 
41  Again, for the purposes of natural psychology, James believed that we 
should treat the mental as we experience it, i.e., non-physically.  As Cooper points out, 
James thought the nature of consciousness and its causal relationship with the brain were 
largely issues that fell outside the scope of scientific inquiry and into metaphysics.42 
James was content in Principles to leave aside many of the mysteries of psycho-physical 
dualism, later referring to psychology as the “antechamber to metaphysics.”43
                                                          
39 By “soft determinism,” I mean the idea that determinism is compatible with individual freedom.  
In “The Dilemma of Determinism,” James calls soft determinism a “quagmire of evasion,” arguing that it 
fails to resolve the problems of the deterministic world-view.  
  Thus, I 
 
40 Owen J. Flanagan, “Consciousness as a Pragmatist Views It,” The Cambridge Companion to 
William James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37-38. 
 
41 Cooper, op. cit., 45. 
 
42 Ibid., 46. 
 
43 Essays, Comments, and Reviews, 296. 
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think we can safely conclude that in Principles James was a dualist, from both the 
perspective of empirical psychology and from the perspective of a moral agent who 
believed in free will.   
It is, therefore, accurate to say that insofar as consciousness constitutes the self, it 
remains for James irreducible to the physical world.  But in the passage from Flanagan 
cited above, Flanagan refers to James’s substance dualism as “ambivalent,” implying 
James was not a committed substance dualist.  I believe this is correct.  Although James 
is a methodological dualist in the Principles, he nevertheless rejected the idea that the self 
is essentially an unchanging, substantive entity.  Instead, James views the self as 
constituted by the contents of an ever-changing stream of thought.  Before we arrive at 
James’s conclusions, let us first follow James’s development of the self in the chapter 
“The Consciousness of Self.”  
James begins by broadly conceiving the self as: 
The sum total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic 
powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors 
and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and 
bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax 
and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels 
cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in 
much the same way for all.44
Thus, James is attempting to determine what we practically mean by the term “self,” how 
the term cashes out in experience.  James surmises that what one “can call his” falls into 
four different categories which mutually constitute the self:  the material self, the social 
self, the spiritual self, and the pure ego.  Each of these selves represents a different aspect 
of the self, although the material self, social self, and spiritual self all refer to the 
  
                                                          
44 Principles, 1:280-81. 
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“Empirical Me,” what I am about, so to speak.  By contrast, the pure ego refers to just the 
first person pronoun, I, the “bare principle of personal Unity,” and its nature.45
The material self, according to James, is mostly our body, which is what we feel 
most intimately connected with.  What follows the body in order of importance, in 
James’s view, are our clothes, our immediate family, our home, and, lastly, all our other 
property.
 
46   The social self, by contrast, is “the recognition which he gets from his 
mates.”47
No more fiendish punishment could be devised . . . than that one should be 
turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the 
members thereof.  If no one turned round when we entered, answered 
when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met 'cut us 
dead,' and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and 
impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruelest 
bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, 
however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be 
unworthy of attention at all.
  According to James, because we are deeply social beings, getting noticed by 
others (preferably favorably) is one of our fundamental needs.  Regarding the importance 
of being noticed by our peers, I think James demonstrates tremendous insight into human 
nature when he writes: 
48
There may be no better confirmation of this hypothetical situation than our present 
culture in which many people would rather be a disreputable “reality” television star than 
 
                                                          
45 Principles, 1:283 
 
46 Ibid., 1:280;  It is rather curious that James believes we view our clothes as a more important 
part of our material self than our own family!  James adds that, “there are few of us who, if asked to choose 
between having a beautiful body clad in raiment perpetually shabby and unclean, and having an ugly and 
blemished form always spotlessly attired, would not hesitate a moment before making a decisive reply.”  
Though I doubt that people identify with their clothes to the extent James is suggesting, it does seem to be 
the case that, when we think about our self, our clothes seem to factor in, especially when we try to literally 
picture our self.  In any case, the more general point James is making is that our material self reflects any 
and all the worldly stuff we care about. 
 
47 Ibid., 1:281 
 
48 Ibid. 
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to remain a “nobody”--to say nothing of the acts of violence committed by neglected or 
marginalized members of society against others and sometimes even themselves.  Thus, 
James was certainly correct to emphasize the role of social recognition, or lack thereof, in 
our self-makeup.   In discussing our social self, James makes the further point that, 
because we are recognized differently by different groups of people, we have multiple 
social selves: 
Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, 
swears and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. We do 
not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our 
customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and 
employers as to our intimate friends.49
In James’s view, these differences amongst our social selves are not necessarily 
burdensome.  For example, in some instances people have different social selves which 
they want to keep forever separate, e.g., a President of a country who does not want the 
citizens to know how he behaves in private settings with his closest friends.  There can 
also be “harmonious” social selves, e.g., the social self of a basketball player while 
playing a game and their social self after the game as they return home to their family.  
Therefore, our multiple social selves need not conflict. 
 
The final aspect of our “Empirical Me” is the spiritual self which James describes 
as “a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken 
concretely.”50  James calls this subjective being the “most enduring and intimate part of 
the self, that which we most verily seem to be.”51
                                                          
49 Principles, 1:282. 
   Rejecting the “abstract way” of 
dealing with this spiritual self, James does not attempt to dissect it into separate faculties 
 
50 Ibid., 1:283. 
 
51 Ibid. 
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to be independently analyzed.  Instead, James insists that we treat the spiritual self 
according to a “concrete view,” just as it is experienced, with all of our faculties working 
simultaneously.52  Thus, he proposes that this self is either identified with the entire 
stream of consciousness or some segment of it, “both the stream and the section being 
concrete existences in time, and each being a unity after its own peculiar kind.”53 
Reflecting on this issue, James notes that he is no longer considering the content of 
thought but, rather, thinking about ourselves as thinkers.  According to James, this 
“momentous” and “mysterious” aspect of our self, as a matter of fact, exists.54
A certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest is so identified in 
an altogether peculiar degree, and is felt by all men as a sort of innermost 
centre within the circle, of sanctuary within the citadel, constituted by the 
subjective life as a whole. Compared with this element of the stream, the 
other parts, even of the subjective life, seem transient external possessions, 
of which each in turn can be disowned, whilst that which disowns them 
remains.
  Regarding 
whether the thinker is identified with the whole of or only a segment of the stream of 
consciousness, James remarks that: 
55
Thus, the thinker of the spiritual self within the stream of consciousness seems to stand 
apart and consequently resists identification with the entirety of the stream.  James writes: 
 
They would call it the active element in all consciousness; saying that 
whatever qualities a man's feelings may possess, or whatever content his 
thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which seems to 
go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to 
be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the 
perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent it 
influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest,—
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53 Ibid. 
 
54 Ibid. 
 
55 Ibid., 1:285. 
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not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that 
within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. 
It is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to 
emanate the fiats of the will.56
What James is describing here is what many people have traditionally called the “Soul,” 
the active substance which is the engine of our conscious life.  It is here that James 
proceeds to describe what he feels regarding this “central nucleus” of our mental life 
which leads him into those odd descriptions of “bodily processes . . . taking place in the 
head.”
 
57
That (in some persons at least) the part of the innermost Self which is most 
vividly felt turns out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic 
movements of 'adjustments' which, for want of attention and reflection, 
usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that over and 
above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more; but whether it 
be of fainter physiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but 
rather of subjectivity as such, of thought become 'its own object,' must at 
present remain an open question, — like the question whether it be an 
indivisible active soul-substance, or the question whether it be a 
personification of the pronoun I, or any other of the guesses as to what its 
nature may be.
   Regarding these phenomenological introspections, James concludes: 
58
Again, it is clear that James did not want his descriptions of his felt, phenomenal self to 
be misconstrued as conclusions about the ontological status of the self—it was left an 
open question here.  It is a question, however, that James takes up in the later sections 
“The Pure Ego” and “The Pure Self or Inner Principle of Personal Unity.” 
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In “The Pure Ego,” James calls the issue “the most puzzling puzzle with which 
psychology has to deal.”59
If, with the Spiritualists, one contend for a substantial soul, or 
transcendental principle of unity, one can give no positive account of what 
that may be. And if, with the Humians [sic], one deny such a principle and 
say that the stream of passing thoughts is all, one runs against the entire 
common-sense of mankind, of which the belief in a distinct principle of 
selfhood seems an integral part.
  Moreover, he claims that any position that one holds must be 
held “against heavy odds.”  James has a clear sense of the traditional difficulties: 
60
Characteristically, James attempts to cut a middle path through the Spiritualist and 
Humean positions—neither completely reducing the self to a simple train of associations 
nor elevating it to the status of a permanent, substantive entity.  Instead, James argues 
that, for the purposes of psychology, a succession of perishing thoughts is adequate to 
fully describe consciousness.   
 
What is important about this “passing Thought” is that it has the function of 
appropriation or rejection; it is the “hook” in every present state of consciousness which 
is able to “knit on” thoughts from one moment to the next.61  This appropriative feature 
of the passing Thought is what sustains continuity and personal identity.  What has been 
appropriated conveys a sense of “warmth and intimacy” to the subject which is 
continually recognized as me or mine.62
                                                          
59 Principles, 1:314. 
   James compares the passing Thought to an 
owner of a herd of cattle who is able to herd them because he is able to recognize his own 
“brand.”  Just as there is a “herd-brand,” James suggests there is a “self-brand” that is 
 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Ibid., 1:324. 
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instantiated through the appropriative function of the passing Thought.63   Thus, 
according to James, the substantial soul of the Spiritualists does not need to be posited to 
explain the continuity of personal identity-- it’s superfluous for the purposes of science 
and psychology.  Still, James adds the important caveat that “there may be another non-
phenomenal Thinker behind [the passing Thought].”64
An important question that now arises is whether James’s account of self-identity 
over time is compatible with the possibility of immortality.   Is it reasonable to believe 
that the conditions for self-identity James identifies will remain after death and, if so, will 
anything be lost in transition?  To begin answering these difficult questions, let us first 
admit that much of what constitutes what James refers to as our “Empirical Me” would 
lose relevance for us upon bodily death.  That is to say, the body that we now inhabit and 
care for, the material possessions we value, the opinions of our co-workers, and our 
routine, day-to-day concerns in general, would surely lose some importance or value after 
we pass on--assuming this is possible.   Unless one supposes that our consciousness 
jumps into a new body and environment very similar to this one, it seems safe to say that 
our self would undergo some redefinition according to the novel context in which we 
would find ourselves.  Gale rightly notes that, in James’s philosophy, “the essence of 
consciousness is to be selectively attentive on the basis what is interesting or 
important.”
 
65
                                                          
63 Principles, 1:320. 
  Therefore, the extent to which our self becomes redefined after death will 
directly depend upon how much of what we find to be interesting or important resembles 
 
64 Ibid., 1:324. 
 
65 Richard M. Gale, “James on Self Identity Over Time,” Modern Schoolman LXXI (March 1994): 
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what we now find interesting or important.  This aspect of self-identity reflects what Gale 
identifies as James’s shift away from a bare numerical understanding of self-identity to a 
qualitative understanding.  Thus, Gale writes: 
When a person, upon undergoing a psychological upheaval that results in 
radical difference in the way in which they remember and evaluate the 
importance of things, says “I am no longer the same person,” it is not to be 
parsed in its ordinary manner of “I am numerically one and the same 
person throughout but have just changed in my psychological traits.”  
Rather, that person bears little if any numerical identity to the past 
person.66
This is, of course, a departure from common sense.  As Gale points out, we typically 
count an individual as one and the same person throughout their life, regardless of wild 
variations in behavior, as long as there is basic bodily continuity.  For example, if 
somebody commits a serious crime and subsequently becomes “converted,” we still 
consider them to be the same person and hold them responsible.   According to James’s 
account, however, it would be wrong to make this assumption.  For, James believes 
people can fundamentally transform themselves and become an altogether different 
person.   In any case, the important point here is that the Empirical Self that one now 
identifies with would change according to what becomes of interest and importance after 
bodily death.  Therefore, unless one were to believe that there is a complete 
“psychological upheaval” and total revaluation of values immediately upon death, there is 
no reason to assume that there wouldn’t be some noticeable continuity between the two 
worlds or perspectives—that some aspects of our self-identity would remain the same. 
 
 The more interesting and crucial issue here is not the fate of the Empirical Me, 
but, rather, the fate of the thinker actually doing the attending and, consequently, 
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contributing to the fashioning of the Empirical Self.  Fontinell is quick to describe this 
distinction between the “objective me” and the “subjective I” as “a distinction of focus 
and function.”67
 The first problem concerns the role of feeling in establishing self-identity.  James 
writes that, “Whatever the content of the ego may be, it is habitually felt with everything 
else by us humans, and must form a liaison between all the things of which we become 
  Thus, Fontinell argues, the self in Principles is not really divided 
between a thinker and the objects of thought; rather, these are two functions of the same 
self that are identified separately according to different emphases.  Fontinell’s 
interpretation of the self in Principles along functional lines takes into account James’s 
eventual rejection of dualism and later metaphysics.  Although I do not want to follow 
Fontinell’s method here, I do believe it is helpful and legitimate to raise this issue of 
function in regard to the subjective I.   That is, we can speak of the function of the 
subjective I within the dualistic framework of Principles, without illicitly importing ideas 
from James’s later philosophy.  We can say then that the main function of the subjective I 
is to appropriate those “warm” and “intimate” thoughts, resulting in a unified and 
continuous self.  Further, as was mentioned above, James understands the self to be, in 
actuality, the passing Thought—a temporary pulse of consciousness, perpetually 
changing and in process from one moment to the next.   In other words, each pulse of 
thought features the subjective I which continuously identifies itself more or less with 
previous pulses of thought.   It seems then, because James does not believe the passing 
Thought is reducible to the body, that the subjective I could carry on its distinctive 
function without the body.   However, upon closer analysis we immediately run into at 
least two problems concerning self-identity and the possibility of immortality.  
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successively aware.”68  Thus, as Fontinell correctly suggests, “The self, insofar as it is an 
identity-in-diversity, a sameness-amidst-differences, a unity-within-plurality, must be 
‘felt.’”69   Concerning the establishment of self-identity, Perry writes, “In James, the 
personal subject loses all of its special privileges.  It must submit to the common test.  If 
it is there at all it must give evidence of its existence, and this evidence furnishes, so far 
as it goes, the only clue to its nature and character.”70  Fontinell adds, “The ‘ground’ 
evidence, for James, is what is felt or presented in conceptual experience.”71
 The second problem is partly related to the first; namely, if dualism is assumed, 
then consciousness considered apart from the body and all things “material” seems to 
become undesirably diaphanous and barren.  The issue is only exacerbated by James’s 
“whittling down” of consciousness to the momentary pulses of a passing Thought and 
arguing that the I  functions only as a liaison and is not a substantive entity.  In his classic 
essay, “The Reappearance of the Self in the Last Philosophy of William James,” Milic 
  If one 
assumes dualism, as James does in Principles, the problem for immortality then becomes:  
How does one maintain the necessary feeling of self-identity when one becomes 
dissociated from one’s body?  Regarding the functioning of a subjective I, what would it 
then mean to appropriate on the basis of “warmth” and “intimacy” once disembodied?  
More generally, what would it mean for consciousness to be selective on the basis of 
interest and importance without the usual bodily manifestation of related emotions?  I 
find this very difficult if not impossible to imagine. 
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Capek asks, “was it logical for James to claim that ‘the passing thought is the only 
thinker,’ or, in other words, that the stream of thought is nothing but a mere multiplicity 
of successive perishing pulses?”72  Capek refers to these pulses of thought as James’s 
“psychical molecules” which seem to differ from his atomistic and associationist 
predecessors only in respect to their “larger temporal span.”73   Recall that James 
describes the unifying link, the I, between pulses of thought as “something not among 
things collected, but superior to them all, namely, the real present onlooking, 
remembering, ‘judging thought’ or identifying ‘section’ of the stream.”74  Capek properly 
points out that James’s account is, ironically, very similar to John Stuart Mill’s postulate 
of an “inexplicable tie” which was supposed to account for the connection between 
successive feelings and which James denounces.75
This ‘inexplicable tie’ which connects the feelings, this ‘something in 
common’ by which they are linked and which is not the passing feelings 
themselves, but something permanent, . . . what is it but metaphysical 
substance come again to life?
  About Mill, James writes: 
76
I think Capek is correct here in claiming that James failed to notice how his own criticism 
applied to his account.
 
77
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  James struggles in Principles to give an account of the I that 
was substantial enough to perform the necessary functions of self-hood, yet 
unpretentiously confined to experience and introspection.  We must keep in mind, 
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however, that James’s goal in Principles was not to provide a metaphysical account of 
the mind, even if his descriptions of psychological states frequently bleed into 
metaphysical territory.   
That said, given James’s account here, what are we to make of these problems in 
regards to self-identity and the prospect for immortality?  If we assume dualism, 
accounting for the role of feeling in self-identity once the mind is free of the body 
becomes highly problematic; moreover, once separated, it is puzzling just how much 
substantive reality the I actually possesses.  Fortunately, and somewhat tellingly, James’s 
thinking after Principles works to address these issues.  Not only will James eventually 
reject dualism, denying any ultimate difference between the mental and the physical, he 
will also enlarge the scope of the self beyond that of the momentary passing Thought.  As 
we will see in the following chapters, the passing Thought will remain at the center of our 
experience, but James will argue that it is not our full self--it is not the whole field of 
consciousness.   The upshot of all of this will be a conception of a self that is neither 
mental nor physical simpliciter, but is continuous with both, and it will be conceived as 
essentially related to wider, more inclusive fields of consciousness.  Thus, given these 
modifications to his theory, it becomes increasingly conceivable how the conditions for 
self-identity over time identified in the Principles may be realized in the event of bodily 
death.  But to eventually appreciate these changes, we will need to first return to James’s 
account of the self in Principles and consider further features of his account.    
 The particular question of whether there is a soul substance underlying the 
passing Thought is directly addressed by James in the section “The Pure Self or Inner 
Principle of Personal Unity.”  According to popular accounts of the soul, James observes, 
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the soul is typically thought to be immaterial, simple, and substantial.  As a result, the 
soul is thought to be incorruptible and naturally immortal. By contrast, “the Thought is a 
perishing and not an immortal or incorruptible thing.” 78
We ought certainly to admit that there is more than the bare fact of 
coexistence of a passing thought with a passing brain-state. But we do not 
answer the question 'What is that more?' when we say that it is a 'Soul' 
which the brain-state affects.  This kind of more explains nothing. . . . The 
Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from 
otherwise known properties of the soul. They simply find various 
characters ready-made in the mental life, and these they clap into the Soul, 
saying, "Lo! behold the source from whence they flow!" The merely 
verbal character of this 'explanation' is obvious.
   According to James, the issue 
of soul is relevant in determining whether one believes in immortality.  For the purposes 
of science, however, it has no explanatory power: 
79
Thus, unless the Spiritualists are able to demonstrate why their conception of a soul is 
necessary to explain our mental life, James sees no reason to invoke it for the purposes of 
psychology.  That is to say, as long as the minimal notion of a passing Thought is 
sufficient for scientific purposes, there is no need to locate its source in an arcane, non-
material substance.  Why unnecessarily muddle science with metaphysical speculation?  
Thus, in James’s view, science has no use for the soul and, if it weren’t for practical 
demands, he says, “the case would rest here.”
 
80
One of the practical demands James acknowledges is the question of immortality.  
As was mentioned previously, the simplicity and substantiality that traditionally are said 
  Of course, James does not let the case 
rest there. 
                                                          
78 Principles, 1:327. 
 
79 Ibid., 1:328-29. 
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to characterize the soul make it immortal by nature.  However, James argues, this account 
of the soul, 
. . . guarantees no immortality of a sort we care for. The enjoyment of the 
atom-like simplicity of their substance in sæcula sæculorum would not to 
most people seem a consummation devoutly to be wished. The substance 
must give rise to a stream of consciousness continuous with the present 
stream, in order to arouse our hope, but of this the mere persistence of the 
substance per se offers no guarantee.81
A cosmos full of simple, soul-pellet substances--the sedimentary remains of human life--
was not the kind of immortality James cared for.  James suggests that an immortality that 
we care for must ensure some continuity with our current stream of consciousness and an 
absolutely simple substance fails to make that guarantee.  But rather than arguing for 
immortality on the basis of atom-like simplicity, James suggests that a moral grounding 
may be more compelling: 
 
The demand for immortality is nowadays essentially teleological. We 
believe ourselves immortal because we believe ourselves fit for 
immortality. A 'substance' ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy 
to survive; and an insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself provided it be 
worthy, if the nature of Things is organized in the rational way in which 
we trust it is.82
What I think James is getting at here is that immortality makes more sense in the context 
of being able to realize ideals which exceed our ability to realize in this natural life, e.g., 
as Gale suggests, realizing a deeper union with the universe, or the ultimate elimination 
of evil.  To put it another way, if humans have certain needs or ideals that must be met in 
order to flourish, and these require a belief in immortality to realize, it is rational to hope 
the universe (assuming it is rational) will be responsive to our demands.  Sami Pihlström 
taps into this idea in his 2002 essay, “William James on Death, Mortality, and 
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Immortality.”  Pihlström writes that, “From a Jamesian (or, equally clearly Kantian) point 
of view, ethics grounds metaphysics, not vice versa, although even ethical needs are not 
any absolute grounding for anything, because they can and should be revised in the 
course of changes that may take place in our lives.”83
We have no other principle for deciding it than this general idealistic 
belief: that every created thing will continue whose continuance belongs to 
the meaning of the world, and so long as it does so belong; whilst 
everyone will pass away whose reality is justified only in a transitory 
phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further 
application in human hands need hardly be said. We surely know not the 
merits which may give to one being a claim on eternity, nor the defects 
which would cut others off.
  Although I am largely sympathetic 
to Pihlström’s view, I would have to add the caveat that James’s conception of reality 
does not simply fall back on ethical demands.  For James, if one felt an ethical demand 
which contradicted our immediate, lived experience, it would be better to renounce the 
demand than base a metaphysics upon it.  In other words, James considered himself an 
empiricist first and foremost.  In any case, James gives the final word on immortality to 
the German philosopher Hermann Lotze: 
84
The insight here, which James endorses, is that our best hope for immortality lies in 
living our lives as meaningfully as possible, striving for our ideals, and trusting that our 
active efforts merit preserving in the world’s course.  Thus, James’s rejection of a soul as 
a substantive entity with a natural guarantee of immortality, does not, in any way, 
undermine his hope for immortality.  As was the case with free will, James so far makes a 
case for immortality on primarily moral grounds—that the good in the universe shall 
prevail and shall remain.  
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84 Principles, 1:330; James translates this passage from Lotze’s 1883 work Grundzüge der 
Metaphysik. 
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Still, even though James makes this shift, discounting the relevance of a 
substantive soul for immortality, I would argue that James’s non-substantive account of 
the self actually reflects James’s hope for an immortality he cared for.  One of the 
important metaphysical advantages James’s non-substantive self has over its substantive 
counterpart is its tremendous boundlessness.  James writes: 
One great use of the Soul has always been to account for, and at the same 
time to guarantee, the closed individuality of each personal consciousness. 
The thoughts of one soul must unite into one self, it was supposed, and 
must be eternally insulated from those of every other soul. But we have 
already begun to see that, although unity is the rule of each man’s 
consciousness, yet in some individuals, at least, thoughts may split away 
from the others and form separate selves. As for insulation, it would be 
rash, in view of the phenomena of thought-transference, mesmeric 
influence and spirit-control, which are being alleged nowadays on better 
authority than ever before, to be too sure about that point either. The 
definitively closed nature of our personal consciousness is probably an 
average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary 
force or fact; so that, if one wishes to preserve the Soul, the less he draws 
his arguments from that quarter the better. So long as our self, on the 
whole, makes itself good and practically maintains itself as a closed 
individual, why, as Lotze says, is not that enough? And why is the being-
an-individual in some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder an 
achievement?85
Accordingly, even though James’s conception of a non-substantive self resulted from 
scientific parsimony, he saw it offering a model which better fit his findings in abnormal 
psychology and psychic research.  As was shown in the previous chapter, James’s work 
in these fields took him towards a view of the self that was open to mystical 
experiences—to positing a “mother sea” of consciousness surrounding our own 
consciousness.  In Principles James remarks that: 
 
For my own part I confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try 
to define the more [what is beyond the self], I find the notion of some sort 
of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, 
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in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual 
souls.86
Clearly, the notion of a self “eternally insulated from . . . every other soul” was not an 
attractive idea for James.  It fit neither his research nor his metaphysical tastes.  Whatever 
the ultimate nature of James’s passing Thought, it was open to change, an aspect of the 
flowing stream of consciousness--active and alive.  Therefore, regarding his hope for 
immortality, I think James had it both ways in the Principles:  He stressed the moral 
justification for immortality while simultaneously engineering a non-substantive model 
of the self consistent with concrete experience and science, which, because of its 
indefiniteness, seems a better candidate to realize the “dramatic probabilities of nature.”  
Accordingly, although James’s discussion of the self in the Principles sometimes appears 
to be reductionistic, I hope it is now more obvious that James was consistently and 
intently focused on preserving our most meaningful possibilities.  In the next chapter, we 
will move to James’s work regarding the self directly after Principles, notably his 
Ingersoll Lecture, “Human Immortality,” and The Varieties of Religious Experience.  
Again, I will argue that we find James actively seeking a conception of the self suited for 
immortality. 
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Chapter 4 
Expanding the Self: Immortality and James’s Field Model 
In this chapter, I will consider James’s 1897 Ingersoll Lecture, “Human 
Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine,” as well as his landmark work 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, published in 1902.  I will argue that each of these 
works reflects James’s desire to better ground the possibility of personal immortality.  In 
Human Immortality, specifically, we will see this evidenced by James’s belief in the 
superiority of a non-reductionistic view of consciousness, as well as his profound 
expressions of regard for the value of human life.  In Varieties, I will consider how James 
turns away from dualistic categories and begins to employ a consciousness-as-field 
metaphor, better suiting both his psychological descriptions and a metaphysics consistent 
with the possibility of personal immortality.  In the end, we will have a better 
understanding of the direction in which James is taking the self—a direction that is 
continuously looking to enrich it and expand its possibilities. 
In his essay, Human Immortality, James appraises immortality as “one of the great 
spiritual needs of man” yet quickly attempts to distinguish himself from those “with a 
real passion for the matter.”1  “I have to confess,” writes James, “that my own personal 
feeling about immortality has never been of the keenest order, and that among the 
problems that give my mind solicitude, this one does not take the very foremost place.”2
                                                          
1 Essays in Morality and Religion, 78. 
  
Personal immortality may not have been his “keenest” passion or his “foremost” concern, 
but James’s lecture reveals a man invested enough in the issue to defend its possibility.  
 
2 Ibid. 
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James states his goal in the lecture as contributing two “grains of truth” to the debate 
which take the form of replies to two objections which have robbed “the notion [of 
immortality] of much of its old power to draw belief.”3
The first objection to the possibility of immortality is founded on the idea that 
consciousness is nothing but a function of the brain.  If consciousness is simply a 
function of the brain, the argument goes, then it will cease to be whenever the brain 
ceases to function.  Put another way, if consciousness is absolutely dependent upon the 
brain, it cannot exist apart from the brain.  Such is the psycho-physiological view, the 
reigning view of the scientific community in James’s day as well as our own.  James 
admits that this understanding of consciousness is perfectly consistent with our own 
experience and the findings of scientific research: 
  
Every one knows that arrests of brain development occasion imbecility, 
that blows on the head abolish memory or consciousness, and that brain-
stimulants and poisons change the quality of our ideas. The anatomists, 
physiologists, and pathologists have only shown this generally admitted 
fact of a dependence to be detailed and minute. What the laboratories and 
hospitals have lately been teaching us is not only that thought in general is 
one of the brain's functions, but that the various special forms of thinking 
are functions of special portions of the brain. When we are thinking of 
things seen, it is our occipital convolutions that are active; when of things 
heard, it is a certain portion of our temporal lobes; when of things to be 
spoken, it is one of our frontal convolutions.4
Here James grants that the scientific evidence in favor of the reigning theory is 
compelling and he recognizes that the only persons resisting the theory are thought to be 
“a few belated scholastics, or possibly some crack-brained theosophist or psychical 
researcher.”
 
5
                                                          
3 Essays in Morality and Religion, 79. 
  However, even if this is true, says James, “function can mean nothing more 
 
4 Ibid., 80. 
 
5 Ibid., 81. 
105 
 
than bare concomitant variation.”6  James maintains that all science has shown is that 
when brain-states change, consciousness changes, but this does not prove that the brain 
produces consciousness.  That is, brains producing thought is one way the functional 
relationship could work, but it’s not the only way.  As James points out, the brain-thought 
relationship may not be productive, like a tea-kettle producing steam, but, rather, 
permissive, like a crossbow releasing an arrow, or transmissive, like a prism through 
which light is “determined to a certain path and shape.”7  Thus, “when we think of the 
law that thought is a function of the brain,” writes James, “we are not required to think of 
productive function only; we are entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive 
function.”8
Although James uses the example of a lens or prism transmitting light, the 
transmission of data through radio or electromagnetic waves (which was being 
researched during James’s lifetime) provides, I think, James with a more compelling 
analogy.  It may be more helpful, that is, to think of the brain’s transmission of 
consciousness as being akin to a television’s transmission of a satellite broadcast.  In this 
analogy, assuming we are unaware of the satellite transmission, we would know that 
when certain parts of the television break, the picture is lost.  Further, a television 
repairman (scientist) would know that by manipulating certain parts of the television, one 
can alter the color of the picture, the contrast, the tint, the sharpness, the lightness and 
darkness, etc.   Thus, they know that only when the television is in working order does 
   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Essays in Morality and Religion, 88. 
 
7 Ibid., 86. 
 
8 Ibid. 
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the picture appear and, by manipulating different parts of the device, the picture can be 
altered.  Further, if no one knew about the broadcasting and receiving of electromagnetic 
waves, it would be natural to assume that the television created the picture on its own.  Of 
course, this would be a mistake, and James believes science may be making a similar 
error.  The latent and unchallenged assumption of science has been that thought can only 
be a productive function of the brain—but there are reasonable alternative accounts that 
do not entail an absolute dependence of consciousness on the brain.   
Yet, are these alternative accounts really plausible or are they “thoroughly 
fantastic,” a “foolish metaphor,” and the “common materialistic notion vastly simpler”?  
James asks, “Is it not more rigorously scientific to treat the brain's function as function of 
production?”9  His response is two-fold.  First, considering the popular scientific view, it 
is unknown and deeply mysterious how matter, as they conceive it, is capable of creating 
consciousness.  Unlike the steam produced by a tea-kettle, consciousness and matter 
seem elementally heterogeneous.  Thus, insofar as such essential information is lacking, 
all functional accounts of consciousness are on equal footing and “we can only write 
down the bare fact of concomitance; and all talk about either production or transmission, 
as the mode of taking place, is pure superadded hypothesis.”10  Secondly, James suggests 
that the transmission theory has “certain positive superiorities.” One way the transmission 
theory is superior to the productive theory, according to James, is that it begins by 
assuming that consciousness “already exists, behind the scenes, coeval with the world.”11
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The productive theory requires that consciousness is always being produced, de novo, 
while the transmission theory, in contrast, “avoids multiplying miracles.”  Thus, James 
argues that it is simpler to assume that consciousness exists in its own right rather than 
the counter-intuitive assumption that it is produced by something of a seemingly 
dissimilar nature. Another way the transmission theory seems superior to James is that it 
is able to account for “those obscure and exceptional phenomena reported at all times 
throughout human history” such as: 
[R]eligious conversions, providential leadings in answer to prayer, 
instantaneous healings, premonitions, apparitions at time of death, 
clairvoyant visions or impressions, and the whole range of mediumistic 
capacities, to say nothing of still more exceptional and incomprehensible 
things. If all our human thought be a function of the brain, then of course, 
if any of these things are facts,—and to my own mind some of them are 
facts,—we may not suppose that they can occur without preliminary brain-
action.12
According to the production theory, these types of psychic phenomena must be 
understood as meaningless at best, pathological at worst.  The transmission theory, on the 
other hand, naturally accounts for exceptional psychic states, particularly if we “suppose 
the continuity of our consciousness with a mother-sea.”
 
13 If our brain forms a threshold 
against an impinging “mother-sea” of consciousness, the “exceptional waves occasionally 
pouring over the dam” can meaningfully be accounted for.14
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  For these reasons, in 
addition to its consistency with the hope for immortality, James argues the transmission 
theory is the superior theory, though acknowledging many puzzles remain to be solved.   
 
13 Ibid., 94. 
 
14 Ibid. 
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One underlying issue in play, which James addresses in a footnote, is that he is 
admittedly working from the “ordinary dualistic point of view of natural science and of 
common sense” which understands consciousness as a different kind of “stuff or 
substance” than physical objects.15  Thus, the dualism assumed here by James, like in the 
Principles, is strategic and methodological, not James’s settled metaphysical position.  In 
fact, James will continuously move away from dualism, explicitly rejecting it in his later 
works.16   Self-consciously aware of the drift of his own thought, James remarks that he 
is “free, of course, on any later occasion to make an attempt, if I wish, to transcend 
[dualism] and use different categories.”17
The second objection to immortality that James wishes to dispute is what Eugene 
Fontinell calls the “logistical objection.”  This is the idea that immortality cannot be true 
because it would imply that an “incredible and intolerable number of beings” would be 
immortal.  James’s concern, according to Fontinell, is “how could God possibly maintain 
in existence the billions of people who have existed and who will come to exist?”
  In The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
James moves further away from dualistic categories through his use of a consciousness-
as-field metaphor.  Before we turn to that work, however, it remains to consider James’s 
second “grain of truth” concerning the possibility of immortality.   
18
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Indeed, James raises this concern; however, that particular issue neither exhausts nor 
captures the heart of James’s discussion.  The concern for James is not only the 
 
16 In Essays in Radical Empiricism, a series of essays James wrote between 1904-05, he introduces 
his non-dualistic doctrine of Pure Experience; a pluralistic monism which denies any substantive difference 
between the mental and physical.  This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
17 James, op. cit., 82. 
 
18 Fontinell, op. cit., 115. 
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“logistical problem” concerning overpopulation in the City of God, but, more 
importantly, the difficulty we have in believing that billions of souls have been worth 
saving.  Whatever the philosophical merit of this issue, I think James’s discussion here is 
valuable at least insofar as it reveals his belief in and appreciation for the dignity of 
human life--past, present, and future.  According to James, the old “aristocratic view” of 
immortality which claimed only an elite few will be saved is no longer a tenable option.  
Our evolved sympathetic nature, claims James, has led us to reject the exclusivity of this 
old view in favor of a more inclusive “democratic view” of immortality.19
Bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh are these half-brutish prehistoric 
brothers. Girdled about with the immense darkness of this mysterious 
universe even as we are, they were born and died, suffered and struggled. 
Given over to fearful crime and passion, plunged in the blackest 
ignorance, preyed upon by hideous and grotesque delusions, yet 
steadfastly serving the profoundest of ideals in their fixed faith that 
existence in any form is better than non-existence, they ever rescued 
triumphantly from the jaws of ever-imminent destruction the torch of life, 
which, thanks to them, now lights the world for us. How small indeed 
seem individual distinctions when we look back on these overwhelming 
numbers of human beings panting and straining under the pressure of that 
vital want! And how inessential in the eyes of God must be the small 
surplus of the individual's merit, swamped as it is in the vast ocean of the 
common merit of mankind, dumbly and undauntedly doing the 
fundamental duty and living the heroic life! We grow humble and reverent 
as we contemplate the prodigious spectacle. Not our differences and 
distinctions,—we feel—no, but our common animal essence of patience 
under suffering and enduring effort must be what redeems us in the Deity's 
sight. An immense compassion and kinship fill the heart. An immortality 
   For a man 
who earlier professed a kind of nonchalance about this issue of immortality, the following 
eulogistic description of the human plight is surprisingly passionate and inspired: 
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from which these inconceivable billions of fellow-strivers should be 
excluded becomes an irrational idea for us.20
What James is drawing our attention to is the tendency to dismiss as insignificant the 
innumerable lives of our common ancestors as well as a certain blindness we have 
towards the inner lives of others, unable to appreciate their worth.  Although we may be 
incapable of seeing the value of lives so different than our own, James suggests that the 
needs of the Universe and God’s capacity to love are inexhaustible and know no bounds.  
“The heart of being can have no exclusions akin to those which our poor little hearts set 
up,” says James.
 
21
Let us now return to the issue of immortality as a metaphysical possibility by 
considering James’s discussion of consciousness in his landmark work The Varieties of 
Religious Experience.  In Varieties, lectures 9 & 10 are devoted to the psychology of 
religious conversion, one of the main themes of the book.  In lecture 9 James first 
introduces the metaphor of a mental field or a field of consciousness.  According to 
James, within our field of consciousness lie a number of diverse aims or interests around 
which systems of related ideas and objects form.   Moving away from ordinary dualistic 
categories, consciousness is not conceived here as an enduring substantial entity, at least 
not in any typical sense, as James continually stresses the transitivity and temporality of 
consciousness.   
  Thus, despite his earlier remarks, which indicate a modest interest in 
immortality, James’s profuse, emotional exhortations to recognize the sanctity of human 
life reveals a man who was sensitive to the issue of immortality.  James believed we 
generally are worthy of salvation.  But then so are all those “brutes” who preceded us. 
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In order to illustrate how this field of consciousness operates, James uses the 
example of the President of the United States on a camping trip.  As the President 
transitions from the Oval Office to the wilderness, James says he “changes his system of 
ideas from top to bottom.”22  The habits of the President qua camper will hardly resemble 
those habits he left behind in Washington.  James suggests that if this person never 
returned to political life, “he would be for practical intents and purposes a permanently 
transformed being.” 23  Such is the dramatic alteration we may undergo simply by 
changing our aim or center of interest, and “[w]henever one aim grows so stable as to 
expel definitively its previous rivals from the individual's life” a true transformation takes 
place.24  According to James, then, a current aim or interest and its associated system of 
ideas form only a part of the field of consciousness or a sub-field.  As James describes it, 
the sub-field containing our current aim, contains the “excitement,” “hot parts,” and 
“dynamic energy.”25
                                                          
22 VRE, 160. 
   Thus, when the President’s aim is camping in the wilderness, 
firewood, tents, water, wildlife, trees, would be some of the “hot” ideas or objects in his 
sub-field creating “personal desire and volition,” while the ideas and objects affiliated 
with unrelated aims would seem “cold” to him, leaving him passive and indifferent.  
Religious conversions work according to these same general principles.  James writes:  
“[When] the focus of excitement and heat . . . come[s] to lie permanently within a certain 
system; and then, if the change be a religious one, we call it a conversion, especially if it 
 
23 Ibid., 161. 
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be by crisis, or sudden.”26  James calls such a “hot” place, “the habitual centre of . . . 
personal energy.”  For the religious convert, then, “religious ideas, previously peripheral 
in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual 
centre of his energy.”27
Psychology, then, recognizes that shifts of aims occur and can provide a general 
psychological description of the process; yet, psychology, says James, is “unable in a 
given case to account accurately for all the single forces at work.”
 
28  James is claiming 
that how the shifts occur and why some peripheral aims become central eludes the 
purview of the psychologist.  He writes: “Neither an outside observer nor the Subject 
who undergoes the process can explain fully how particular experiences are able to 
change one’s centre of energy so decisively.”29  The underlying nature of these 
reorientations remain, for us, largely opaque.  “We [repeatedly] have a thought,” observes 
James, “but on a certain day the real meaning of the thought peals through us for the first 
time,”  growing “hot and alive within us.”30  To take a somewhat ordinary example, 
consider how, at the end of a class period, a student might finally get what the teacher has 
been trying to communicate and, as James put is, “everything has to re-crystallize about 
it.”31
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  Maybe it is even several years later when one is struck by a new understanding of 
an old bit of information.  When teachers, in particular, speak of “planting seeds” in the 
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minds of their students, it seems they are assuming just such a phenomenon. Teachers 
realize that the ideas impressed upon their students will remain largely peripheral for 
them, at least in the short term; but it is their hope that someday these ideas will bloom 
and fully ripen just as they have in their own mind.  As James suggests, new information 
acts as an accelerant to change while fixed worldviews and habits work as a retardant—
and “influences may work subconsciously or half unconsciously.”32
In lecture 10 of Varieties, the concluding lecture on conversion, James picks up 
on the field-of-consciousness model he introduced in the previous lecture.  In this lecture, 
James turns our attention away from our present “hot” mental field, the habitual center of 
personal energy, to their periphery—their indeterminate margins.  According to James, 
this margin “lies around us like a 'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of energy 
turns like a compass-needle, as the present phase of consciousness alters into its 
successor.”
  As a result, to the 
frustration of psychologists, teachers, and students alike, the how and the why of such 
alterations seem perfectly impossible to predict.   
33  Beyond this margin, says James, float our memories, “ready at a touch to 
come in” and all of our “residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitute our 
empirical self stretches continuously beyond it.”34
The ordinary psychology, admitting fully the difficulty of tracing the 
marginal outline, has taken for granted, first, that all the consciousness the 
person now has, be the same focal or marginal, inattentive or attentive, is 
there in the ‘field’ of the moment, all dim and impossible to assign the 
  Assuming the general accuracy of this 
description of consciousness, James believes that psychology had failed to account for it: 
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latter’s outline may be; and, second, that what is absolutely extra-marginal 
is absolutely non-existent, and cannot be a fact of consciousness at all.35
For James, then, psychology has failed to recognize “a set of memories, thoughts, and 
feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of primary consciousness altogether, but 
yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by 
unmistakable signs.”
 
36  The “extra-marginal” here is what James also refers to as the 
“subconscious,” as well as “ultra-marginal” and “subliminal.”  James describes the recent 
discovery of consciousness existing beyond the field “an entirely unsuspected peculiarity 
in the constitution of human nature.”37  The reality of subliminal consciousness James 
thought was borne out by the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion.  This is the now 
well-known scenario in which a hypnotized subject is ordered to perform some 
designated act upon waking, once given the signal.  When the subject awakens and 
performs the act accordingly, James reports that the person will not remember the 
suggestion and “always trumps up an improvised pretext for his behavior if the act be of 
an excentric [sic] kind.”38
A more commonplace manifestation of subliminal consciousness at work is the 
forgotten name example James employs in lecture 9, though, for a different purpose.  As 
  Additionally, James refers to the work of Alfred Binet, Janet, 
Freud, and others regarding their uncovering of buried memories in hysteric patients 
responsible for insidiously tormenting their daily life—research which inspired many of 
the now familiar approaches to psychotherapy.    
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James describes it, when we try to recollect a forgotten name, we try to draw it out by 
recalling all the “places, person, and things with which the word was connected.”39
Give up the effort entirely; think of something altogether different, and in 
half an hour the lost name comes sauntering into your mind, as Emerson 
says, as carelessly as if it had never been invited. Some hidden process 
was started in you by the effort, which went on after the effort ceased, and 
made the result come as if it came spontaneously. A certain music teacher, 
says Dr. Starbuck, says to her pupils after the thing to be done has been 
clearly pointed out, and unsuccessfully attempted: "Stop trying, and it will 
do itself!"
  We 
can sense that the name is there, just beyond our current field of consciousness, but, as 
James suggests, when we apply more “pressure in its direction” we only seem to keep it 
from breaking through the surface.  Thus, the solution, says James, is often times to take 
just the opposite tact: 
40
This passage is important, not for its practical advice, but, rather, because of James’s idea 
that a “hidden process” set forth in the past can continue to be at work--unbeknownst to 
us.  James draws a direct analogy between the forgotten name suddenly appearing after 
giving up the search and a sudden religious conversion occurring upon self-resignation or 
self-surrender.  In lecture 10, James suggests that such instantaneous conversions are not 
necessarily more divine or more miraculous but rather the outcome of a particular 
psychological peculiarity.  That is, some people have an ultra-marginal consciousness 
which is more developed than others, and this creates a more fertile “region in which 
mental work can go on subliminally, and from which invasive experiences, abruptly 
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upsetting the equilibrium of the primary consciousness, may come.”41
Still, even though the psychological description is adequate to explain the 
phenomenon of religious conversion, James does not believe one must necessarily 
exclude the possibility that the ultra-marginal consciousness of a religious convert was 
affected by the presence of an external “higher control,” e.g., “God.”  James writes:  
  In other words, a 
vast and rich subliminal field potentially allows for a more substantial and momentous 
harvest.  In any case, whether conversions happen gradually or suddenly, James believes 
they are best accounted for by the real efficacy of an ultra-marginal consciousness in 
which hidden processes are ongoing and typically reveal themselves when our present 
field of consciousness is conditioned in their favor.   
Just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to 
the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that if there be 
higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological 
condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious 
region which alone should yield access to them.  The hubbub of the 
waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Subliminal might 
remain ajar or open.42
As Richard R. Niebuhr points out, James advances a double hypothesis.  First, our 
subliminal consciousness may be a gateway to another reality.  Second, this additional 
reality may contain higher spiritual agencies.  For James, these are only hypotheses, but, 
as Niebuhr puts it, hypotheses that James “takes with the greatest seriousness.”
 
43
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  In a 
letter written to Henry W. Rankin in 1901, James describes the gravity of these ideas as 
they relate to his own outlook on life: 
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I attach the mystical or religious consciousness to the possession of an 
extended subliminal self, with a thin partition through which messages 
make irruption.  We are thus made convincingly aware of the presence of 
a sphere of life larger and more powerful than our usual consciousness, 
with which the latter is nevertheless continuous.  The impressions and 
impulsions and emotions and excitements which we thence receive help us 
to live, they found invincible assurance of a world beyond the sense, they . 
. . communicate significance and value to everything.44
James expresses a similar view regarding the reality and value of the world beyond the 
sense in the final lecture of Varieties: 
 
So far as our ideal impulses originate in this [mystical or supernatural] 
region . . . we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we 
belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense 
wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not 
merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune 
with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned 
into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the 
natural world upon our regenerative change.  But that which produces 
effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if 
we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world 
unreal.45
In this passage James has turned from the task of psychological description to what he 
terms “spiritual judgment,” or the determination of the value of a given idea.  For James, 
as is well-known, the value of an idea or belief is determined by its practical effects, by 
its “fruits.”  Accordingly, considering the apparent effects of communing with this 
unseen region—that “new men,” i.e., heroic, moral, and saintly men, are made, the value 
of such communion is immeasurable.  Designating this supreme reality “God,” James 
insists, “We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his 
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influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled.”46  James wrote that psychology is the 
“antechamber to metaphysics,” but here we see psychology was also the antechamber to 
salvation for James.47
As for the topic of immortality, James does not officially take up the issue until 
the final pages, in the postscript.  Discussing the practical significance of religion, James 
claims that most people would cite personal immortality as the first important “difference 
in natural fact” that follows from God’s existence.  James further suggests that religion 
and immortality have become so intertwined that “for the majority of our own race 
[religion] means immortality” and “whoever has doubts of immortality is written down as 
an atheist without farther trial.”
  
48  James, on the contrary, attempts to downplay the 
importance of personality immortality, stating that the issue seems to be a “secondary 
point.”  As long as “our ideals are cared for in ‘eternity,’” writes James, “I do not see 
why we might not be willing to resign their care to other hands than ours.”49  Regarding 
this kind of partial salvation, the salvation of our ideals, James suggests that, “all of us 
are willing [to make this sacrifice], whenever our activity-excitement rises sufficiently 
high.”50
                                                          
46 VRE, 406. 
   Surely, however, James must have recognized that the preservation of human 
relationships, loving ones in particular, is one of our (and James’s) most cherished ideals.  
Even so, what good is the realization of our ideals if there remain no witnesses?  This is a 
point raised by James’s friend Carl Stumpf: 
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Your sentence: ‘If our ideals are only cared for in “eternity”, I do not see 
why we might not be willing to resign their care to other hands than ours’ 
seems to me to contain a sort of inner contradiction.  The realization of 
ideals is only possible on the presupposition of individual immortality. . . .  
Let the earth become frozen, let no new individuals arise, then where is 
the realization of ideals to be found, if the spirit does not endure?51
In response to Stumpf, James admits: 
  
I do not see why there may not be a superhuman consciousness of ideals 
of ours, and that would be our God.  It is all very dark.  I never felt the 
rational need of immortality as you seem to feel it, but as I grow older I 
confess I feel the practical need of it much more than I ever did before; 
and that combines with the reasons, not exactly the same as your own, to 
give me a growing faith in its reality.52
Clearly, the issue of immortality for James was a vital one.  What is going on here is that, 
in Varieties, James consciously attempted to put his best “tough-minded” self forward in 
order to offset what may have appeared as excessive sentimentality.  In the final lecture 
of Varieties, “Conclusions,” James reveals this worry: “In re-reading my manuscript, I 
am almost appalled at the amount of emotionality which I find in it.”
 
53 Additionally, in 
the “Postscript,” after classifying his views as “piecemeal supernaturalism,” James 
describes his precarious position in light of “reigning intellectual tastes”:  “[T]he current 
of thought in academic circles runs against me, and I feel like a man who must set his 
back against an open door quickly if he does not wish to see it closed and locked.”54
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Accordingly, the apparent demotion of personal immortality in favor of the emotionally 
leaner, stoical hope for the preservation of our ideals should be understood in the context 
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of James’s concerted attempt to appease those who may question his intellectual 
discipline and emotional stability.  I say this is only an apparent demotion of immortality 
because James immediately adds:  “Yet I sympathize with the urgent impulse to be 
present ourselves, and in the conflict of impulses, both of them so vague yet both of them 
noble, I know not how to decide.” (my italics)55  Thus, James views both the immortal 
preservation of our ideals in some other consciousness and personal immortality as noble 
ideas but which is more worthy of belief he leaves ultimately undecided.  “It seems to me 
that it is eminently a case for facts to testify,” James concludes, “I consequently leave the 
matter open.”56
For practical life at any rate, the chance of salvation is enough. No fact in 
human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a 
chance. The existence of the chance makes the difference, as Edmund 
Gurney says, between a life of which the keynote is resignation and a life 
of which the keynote is hope.
  That the matter of immortality remained open for James clearly indicates 
his belief in its possibility.  For James, just as was the case with free will, this lack of 
certainty hardly made it a trivial issue.  That is, like free will, the viability of personal 
immortality as a possibility is all a person practically needs to live accordingly.  James 
writes: 
57
Thus, the truth of personal immortality for James was not settled (and never would be), 
but the possibility remained open, i.e., there is a chance it is true and the practical effect 
is the sustaining of hope.  Still, as Fontinell makes clear, the possibility of immortality is 
not a bare chance for James; rather, it is a reasonable extrapolation from the metaphysics 
of a field-self that is articulated in Varieties:  
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We may, unknown to us, be already living “within” this larger life, and 
certain of those fields now constituting the individual self may already be 
playing a role in and in a sense constituting this larger life.  Hence, when 
some, of the fields or relations now constituting personal selves dissolve, it 
is possible that other presently constituting fields might be continued in 
existence through the activity of this larger self.58
Although, again, James’s account of the self or consciousness as field does not imply a 
natural immortality, its essential relatedness to an ultramarginal region, suggests that 
consciousness is, if not more substantial, at least a more robust and pervasive 
phenomenon than previously imagined in Principles.  Thus, even though the expressed 
purpose of Varieties is not to conclusively establish the truth of immortality, James’s 
account does help resolve a related problem identified in the previous chapter, i.e., the 
seemingly insubstantial and flimsy nature of the passing Thought.  Now, if we conceive 
consciousness to be deeply connected to other fundamental realities, powers, and spiritual 
agencies,  any number of future possibilities are opened up for the self--including 
immortality.  And, for James, “the chance of salvation is enough.”
 
59
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 Let us now turn to 
James’s later works which represent his attempt to form a systematic metaphysics in 
which the self could finally find a permanent home. 
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Chapter 5 
Radical Empiricism and Immortality: James’s Quest for Intimacy 
In this chapter I will be considering the nature of the self in James’s later 
metaphysical works, namely the 1909 Hibbert Lectures published as A Pluralistic 
Universe, Some Problems in Philosophy posthumously published in 1911, and Essays in 
Radical Empiricism, a collection of essays written in 1904-05 and posthumously 
published in 1912.  James’s concern with the possibility of an afterlife, I will argue, is 
evident throughout these works as his metaphysical thinking steered him away from 
Cartesian dualism and into an anti-materialistic, pluralistic pantheism bordering on 
panpsychism.  In the 1904-05 essays, James introduces his doctrines of Radical 
Empiricism and Pure Experience, the latter claiming that both consciousness and so-
called physical entities are reducible to the more basic element called “pure experience.”  
The looming issue will be how to understand James’s re-conception of the self in light of 
his radical empiricistic metaphysics.  Of particular concern will be James’s conception of 
the self as non-basic, ultimately relational, and continuous with wider fields of 
consciousness.  One of the main issues that will arise for James is how a self can be part 
of a larger consciousness, yet still exist as a distinct consciousness.  James never 
satisfactorily resolves the matter but the problem moves him in a novel direction, 
eventually leading him to stress the importance of intimacy over intellectualistic logic and 
so-called rationality.  The result, I argue, is that the possibility of life after death becomes 
even more crystallized in James’s thought. 
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In 1904 James wrote the essay “Does Consciousness Exist?” published in 1912 as 
part of Essays in Radical Empiricism.  In this essay James abandons the Cartesian 
dualism he methodologically and ambivalently adopted in the Principles.  Throughout his 
life James expressed reservations and doubts about the adequacy of Cartesian dualism but 
it wasn’t until the last decade of his life that he proposed his alternative metaphysics 
featuring the dual doctrines of Radical Empiricism and Pure Experience.  As Gale 
correctly observes, although James discusses them concurrently, these two doctrines are 
logically independent of one another.1  James describes Radical Empiricism as his 
“weltanschauung,” a “mosaic philosophy” that, like Humean empiricism, begins with 
individual “plural facts” which refer “neither to substances in which they inhere nor to an 
absolute mind that creates them as its objects.”2
. . . an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element 
that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is 
directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of 
relation experienced must be accounted as ''real' as anything else in the 
system.
  However, to be radical, James writes: 
3
In sum, philosophical inquiry ought to acknowledge everything directly experienced as 
“real,” and “ a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term 
or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.”
 
4
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  Thus, contra Hume, experienced 
relations are just as real as their relata.  Although James’s doctrine of Radical Empiricism 
designates everything directly experienced as “real,” it does not go so far as to make 
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claims about the ultimate nature or ontological ordering of things experienced.  For this 
task, James employed the complementary doctrine of Pure Experience.   
The Pure Experience doctrine is an alternative conception of reality in which 
mind and body are real but not fundamental elements--neither is considered to be an 
irreducible, substantive entity.  James suggested that what is more basic or primitive than 
either mind or body is “pure experience.” Pure experience is the chief ingredient of 
James’s metaphysics, conceived as constitutive of both mind and body but neither mental 
nor physical per se.  James begins the essay “The Thing and Its Relation,” with an 
attempt to clarify his concept: 
Pure experience is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life 
which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual 
categories.  Only newborn babies, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, 
illnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the 
literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite what, tho’ ready to be 
all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects 
that don’t appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases 
interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be 
caught.  Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or 
sensation.  But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with 
emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed and 
abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives 
and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions.  Its purity is only a relative 
term, meaning the proportional amount of unverbalized sensation which it 
still embodies.5
Pure experience, then, may be compared to the unconceptualized “blooming, buzzing 
confusion” in Principles used to describe the raw awareness of the infant.  It is that which 
comprises the ever-changing, continuous flux we first encounter as newborn babies and 
out of which particular aspects become “fixed and abstracted.”  Perry observes that, 
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“Radical empiricism consists essentially in converting to the uses of metaphysics that 
‘stream of consciousness’ which was designated originally for psychology.”6   Myers 
agrees, adding, “Pure experience is the stream of consciousness as it is before any 
conceptualization of distinction-making is applied to it.”7
The instant field of the present is always experienced in its ‘pure’ state, 
plain unqualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated into thing 
and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as 
someone’s opinion about fact. . . . Only in the later experience that 
supersedes the present one is the naïf immediacy retrospectively split into 
two parts, a ‘consciousness’ and its ‘content.’
  The stream of consciousness, 
originating in immediate feeling or sensation, is reconceived by James as pure 
experience, becoming the mainspring of his metaphysics. The important development 
here is that James argues that the mind-body dichotomy is not native to immediate or 
pure experience, but, instead, arises only retrospectively--through conceptualization.  
Mind and body, in other words, are not two radically opposed entities, but dissimilarities 
within pure experience, there being no ultimate distinction between them.  
8
Thus, the mental and physical exist in pure experience “only virtually” or latently.  
According to James, what determines whether something appears to be mind or body is 
the eventual arrangement and contextual relations of pure experience.  James writes: 
 
In the essay “Does Consciousness Exist?” I have tried to show that when 
we call an experience “conscious,” that does not mean that it is suffused 
throughout with a peculiar modality of being (‘psychic’ being) as stained 
glass may be suffused with light, but rather that it stands in certain 
determinate relations to other portions of experience extraneous to itself.  
These form one peculiar “context” for it; while, taken in another context 
of experiences, we class it as a fact in the physical world.  This “pen,” for 
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example is, in the first instance, a bald that, a datum, phenomenon, content 
or whatever other neutral or ambiguous name you may prefer to apply.  I 
call it in that article a “pure experience.”  To get classed either as a 
physical pen or as some one’s perception of a pen, it must assume a 
function, and that can only happen in a more complicated world.  So far as 
in that world it is a stable feature, holds ink, marks paper and obeys the 
guidance of a hand, it is a physical pen.  That is what we mean by being 
“physical” in a pen.   So far as it is instable, on the contrary, coming and 
going with the movements of my eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, 
continuous with infrequent experiences of its “having been” (in the past 
tense), it is the percept of a pen in my mind.  Those peculiarities are what 
we mean by “conscious,” in a pen.9
Thus, the distinction between the mental and the physical is only functional.  According 
to James’s analysis, my thought of a particular pen and the pen-as-physical-object I’m 
thinking about is not an indication of two different entitative realities but, rather, different 
contextual arrangement of pure experience—different arrangements of the “bald that.”  
James’s favorite analogy is to compare the pen to a common point on intersecting lines—
even though each line proceeds in a different direction, they share a common point.  In 
the pen example, mental and physical experiences, like the intersecting lines, share the 
common point of the pen. Moreover, pure experience, the “that,” is not to be thought of 
as a uniform kind of “stuff,” thoroughly homogenous. On the contrary, the signature 
characteristic of pure experience is pluralism: 
 
Although for fluency’s sake I myself spoke early in this article of a stuff of 
pure experience, I have now to say that there are ‘natures’ in the things 
experienced.  If you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of, 
the answer is always the same: ‘It is made of that, of just what appears, of 
space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not.’10
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Pure experience is pluralistic, heterogeneity is part of its nature.  Thus, James is not 
proposing a neutral monism, as he is sometimes interpreted as doing.  Myers points out 
that James’s analysis of reality into different functions fits with his general principle that 
all conceptualization of experience is a fragmented selection for practical ends, his 
central thesis being:  “Subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is 
aboriginally made of its classification.  Classifications depend on our temporary 
purposes”11
The great difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are 
continuous and concepts are discrete.  Not discrete in their being, for 
conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each 
other in their several meanings.
  In Some Problems of Philosophy, James writes: 
12
Myers believes this attempt by James to reduce the mental and physical to functions of 
pure experience fails.  The main problem, according to Myers, is that there is no that that 
we can identify which now functions as a physical object, now as a conscious object.  
Pure experience is not something we directly experience and as a theoretical construct it 
makes no practical difference and fails Jamesian pragmatism.
 
13
If physical things are nothing but complexes of sensations, then the 
materialistic view—that everything begins and ends in physical processes 
differ in character from the felt or noticed details of our sensations—
begins to dissolve.  All sorts of possibilities emerge: our conscious states 
  Still, regardless of 
whether or not James’s metaphysics of pure experience is a failure, we can easily see that 
what James was striving towards was a non-materialistic vision of reality in which the 
mental and physical are essentially continuous.  Myers notes the momentous implications 
of James’s radical vision: 
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may not depend totally upon our brains; our sensations and inner lives 
may coalesce in a larger context which cannot be conceived by analogy to 
the physical environment; and our own experiences may be part of a 
larger, godlike consciousness.14
Indeed, the possibility that our experience “may be part of a larger, godlike 
consciousness” reaches its height in James’s metaphysical writing and will be discussed 
shortly.  For now, it should not escape our attention that there was more than one casualty 
in James’s metaphysics.  James’s double-barreled assault on dualism eliminated 
materialism, but it also forced him to reject traditional conceptions of consciousness.  
Namely, given his functional account of the mental and physical, James was forced to 
deny that consciousness was a basic, irreducible entity.  Myers comments that, in his final 
years, James became convinced of his earlier reflection in Principles that no uniquely 
psychical or nonphysiological consciousness is detectable by introspection.
 
15
I believe that ‘consciousness,’ when once it has evaporated to this state of 
pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether.  It is the name 
of a nonentity. . . .  Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, 
the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ‘soul’ upon the air of 
philosophy. . . . It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and 
universally discarded.
  This was 
partly responsible for materialistic interpretations of James by Dewey and others.  For 
James, then, consciousness in not an entity or something introspectable but, instead, the 
ways in which experiences function in relation to one another.  He writes: 
16
Given James’s unequivocal rejection of an entitative conception of consciousness, some 
obvious questions arise concerning how the self fits into James’s new metaphysical 
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landscape.  In particular, if consciousness is nothing but a function of pure experience, 
what becomes of the prospects for human immortality that, as I’ve been arguing, James 
was evidently concerned with?   
Eugene Fontinell maintains that the field language invoked in A Pluralistic 
Universe recommends a view of the self and consciousness that is very agreeable with the 
possibility of personal immortality.  One of the main features of James’s radical 
empiricism, notes Fontinell, is a conception of the self and reality in terms of overlapping 
fields of consciousness—an idea largely inspired by the work of Gustav Fechner.17
Every smallest state of consciousness, concretely taken, overflows its own 
definition.  Only concepts are self identical; only ‘reason’ deals with 
closed equations; nature is but a name for excess; every point opens out 
and runs into the more.
  In A 
Pluralistic Universe James devotes the lecture “Concerning Fechner” to his views.  
James extols Fechner as a rare example of a philosopher who gets at the “thickness” of 
reality, the concrete, and contrasts his philosophy to thin, rationalistic systems which 
dissect reality to the point of leaving it stagnant.  James agrees with Fechner that the 
conceptual language employed by most philosophers is incommensurable with lived 
reality. 
18
Moreover, James was sympathetic with Fechner’s view that “the more inclusive forms of 
consciousness are in part constituted by the more limited forms.”
 
19
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   Fechner, as 
described by James, views our relation to the earth as analogous to the relation between 
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organs and body—human consciousness here functioning as so many channels of  input 
into the encompassing earth-soul.  James explains: 
What we are without knowing, it [the earth-soul] knows what we are.  We 
are closed against its world, but that world is not closed against us.  It is as 
if the total universe of inner life had a sort of grain or direction, a sort of 
valvular structure, permitting knowledge to flow in one way only, so that 
the wider might always have the narrower under observation, but never the 
narrower the wider.20
According to this understanding, each human consciousness is comprised of finite fields 
and relations, each distinct from one another but ultimately coalescing within and 
partially comprising a wider field (or fields) of consciousness. Thus, as Fechner, James, 
and Fontinell want to suggest, we may, this very instant, be already living in the midst of 
a larger life in which some of our fields are already factoring in.  This is what James has 
in mind when he writes that “we finite minds may simultaneously be co-conscious with 
one another in a superhuman intelligence.”
  
21
I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form 
of experience extant in the universe.  I believe rather that we stand in 
much the same relation to the whole universe as our canine and feline pets 
do to the whole of human life.  They inhabit our drawing-rooms and 
libraries.  They take part in the scenes of whose significance they have no 
inkling.  They are merely tangent to curves of history the beginnings and 
ends and forms of which pass wholly beyond their ken.  So we are tangent 
to the wider life of things.  But just as many of the dog’s and cat’s ideals 
coincide with our ideals, and the dogs and cats have daily living proof of 
the fact, so we may well believe, on the proofs that religious experience 
affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to save the world on ideal 
lines similar to our own.
   
22
Consequently, it is conceivable that, when some of the fields now constituting personal 
selves dissolve, other presently constituting fields might be continued in existence 
 
                                                          
20 PU, 129-30. 
 
21 Ibid., 132. 
 
22 Ibid., 144. 
131 
 
through the activity of this larger “self.”   Speculating along with Fechner about the 
possibility of immortality, James suggests that after death we may enter “into new 
combinations, being affected by the perceptive experiences of those living then, and 
affecting the living in their turn.”23  The notion of an extraordinary context in which such 
relationships are effected corresponds to the “more” beyond the margin of our present 
consciousness which plays such a prominent role in Varieties.  James recapitulates this 
idea in “A World of Pure Experience,” asserting that “Our fields of experience have no 
more definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a more 
that continuously develops, and that continuously superseded them as life proceeds.24   
Perry stresses that “the idea of consciousness ‘beyond the margin’ or ‘below the 
threshold’ was a metaphysical hypothesis of the first importance,” affording James “an 
experimental approach to religion” and providing the “possibility of giving scientific 
support to supernaturalistic faith.”25
The problem of the nature of consciousness and whether it can compound vexed 
James for his entire professional life.  Early in his career, James held that states of 
consciousness appear as they really are, as indivisible wholes.  This position was 
defended in “The Mind-Stuff Theory,” chapter 6 of Principles: 
  But for the metaphysical hypothesis of overlapping 
and enveloping fields of consciousness to be viable what is needed is an account of how 
distinct consciousnesses can compound and yet maintain their distinctness.  That is, how 
can my conscious experience be both mine and, at the same time, convergent and 
constitutive of another consciousness as Fechner and James are suggesting?   
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There are no unperceived units of mind-stuff preceding and composing 
the full consciousness.  The latter is itself an immediate psychic fact and 
bears an immediate relation to the neural state which is its unconditional 
accompaniment.  Did each neural shock give rise to its own psychic shock, 
and the psychic shocks then combine, it would be impossible to 
understand why severing one part of the central nervous system from 
another should break up the integrity of consciousness.  The cut has 
nothing to do with the psychic world.26
To illustrate this point, James asks us to consider what is experienced when we receive 
the taste of lemonade: 
 
The physical lemonade contains both the lemon and the sugar, but its taste 
does not contain their tastes, for it there are any two things which are 
certainly not present in the taste of lemonade, those are the lemon-sour on 
the one hand and the sugar-sweet on the other.  These tastes are absent 
utterly.27
In the 1895 essay “The Knowing of Things Together,” James reversed his stance: “In a 
glass of lemonade we can taste both the lemon and sugar at once.  In a major chord our 
ear can single out the c, e, g, and c’, if it has once become acquainted with these notes 
apart.  And so on through the whole field of experience, whether conceptual or 
sensible.”
 
28  Myers suggests that what caused James’s turnabout was a realization that 
some states of consciousness have an inner complexity that can be identified 
introspectively. He conceded that mental states can be made up of smaller parts of the 
same sort of “stuff,” and resemble in this respect physical things.29
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  But introspection was 
not the only reason James changed course.  James was not only compelled by 
introspection, but additionally by the conceptual difficulty of how two states of 
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29 Myers, op. cit., 62. 
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consciousness can have the exact same object in common.  For, if two people are 
simultaneously perceiving the same pen and their states of consciousness are unique and 
indivisible, we would not be able to claim that they are looking at the same object.  James 
asks, “How can two fields be units if they contain this common part?  We must overhaul 
the whole business of connection, confluence and the like, and do it radically.”30
Still, it remained for James an open question whether or not consciousnesses 
themselves may compound.  Or, as James puts it: “Whether ‘states of consciousness,’ so 
called, can separate and combine themselves freely, and keep their own identity 
unchanged while forming parts of simultaneous fields of experience of wider scope.”
   Such a 
view goes against common sense, denying any real commonality amongst minds.  Thus, 
James came to the eventual conclusion that states of consciousness must be complex and 
in his metaphysics of radical empiricism he explicitly rejected the notion of 
consciousness simpliciter--consciousness as a basic, indivisible, psychic whole.  James 
made consciousness more continuous with the physical, each being complex 
arrangements of pure experience, itself pluralistic.   
31
The difficulty seemed to be the same, you remember, whether we took it 
in psychology as the composition of finite states of mind out of simpler 
finite states, or in metaphysics as the composition of the absolute mind out 
of finite minds in general. It is the general conceptualist difficulty of any 
one thing being the same with many things, either at once or in succession, 
  
In “The Compounding of Consciousness,” lecture 4 of A Pluralistic Universe, James 
comes to realize that all of these dilemmas regarding consciousness come up against the 
same logical quandary: 
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for the abstract concepts of oneness and manyness must needs exclude 
each other.32
The “conceptualist difficulty” at issue here is the logic of identity, which James singles 
out as the culprit responsible for stifling his thinking on the matter:   
  
Sincerely, and patiently as I could, I struggled with the problem for years. 
. . . How can my consciousnesses be at the same time one consciousness?  
How can one and the same identical fact experience itself so diversely?  
The struggle was in vain; I found myself at an impasse. I saw that I must 
either forswear that “psychology without a soul” to which my whole 
psychological and Kantian education had committed me,--I must, in short, 
bring back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now singly 
and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and common 
sense—or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem 
impossible, and then either give up my intellectualistic logic, the logic of 
identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) form of rationality, or, finally, 
face the fact that life is logically irrational.33
James makes the momentous decision to give up the intellectualistic logic, accepting the 
implication that the universe likely defies logic and so-called rationality.  The catalyst for 
James’s brash declaration was the French philosopher Henri Bergson.  Fechner inspired 
James to envisage the world as alive and in terms of hierarchical, overlapping fields of 
consciousness, but it was Bergson who finally convinced James that a logically rigorous, 
abstract conceptualization of the world necessarily distorts and inadequately represents it.   
 
Regarding Bergson’s influence on James, Perry writes that this was “Without 
doubt the most important philosophical and personal attachment of James’s later years . . 
.”34
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  James had read Bergson’s Matter and Memory in 1896 but claimed to set it aside 
because the ideas were “so new and vast that I could not be sure that I fully understood 
 
33 Ibid., 94. 
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them.”35   However, when James reread the work in 1902 he was overcome with 
enthusiasm, prompting him to write to Bergson in order to thank him for his “work of 
exquisite genius.”36  James included with the letter “a little popular lecture of mine on 
immortality” as well as his latest book, the Varieties of Religious Experience.37  What 
James found so enthralling was Bergson’s criticism of intellectualism which included a 
“conclusive demolition of the dualism of object and subject in perception.”38  James 
agreed with Bergson that conceptual thought can only grasp reality in a superficial, 
piecemeal fashion--unable to capture the continuity and “thickness” of the sensible flux 
of experience.  The basic idea was present as early as Principles when James noted how 
“Every one of our conceptions is of something which our attention originally tore out of 
the continuum of felt experience, and provisionally isolated so as to make of it an 
individual topic of discourse.”39   James became a Bergsonian insofar as both believed 
that intellectualistic logic arrests continuous aspects of reality into static, discrete, and 
ultimately discontinuous concepts.  Thus, these concepts are derivatives, having been 
“abstracted and generalized from long-forgotten perceptual instances from which they 
have as it were flowered out.”40
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  In the “Miller-Bode Objections,” James declares: “No 
discrimination without separation; no separation without absolute ‘independence’ and 
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thereupon impossibility of union.”41  James indicts Plato and Socrates as progenitors of 
this lamentable state of affairs as they encouraged the idea that what is most “real” is not 
the thing encountered in experience, but its definition—its essence.  By contrast, what is 
most real for James is just that temporal flux of experience Socrates and Plato found so 
contemptible.  “Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you 
will,” writes James, “exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.”42   James insists that 
“Bergson is absolutely right in contending that the whole of life of activity and change is 
inwardly impenetrable to conceptual treatment, and that it opens itself only to 
sympathetic apprehension at the hands of immediate feeling.”43
As long as one continues talking, intellectualism remains in undisturbed 
possession of the field.  The return to life can’t come about by talking.  It 
is an act:  to make you return to life, I must . . . deafen you to talk. . . . Or I 
must point, point to the mere that of life.
 James was convinced 
that language-use took us a step back from reality:  
44
Reality is too profuse for words. “Language is the most imperfect and expensive means 
yet discovered for communicating thought.” Gavin characterizes James as a “radical 
realist,”  Being can be alluded to, pointed toward, but not completely captured in 
speech.
 
45
What an awful trade that of professor is—paid to talk, talk, talk!  I have 
seen artists growing pale and sick whilst I talked to them without being 
  James writes: 
                                                          
41 Manuscript Essays and Notes, 113. 
 
42 PU, 96. 
 
43 Ibid., 122n. 
 
44 Ibid., 131. 
 
45 Gavin, Reinstatement of the Vague, 79. 
 
137 
 
able to stop. . . . It would be an awful universe if everything could be 
converted into words, words, words.46
Yet, James’s view of language was not wholly negative.  He clearly realized that 
language has many practical uses, namely, it allows us to successfully navigate reality:  
“The only things which we commonly see are those which we preperceive . . . which have 
been labeled for us. . . . If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in 
the midst of the world.”  Seigfried comments that, “It is not an exaggeration to say that 
all of James’s central concerns are expressed in striking metaphors and analogies” which 
is due to the “inadequacy of all efforts to conceptually verbalize experience.”
 
47
James saw that reality as it is lived and experienced is pluralistic yet continuous 
and related; therefore, any philosophy characterized by retrospective classifications and 
thin conceptualizations required for intellectualistic logic would not do.  “Philosophy,” 
writes James, “should seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality, 
not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results.  Thus, the 
most authentic picture of reality for James would be the one with the fewest boundaries.   
 
Boundaries are things that intervene; but nothing intervenes save parts of 
the perceptual flux itself, and these are overflowed by what they separate, 
so that whatever we distinguish and isolate conceptually is found 
perceptually to telescope and compenetrate and diffuse into its 
neighbors.48
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Perry remarks that continuity is “one of the master keys to the understanding of James’ 
thought.  It is the dominant feature of his last metaphysics.”49
If you imagine that this entrance after the death of the body into a common 
life of higher type means a merging and loss of our distinct personality, 
Fechner asks you whether a visual sensation of our own exists in any 
sense less for itself or less distinctly, when it enters into our higher 
relational consciousness and is there distinguished and defined.
   Thus, James never does 
give an account of how consciousnesses can compound and still remain distinct; he 
simply agrees with Fechner that experience does not preclude such a possibility: 
50
Again, the more general point being made here is that, although incommensurable 
according to intellectualistic logic, unity and plurality “compenetrate” in everyday 
experience—neat conceptual divisions don’t exist in reality.  As Fechner’s example 
suggests, my present conscious state is a unity of various sensory inputs, yet the 
distinctness and singularity of each input remains.  To the charge that the universe is a 
“contradiction incarnate,” James answers: “If logic says it is one, so much the worse for 
logic.  Logic being the lesser thing, the static incomplete abstraction, must succumb to 
reality, not reality to logic.”
  
51
The fact that experience contained a profuseness of varying relations was 
especially important for radical empiricism since James thought that particular relations 
of pure experience determined whether it is to be classified as physical or mental.  James 
critique of traditional empiricism was based on its failure to acknowledge that “the 
relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any 
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kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ''real' as anything else in the 
system.”52
An additional upshot of James’s metaphysics, where continuity and relation is the 
rule, is that it offers us a more intimate world.  In his essay, “Interpreting the Universe 
After a Social Analogy: Intimacy, Panpsychism, and a Finite God in A Pluralistic 
Universe,” David C. Lamberth suggests that a desire for an intimate universe, both 
phenomenologically and metaphysically, was a central theme running throughout James’s 
Hibbert Lectures.
  Traditional rationalism, on the other hand, was intolerant of individuality, 
change, and novelty.  For rationalism, according to James, the unifying relation between 
different aspects of reality is accomplished through the existence of the all-encompassing, 
ethereal Absolute.  James’s weltanschauung attempts to preserve the dynamic 
characteristics of reality which means accepting the reality of conjunctions and real 
transitions which are so basic to our concrete experience.  But there were still further 
implications of James’s visioin. 
53  On this view, James’s development of radical empiricism and pure 
experience, emphasizing continuity and relations, worked hand in hand with a desire for a 
universe hospitable and responsive to our most cherished ideals.  James goes so far as to 
suggest that intimacy should be a criterion by which the adequacy of a philosophy should 
be judged:  “Perhaps the words ‘foreignness’ and ‘intimacy,’ which I put forward in my 
first lecture, express the contrast I insist on better than the words ‘rationality’ and 
‘irrationality.’”54
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The essay Lamberth refers us to is “The Types of Philosophic Thinking,” and in it 
the importance of intimacy in James’s thinking comes to the forefront.  James begins the 
work by repeating his well-known belief that a person’s philosophy is inevitably a 
reflection of their temperament.  James writes that a philosophy is “the expression of a 
man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately 
adopted reactions of human characters upon it.”55  More specifically, according to James, 
all world-views and philosophies are derived from analogies made to lived experiences:  
“. . . the only material we have at our disposal for making a picture of the whole world is 
supplied by the various portions of that world of which we have already had 
experience.”56
We can invent no new forms of conception, applicable to the whole 
exclusively, and not suggested originally by the parts. All philosophers, 
accordingly, have conceived of the whole world after the analogy of some 
particular feature of it which has particularly captivated their attention.
  James continues: 
57
James recognized that there is something inevitably idiosyncratic about particular 
philosophies, and yet, because all derive from a shared human mode of experience, there 
is enough commonality to prevent philosophy from being irretrievably individualistic.  
That is, although “Different men find their minds more at home in very different 
fragments of the world,” we assume everyone, insofar as they are human beings, are 
interfaced with reality in roughly the same way.
 
58
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 In any case, James submits that, with 
respect to our attitude towards the universe, we all share the same desire:  “We crave 
55 PU, 14. 
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alike to feel more truly at home with it, and to contribute our mite to its amelioration.”59
On the basis of intimacy, James prefers spiritualistic philosophies over their 
materialistic counterparts.  Materialistic philosophies, arising out of a “cynical character,” 
define the world “so as to leave man’s soul upon it as sort of outside passenger or alien,” 
says James.
  
To “feel more truly at home” is, in general, what James means by intimacy.  But not all 
homes are created equally—some homes are homier, i.e., more intimate than others.   
60  According to James, spiritualistic philosophies, by contrast, arise from a 
“sympathetic temper.”  These philosophies “insist that the intimate and human must 
surround and underlie the brutal.”61
. . . outsiders and keeps us foreigners in relation to God, in which, at any 
rate, his connexion with us appears as unilateral and not reciprocal. His 
action can affect us, but he can never be affected by our reaction. Our 
relation, in short, is not a strictly social relation.
  Thus, on the basis of intimacy, he prefers 
spiritualistic philosophies and rejects materialistic philosophies from further 
consideration. Continuing his analysis, James distinguishes between two different forms 
spiritualistic philosophy has taken: dualistic theism and pantheism.  The problem James 
notices with dualistic theism is that it tends to make us: 
62
In other words, intimacy as mere closeness or withness is not sufficient intimacy.  The 
intimacy that James believes we crave involves the additional “social relation” which is 
characterized by reciprocal activities.  That is to say, part and parcel of our desire for an 
intimate universe is the possibility of ameliorative activity within that universe as well.  
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Accordingly, pantheism, by including humans beings in the divine, is able to attain a 
“higher reach of intimacy,” than dualistic theism.63   Unlike dualistic theism, pantheism 
does not maintain an insurmountable gulf between an infinite God and His finite 
creatures.  Pantheism is thus more intimate than dualistic theism.  However, pantheism 
comes in monistic and pluralistic varieties, the latter of which, according to James, is the 
more intimate philosophy.64
James contends that radical empiricism is superior insofar as it is more intimate in 
the phenomenological sense of comporting with our lived, concrete experience as well as 
in the metaphysical sense of granting reality to all we directly experience.  As Lamberth 
puts it: 
  The pluralistic variety of pantheism James has in mind, of 
course, is his own radical empiricism.  James seeks to show that radical empiricism is 
more intimate than its monistic competitors, namely, rationalistic philosophies of the 
Absolute.  
Intimacy concerns not only the phenomenological affects that can be 
discerned through considering the subject, in addition intimacy refers 
directly to the concrete characteristics of factual relations, conjunctive and 
disjunctive, which are  constitutive of all of reality as such (inclusive of 
thoughts and things).  Intimacy as a criterion, then, demands a philosophy 
that is both phenomenologically and metaphysically responsive to 
experience.65
As we have seen, James’s metaphysics of radical empiricism and pure experience, 
compared with its rationalistic counterparts and their thin abstractions and intellectualistic 
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logic, more adequately envisaged reality as it experienced—in all its continuity and 
connectedness—thus best satisfying that craving for essential relatedness and intimacy.   
But what James’s believes makes his metaphysics finally superior is that it suggests only 
a finite God with whom we coincide and actively work to better reality.   
In James’s metaphysics, unlike dualistic theism, there is no unbridgeable gulf 
between humans and a finite God, and, unlike monistic pantheism, a meaningful, 
interactive social relationship is possible.  Moreover, a finite God, not being all-powerful, 
is not necessarily indicted by the presence of imperfection and evil.  Additionally, human 
freedom and novelty are more compatible with a non-monistic world.  James admits that 
a pluralistic universe featuring a finite God is incomplete, but it is “self-reparative 
through us, as getting its disconnections remedied in part by our behavior.”66
Thus does foreignness get banished from our world, and far more so when 
we take the system of it pluralistically than when we take it monistically. 
We are indeed internal parts of God and not external creations, on any 
possible reading of the panpsychic system. Yet because God is not the 
absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, 
his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other 
smaller parts—as similar to our functions consequently.
  This is 
what James refers to as “meliorism,” which he contrasts with optimism and pessimism.  
Optimism says the world must and shall be saved; pessimism says the world cannot be 
saved, while meliorism claims that the world may be saved.  The remedy is accomplished 
by cooperating with God--the being having the wider, more encompassing field of 
consciousness with whom we are essentially continuous.  Regarding this essential 
relatedness, James writes, 
67
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Thus, any super-human consciousness should not be something wholly different and 
unrelatable, but, instead, will be similar to the kinds of consciousness we are familiar 
with.  Moreover, James suggests, “Having an environment, being in time, and working 
out a history just like ourselves, [God] escapes from the foreignness from all that is 
human, of the static timeless perfect absolute.”68
The believer finds that the tenderer parts of his personal life are 
continuous with a more of the same quality which is operative in the 
universe outside of him and which he can keep in touch with, and in a 
fashion get on board and save himself, when all his lower being has gone 
to pieces in the wreck.  In a word, the believer is continuous, to his own 
consciousness, at any rate, with a wider self from which saving 
experiences flow in.
  In addition, the redemptive power 
advanced by traditional notions of God is not abandoned under this finite conception: 
69
  
 
As Lamberth observes, in Varieties “the relational character of religious experience” was 
a subjective one, confined to the mind.  In James’s metaphysics, however, it “can be 
understood as an objective function within the fabric of pure experience.”70 What James 
previously referred to as the “wider self” and “the more” can be taken to refer not merely 
to a subjective subconscious region but also to a real “superhuman consciousness.”71
 But what are the implications of a finite God for James’s hope for immortality?  
Was James’s finite God finite in every respect?  Could there come a time when 
Nietzsche’s proclamation, “God is dead,” could literally be true--in which case we are 
simply out of luck?  In A Pluralistic Universe, James writes that God is best conceived 
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not as all-embracing, but as “finite, either in power or knowledge, or in both at once.”72  
Thus, as James conceives it, there may be limitations on what such a God can do and 
what He can know, but James neither suggests nor seems to be concerned about whether 
or not God’s existence is ultimately contingent.  In the 1881 essay “Reflex Action and 
Theism,” James argues that God, “if he did exist, would form the most adequate possible 
object for minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at the root of the universe.”73  
James then clarifies what he means by the term “God”:  “First, it is essential that God be 
conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under 
the form of a mental personality.”74  Although he does not explicitly discuss the issue, by 
defining God as “deepest power in the universe” James seems to be implying that God is 
everlasting.  For, if God’s existence is contingent upon other realities, these other 
realities, at least in one respect, could be considered more powerful than God.  That is to 
say, it could be argued that whatever has the last say in terms of Being, in terms of 
existence, could claim to be the “deepest power.”  In any case, James later makes the 
comment that, although one does not know exactly how one interacts with God, “It is 
sufficient for him to know that he himself simply is, and needs God; and that behind this 
universe God simply is and will be forever, and will in some way hear his call” (my 
italics).75
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  Thus, James does seem to understand God as necessarily everlasting, 
otherwise, as was mentioned above, there may come a time when “the deepest power in 
the universe” is dead—along with all of the previously sustained hopes and ideals carried 
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therein.  As Ellen Kappy Suckiel justifiably notes, “James offers a plethora of ideas and 
suggestions regarding the concept of God, many of which appear to be in a state of 
gestation, and which require a great deal more analysis than he provides.”76
That James in working out his metaphysics of radical empiricism was constantly 
shoring up the possibility of immortality I think should now be obvious.  The craving for 
an intimate and ongoing relationship with the universe, with a higher and wider 
consciousness one may call “God,” was supposed to be more fully realized beyond this 
life, and into the future.  A quick fling wouldn’t do.  As James puts it, our essential 
continuity with a wider field of consciousness is our life raft “when lower being has gone 
to pieces in the wreck.”  Although, when it comes to filling in the details on how this all 
is supposed to work, James simply doesn’t.  Instead of nuts and bolts, we are given 
suggestive metaphors and analogies, a “vague blueprint” as Myers calls it—which is 
perhaps the best that can be done.
  Perhaps 
James would respond here with a similar line of reasoning he used in Principles 
regarding the possibility of immortality.  If we suppose the universe is rational, and if 
God exists as the best and most valuable thing within it, it would be irrational to suppose 
God is not everlasting.  In any case, James does appear to assume the eternality of his 
finite God. 
77
In his notes for a second series of Gifford Lectures, James wrote, “Philosophies 
are only pictures of the world which have grown up in the minds of different 
  All commentators realize James left many important 
questions unanswered.   
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individuals.”78
In the final chapter I will conclude that James’s quest for securing future 
possibilities for the self is a reflection of both the Promethean and mystic aspects of his 
life and thought—and there was nothing contradictory about combining the two 
endeavors for James.  I don’t believe there is a division in James’s psyche nor his 
philosophy.  Again, James’s understanding of psychical phenomena, his analysis of 
religious experience, and his radical empiricistic metaphysics expanded the possibilities 
for the self and rendered the subject more active in the world.  
  And a “picture of the world” is probably the best way to describe James’s 
radical empiricistic metaphysics.  James’s vision of reality offers possibilities such as 
immortality and is intentionally meant to be consistent with science, even supported by it, 
but he is not attempting to offer any kind of scientific or philosophic proof.  Rather, 
James is offering us those analogies he spoke of earlier as he tried to incorporate reality 
as he experienced it into conceptual language.  James never proved that we may survive 
bodily death but, as he developed his metaphysics and his vision of reality came more 
and more into focus, the more it made perfect sense. 
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Chapter 6 
Mysticism in James’s Thought: A Final Reply to Gale 
Throughout the previous four chapters I have argued that James’s belief in the 
possibility of immortality grew stronger as he developed an understanding of the self that 
increasingly grounded such a possibility.  With this account in place, I will now return to 
Gale’s divided-self thesis that was set aside at the end of the first chapter.  If you’ll recall, 
in the first chapter I argued, against Gale, that James was not a mystic.  As we have seen, 
James’s understanding of the self certainly provides a conceptual framework to account 
for mystical experiences, but he himself was not one.  In any case, what remained to be 
decided was Gale’s further argument that two incommensurable types of selves are 
present within James’s philosophy.  In this chapter I will conclude my re-unification of 
James by considering Gale’s characterization of these selves, ultimately concluding that 
Gale’s characterization not only runs against the current of James’s thought, but, in 
addition, is unsupported by and conflicts with James’s texts.  In the end I will have 
hopefully offered a more coherent and cohesive view of the Jamesian self and its 
dramatic possibilities. 
To be clear, the two incompatible selves that Gale identifies within James’s 
philosophy, the Promethean self and the mystical self, are not incompatible in the same 
way, for example, that being Donald Trump is incompatible with being Michael Jordan.  
That is to say, they are not incompatible simply because of a lack of time, talent, and 
competing interests.   James fully appreciated this sort of incompatibility:  
Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well 
dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a bon -
vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, 
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statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. 
But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run 
counter to the saint's; the bon -vivant and the philanthropist would trip 
each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep 
house in the same tenement of clay. Such different characters may 
conceivably at the outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make 
any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed. So the 
seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, 
and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation. All other selves 
thereupon become unreal, but the fortunes of this self are real.1
Gale concedes James’s point that a single human being cannot possibly realize all of 
these different types of selves and must eventually choose amongst them.  Further, Gale 
acknowledges that many of these selves have beliefs and interests that are not shared or 
consistent with the beliefs of other kinds of selves.  However, Gale suggests that, 
fundamentally, these selves are conceived by James as pragmatic agents seeking to 
maximize desire-satisfaction by “riding herd” on discrete, external objects.
 
2
As I see it, one of the underlying problems with Gale’s account is his willingness 
to dichotomize James’s psyche and philosophy in much the same way as James believed 
intellectualistic logic dichotomized experience.  That is to say, Gale does to James what 
  Thus, Gale 
classifies all of them as Promethean selves.  What doesn’t fit into this class is the 
mystical self.  The mystical self, according to Gale’s interpretation, neither seeks to 
maximize desire-satisfaction nor does he conceive reality as consisting of discrete, 
external objects.  In other words, the Promethean self and the mystical self each belong to 
a different world--they cannot co-exist, both cannot be actual.  In sum, Gale believes that 
James inadvertently comes up with two, mutually exclusive, competing models of the 
self.   
                                                          
1 Principles, 1:295-96. 
 
2 Gale, Divided Self, 260. 
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James claims intellectualistic logic does to reality—fixing aspects of the perceptual flux 
into static concepts which are then hypostatized as being more real than the source 
whence they came.  Recall James’s remarks about the inevitable results of 
intellectualistic logic:  “No discrimination without separation; no separation without 
absolute ‘independence’ and thereupon impossibility of union.”3  Thus, when Gale 
discriminates between two separate selves in James’s text, defines and classifies them, it 
becomes no great mystery how difficult it then becomes to reconcile the two.  James O. 
Pawelski, in The Dynamic Individualism of William James, hits on the same point.  
According to Pawelski, Gale’s “intellectualization” of James creates “two straw men” 
which broadly mirrors the distinction James makes in Pragmatism between the tough-
minded and the tender-minded temperaments.4  Pawelski agrees with Gale that we do 
need to find a way to integrate our conflicting and competing tendencies, but he believes 
that the dilemma Gale sets up between radically opposite selves is neither an accurate 
reading of James nor edifying.5
According to Gale’s analysis, the clash between a Promethean self and a mystical 
self in James’s philosophy occurs on two main fronts.  The first clash between these 
supposedly rival selves concerns the activity or passivity of the will.  The Promethean 
self Gale identifies is characterized by an active will, while the mystical self requires a 
  Thus, although we could respond to Gale’s charge that 
James was a contradiction incarnate with James’s line: “If logic says it is one, so much 
the worse for logic,” we can do better by identifying how and why Gale’s classificatory 
scheme gets James wrong.   
                                                          
3 Manuscript Essays and Notes, 113. 
 
4 Pawelski, op. cit., 107. 
  
5 Ibid. 
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passive will.6  The second clash between these selves occurs because of their competing 
claims about the nature of reality.  The Promethean self is a committed fallibilist and 
Ontological Relativist who “rides herd” on discrete external objects in order to maximize 
desire-satisfaction.  By contrast, according to Gale’s account, the mystical self makes 
apodictic claims about an Absolute reality characterized by an overall unity.7
That the divided-self interpretation of James should be given up is partly 
accomplished by Gale himself as he attempts to reconcile James’s Promethean self with 
his alleged mystical self in the last chapter of his book.  Throughout the book, up until the 
last chapter, Gale emphasizes that one of the essential differences between James’s 
Promethean self and his mystical self was that the Promethean self has an active will and 
the mystical self, having surrendered its will, is passive.  In the final analysis, however, 
Gale softens his stance: 
  Gale takes 
the second clash to be the more significant of the two and believes it to be irreparable in 
James’s philosophy.  Thus, in order to diffuse the situation and reunify James, we have to 
determine whether he does, in fact, advance these competing conceptions of the self as 
Gale describes them.  I don’t believe he does. 
The aporia due to the clash between the active and passive selves has been 
made to appear more formidable than it really is.  Even Promethean selves 
must be permitted to sleep, for they won’t amount to much as Promethean 
agents if they don’t.  Similarly, they shouldn’t be denied some mystical R 
and R if it enables them to return to the war zone better equipped to do 
battle with the forces of evil.8
As it turns out, some amount of activity and passivity is necessary for both types of 
selves.  What prompts Gale’s reconsideration is James’s insistence that ideals and 
 
                                                          
6 Gale, op. cit., 257-60. 
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8 Ibid., 312. 
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experience should result in practical and moral activity.  First, Gale acknowledges 
James’s stress on the connection between inner ideals and overt behavior in the essay 
“What Makes a Life Significant.”  Gale concludes, “Just as one’s inner ideal must 
causally lead one to the right sort of Promethean actions, so a mystical experience, in 
general, must do likewise for its subject.”9  Second, Gale cites James’s insistence on a 
practical union with God rather than a sort of substantial identity in “Reflex Action and 
Theism.”  According to Gale, James’s “emphasis on the practical expresses his insistence 
on mystical experiences bearing fruit for life.”10  As Gale sees it, James wants to put 
mystical experiences to work in the service of a melioristic religion.11
I believe Gale was right to soften the distinction between the active nature of the 
Promethean self and the passive nature of the mystical self, but, like Pawelski, I don’t 
believe Gale goes far enough.  Pawelski’s specific criticism of Gale on this point centers 
around James’s reflex action theory, which Pawelski believes belongs to the center of 
James’s thought.
 
12
The structural unit of the nervous system is . . . a triad, neither of whose 
elements has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists 
only for the sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the 
central process of reflection exists only for the sake of calling forth the 
final act. All action is thus re-action upon the outer world; and the middle 
stage of consideration or contemplation or thinking is only a place of 
transit, the bottom of a loop, both of whose ends have their point of 
application in the outer world. If it should ever have no roots in the outer 
world, if it should ever happen that it led to no active measures, it would 
fail of its essential function, and would have to be considered either 
  In “Reflex Action and Theism,” James describes the human organism 
as composed of three dynamic, interrelated elements: 
                                                          
9 Gale, op. cit., 312. 
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Pawelski, op. cit., 109. 
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pathological or abortive. The current of life which runs in at our eyes or 
ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips. The only use of the 
thoughts it occasions while inside is to determine its direction to 
whichever of these organs shall, on the whole, under the circumstances 
actually present, act in the way most propitious to our welfare.13
Accordingly, complete human experience exists in three sequential and interrelated 
stages:  (1) incoming sense impressions, (2) reflective processing of sense impressions, 
and (3) a subsequent action or reaction.  Thus, as Pawelski puts it, “The reflex arc is 
understood as a dynamic system, with nerve currents flowing in, being processed, and 
then flowing out again,” adding, “Any disruption to this dynamism is indicative of 
malfunction.”
 
14  Pawelski’s charge against Gale is that Gale wants to “snip the reflex arc” 
by severing the connections between stage (1) and stages (2) and (3).15  In other words, 
Gale’s mystical self is characteristically stuck at the level of sense impressions, 
sympathetically and non-conceptually intuiting reality, while the Promethean self is all 
instrumental rationality, volition, and action.  Accordingly, Pawelski argues that James 
would have considered each of these selves as malfunctioning.16
In “The Still Divided-Self of William James,” Gale responds to this charge by 
claiming that James’s reflex arc was a normative theory, and shouldn’t be understood as a 
factual thesis.  That is to say, Gale claims that some experiences, e.g., mystical 
experiences, do not result in overt behavior, and, therefore, are exceptions to the reflex 
arc model.
   
17
                                                          
13 Will to Believe, 91-92. 
  Pawelski argues, I think correctly, that Gale simply misunderstands James’s 
 
14 Pawelski, op. cit., 109. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid., 109-10. 
 
17 Gale, op. cit., 156-57. 
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view.  According to Pawelski, Gale mistakenly supposes that “the discharge James has in 
mind must be a motor action.”18
The fact is that there is no sort of consciousness whatever, be it sensation, 
feeling, or idea, which does not directly and of itself tend to discharge into 
some motor effect. The motor effect need not always be an outward stroke 
of behavior. It may be only an alteration of the heart -beats or breathing, or 
a modification in the distribution of blood, such as blushing or turning 
pale; or else a secretion of tears, or what not. But in any case, it is there in 
some shape when any consciousness is there; and a belief as fundamental 
as any in modern psychology is the belief at last attained that conscious 
processes of any sort, conscious processes merely as such, must pass over 
into motion, open or concealed.
  Pawelski cites the following passage from James’s 
Talks to Teachers: 
19
Thus, stages (1) and (2) of the reflex arc do not necessary discharge as a motor effect or 
overt action; instead, they may result in some internal modification, however slight.  In 
sum, I believe Pawelski is correct insofar as Gale fails to appreciate James’s reflex action 
theory and is willing to snip it at points James never would.  Still, I believe we can go 
even further in challenging Gale’s characterization of a mystical self.  Specifically, I 
don’t believe a so-called “passive will” belongs to James’s characterization of the 
mystical-religious person at all.   
 
In order to determine this, let us recall James’s discussion of passivity in Varieties 
in which it was considered to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for mystical 
experience, but only “usually found.”  James writes: 
Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by 
preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going 
through certain bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of 
mysticism prescribe; yet when the characteristic sort of consciousness 
once has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
18 Pawelski, op. cit., 110. 
 
19 Talks to Teachers, 102. 
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indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power. 
This latter peculiarity connects mystical states with certain definite 
phenomena of secondary or alternative personality, such as prophetic 
speech, automatic writing, or the mediumistic trance.20
A couple of important points may be drawn from this passage.  First, the passivity usually 
found in a mystical experience is typically confined to the duration of the mystical 
experience itself.  Second, in order to have a mystical experience it is not necessary to be 
passive before or after the experience.  In James’s view, then, passivity is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for a mystical experience either before, during, or after 
such an experience.  Additionally, in this passage James only claims that the mystic feels 
as if their will was in abeyance, which is not conclusive evidence that it, in fact, was.  
Thus, one of the problems with Gale’s analysis is that it fails to highlight James’s 
restrictive usage of passivity.  Gale simply refers to “passivity” as “one of the four 
defining conditions of a mystical experience,” and further equates it with “resignation” 
and “abandonment of the finite self” that is characteristic of all mystical and religious 
experience.
 
21
In support of his view, Gale cites the following from James: 
  Thus, James’s idea of passivity as a usual accompaniment to mystical 
experience becomes promoted by Gale to be the hallmark of mystical experience.  I think 
this is a mistake. 
There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in 
which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by 
a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and 
waterspouts of God.22
                                                          
20 VRE, 302-03. 
 
 
21 Gale, op. cit., 256. 
 
22 VRE, 46. 
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It is not obvious from this passage what role our will plays when we are “nothing in the 
floods and waterspouts of God.”  After all, James uses the term “willingness” to describe 
our relation to this state of mind.  In Principles, James describes belief as resembling 
“acquiescence” and “consent,” the latter of which is “recognized by all to be a 
manifestation of our active nature,” adding, “It would naturally be described by such 
terms as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our disposition.'”23  Moreover, James claims that 
“Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are 
two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon.”24   The only difference 
between an object of belief and an object of the will, according to James, is that an object 
of the will is a goal to be achieved.  As Henry Samuel Levinson puts it:  “Whether the 
mind was believing or willing . . .  it did the same thing:  it looked at an object and 
consented to its existence, espoused it, and claimed reality on its behalf.”25  That the 
religious person consents, and, thus, wills, is suggested by James when he compares the 
Christian’s agreement with God’s scheme to the Stoic who merely agrees to the scheme.  
James writes that “He literally abounds in agreement, he runs out to embrace the divine 
decrees.”26
In Gale’s defense, James does commonly use the word “passive” to describe the 
mystico-religious person; so, if it does not refer to a purely passive will, what does it refer 
to?  Given that he uses the term in a wide variety of contexts, James doesn’t seem 
  Thus, it is far from clear that “willingness to close our mouths and be as 
nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God” indicates a purely passive will.   
                                                          
23 Principles, 2:913. 
 
24 Ibid., 948. 
 
25 Henry Samuel Levinson, The Religious Investigation of William James (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 48. 
  
26 VRE, 43. 
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altogether clear about it either.  When he contrasts the “drab discolored way of stoic 
resignation” with the “passionate happiness of Christian saints,” James concludes that 
“the difference is as great as that between passivity and activity, as that between the 
defensive and the aggressive mood.”27
Every idea that represents an act will translate itself into that act unless 
something stands in its way; that barrier can be an “antagonistic or 
inhibiting” idea.  In cases of conflict between ideas or blockage of an 
original idea, the help we provide is an “express fiat” or “act of mental 
consent.”
  The saint, the epitome of human religiosity for 
James, is described as passionate, active, and aggressive while the less religious stoic is 
characterized as passive.  However, the difference between these two is not necessarily 
the difference between an active and passive will.   For James, ideas and states of 
consciousness are naturally impulsive and, if uninhibited, naturally lead to action.  James 
writes:  
28
Myers observes that, “There is a smooth transition from idea to behavior that requires no 
act of will whatsoever.”
 
29  James is sympathetic with Lotze’s view which claims that “All 
the acts of our daily life happen in this wise: Our standing up, walking, talking, all this 
never demands a distinct impulse of the will, but is adequately brought about by the pure 
flux of thought.”30
The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary’ 
is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.  The 
  Thus, the process of willing, according to James, is not to perform an 
action directly; instead, willing involves making a particular idea command one’s 
conscious attention.  James writes: 
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28 Principles, 2:526. 
 
29 Myers, op. cit., 202. 
 
30 Principles, 2:1131. 
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so-doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the 
object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should ensue.31
“Consent to the idea’s undivided presence . . . is effort’s sole achievement,” writes James, 
adding, “Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its congruous associates, is consent to 
the idea and to the fact which the idea represents.”
 
32
To take another example, James describes depression as sometimes being a “mere 
passive joylessness and dreariness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and zest and 
spring.”
  Thus, returning to the example of 
the Stoic and Christian, in so far as both are consenting to their respective ideals, each has 
an active will, regardless of the difference in physical activity. 
33  In this case, a case of a “sick soul,” passivity seems to indicate more than just 
a lack of physical activity; it also seems to indicate a non-functioning or deadened will.  
The depressed person seems to have no interest in anything and, consequently, makes no 
effort to attend to any idea.   Compare this person to someone with an easy-going, happy-
go-lucky attitude, which James describes as “passive happiness.”34  Most people, 
according to James, find this kind of happiness “slack and insipid, and soon grows 
mawkish and intolerable. . . . Some austerity and wintry negativity, some roughness, 
danger, stringency, and effort, some 'no! no!' must be mixed in.”35
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  The passively happy 
person is not passive in respect to activity—they have plenty of that—they are passive in 
regard to being non-assertive, being “people pleasers” and “yes men.”  In other words, 
 
32 Ibid., 2:1169 
 
33 VRE, 123. 
 
34 Ibid., 240. 
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they go along with whatever ideas are in front of them without feeling the tension 
between competing ideas or the need to choose between them.  Some people, writes 
James, “need the sense of tension, of strong volition, to make them feel alive and well;”  
and when they turn to the religious life “they are apt to turn the edge of their need of 
effort and negativity against their natural self; and the ascetic life gets evolved as a 
consequence.”36
The self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn into self-
immolation. It may then so overrule the ordinary inhibitions of the flesh 
that the saint finds positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, measuring 
and expressing as they do the degree of his loyalty to the higher power.
  This hardly sounds like someone with a passive will.  Characterizing 
the ascetic life of the saint, James writes: 
37
Thus, according to James’s account, when people “of strong volition” become religious, 
they may become ascetics who express their piety by directing their will against their 
“natural self” as an expression of “self-surrender.”  James’s language here clearly 
indicates, I believe, that he did not understand a passive will to be a defining mark of the 
religious person.   
 
In order to get a better understanding of this, it might be helpful to distinguish 
between a passive will and what James calls “resignation.”  Although Gale uses the terms 
interchangeably, James does not.  Commenting on the character of resignation in 
religious persons, James remarks that, in the case of “more optimistic temperaments, the 
resignation grows less passive.”38
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  Thus, depending on one’s temperament, resignation 
can take different forms--reflecting varying degrees of passivity and, by implication, 
 
37 Ibid., 221. 
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activity.  But what is resignation?  According to James, both Stoicism and Epicureanism 
are “forms of resignation”: 
The Epicurean said: "Seek not to be happy, but rather to escape 
unhappiness; strong happiness is always linked with pain; therefore hug 
the safe shore, and do not tempt the deeper raptures. Avoid 
disappointment by expecting little, and by aiming low; and above all do 
not fret." The Stoic said: "The only genuine good that life can yield a man 
is the free possession of his own soul; all other goods are lies."39
Resignation, as this description suggests, is relinquishing one’s claim upon worldly goods 
or giving up, as James puts it, “this world’s selfish little interests.”
 
40
Like the identification of passivity with resignation, I believe Gale’s identification 
of resignation with the total abandonment of the self is off the mark.  James calls the 
“abandonment of self” and “willing self-surrender” elsewhere as the “denial of the finite 
  Understood in this 
manner, resignation is not an attitude or posture reserved only for mystico-religious 
people-- as Stoics and Epicureans are proof.  However, in the religious context, we can 
now understand James better when he says “resignation grows less passive” in people 
with optimistic temperaments.  That is, once one no longer identifies their ultimate 
happiness with the goods of this world, some may remain more buoyant and active than 
others.  Compare here Kierkegaard’s “knight of infinite resignation” who gives up 
everything finite in return for the infinite and now finds himself in the awkward position 
of living in a world he no longer feels at home in.  How people adapt to such a situation 
will largely depend upon their native temperament.  Some may sleep in a little longer 
than others. 
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self and its wants.”41  As we saw in the case of the ascetic saint, what is being denied is 
not the self in toto, but the “natural self” concerned with “this world’s selfish little 
interests.”  What is surrendered is the part of the self cramped with desires for worldly 
things.  When these “outlines of the confining selfhood melt away,” writes James, one 
feels an “immense elation and freedom.”42
The sense of enlargement of life may be so uplifting that personal motives 
and inhibitions, commonly omnipotent, become too insignificant for 
notice, and new reaches of patience and fortitude open out. Fears and 
anxieties go, and blissful equanimity takes their place. Come heaven, 
come hell, it makes no difference now!
  James writes: 
43
This renunciation of the finite self is not a complete abandonment of self but, rather, “a 
sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own life.”
 
44
That sense of emotional reconciliation with God which characterizes the 
highest moments of the theistic consciousness may be described as 
“oneness” with him, and so from the very bosom of theism a monistic 
doctrine seems to arise.  But this consciousness of self-surrender, of 
absolute practical union between one’s self and the divine object of one’s 
contemplation, is a totally different thing from any sort of substantial 
identity.  Still the object God and the subject I are two.  Still I simply 
come upon him, and find his existence given to me; and the climax of my 
practical union with what is given, forms at the same time the climax of 
my perception that as a numerical fact of existence I am something 
radically other than the Divinity with whose effulgence I am filled.
  In other words, 
we lose our narrow-minded egoism but do not thereby lose our newly expanded self—we 
remain an individual.  In “Reflex Action and Theism,” James makes this point 
unequivocally: 
45
                                                          
41 VRE, 331. 
 
 
42 Ibid., 219-20. 
 
43 Ibid., 221. 
 
44 Ibid., 220. 
 
45 Will to Believe, 106. 
 
162 
 
Thus, concerning our union with God, no matter how hard we try, James claims we 
cannot lose our self.  Moreover, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, James’s ideal 
self was a social self who desired a transactional relationship with an ideal socius: 
We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to 
his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, at those parts 
of it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the 
worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfills or evades 
God's demands.46
Simply put, the passive will of Gale’s mystical self does not make a very good marriage 
partner.  A one-sided relationship was not what James envisioned. 
 
Where Gale’s passive self does seem to connect to James’s text is where James 
claims that the enthusiasm of the religious person “is the result of the excitement of a 
higher kind of emotion, in the presence of which no exertion of volition is required.”47   
The higher emotion of the religious person is an advantage one has over the moralist 
whose “athletic” attitude “tends ever to break down, and it inevitably does break down 
even in the most stalwart when the organism begins to decay, or when morbid fears 
invade the mind.”48
As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give reality to 
whatever objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of 
our passing thought, if nothing more. But, as thinkers with emotional 
  The puzzle that arises is whether the effortlessness with which the 
religious person performs religious acts corresponds to a “passive” will.  To put it another 
way, is the will passive when a person performs an activity they absolutely love to do?  
Does the emotion override and cancel out any activity of the will?  In Principles, James 
writes: 
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reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to 
whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL.49
James seems to be saying here that what we selectively attend to is determined both by 
our will and our emotional reactions.  Our emotional reactions predispose us one way or 
another to objects but do not have the last say.  This is what James seems to have in mind 
when he claims that “The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability to suspend 
belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea.”
 
50
To use an analogy, consider a person bicycling downhill.  Like the exciting idea, 
their momentum is pulling them in a very definite direction; yet, it is still up to them 
whether to start hitting the brakes or really lean into it, expressing their approval as if to 
say “Yes, yes, yes, go, go, go!”  One could say that the leaning didn’t causally determine 
the forward momentum—and this seems right—but it would seem wrong to say that there 
wasn’t an active, willing consent, since the person could have ended the ride at any time.   
Thus, when James says that “no exertion of volition is required” when one has the higher 
religious emotion, I think it is more accurate to say that the direction of the will is 
harmonious with the direction of the emotional reaction.  Moreover, according to James, 
emotional reactions are correlated with definite physical dispositions: 
  Accordingly, even if the religious 
person has an “emotionally exciting idea” of God, they still retain the ability to suspend 
belief through an effort of will.  Thus, they can dissent from the idea, consent to it, or, 
like the passively happy person, unreflectively go along with it.  Since the religious 
person, in James’s view, is not like the passively happy person, we would expect them to 
take a stand one way or another.   
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[There] is continuous cooperation of the voluntary muscles in our 
emotional states.  Even when no change of outward attitude is produced, 
their inward tension alters to suit each varying mood, and is felt as a 
difference of tone or of strain.  In depression the flexors tend to prevail; in 
elation or belligerent excitement the extensors take the lead.  And the 
various permutations and combinations of which these organic activities 
are susceptible, make it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion, 
however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, when 
taken in its totality, as is the mental mood itself.51
My suggestion here, using James’s analysis, is that a mystical-religious experience may 
evoke both a reconception of the self (as continuous with a wider reality, dropping the 
shabby finite, natural self, etc.) as well as an emotional reaction which sets up one’s 
being into a religious stance, as it were.  For example, one may feel more relaxed, at ease, 
and their various appetites may have lost the edge they once had, making it easier to 
brush aside potential temptations and distractions.  Thus, as long as one is a willing 
participant, it will feel effortless—though one may, in principle, withdraw their consent at 
any time.   
 
As a final point, although James sometimes talks as if religious persons are 
permanently overcome with ecstasy, this doesn’t seem to be entirely true.  Even the most 
devout believers will have days where they feel uninspired, days where their piety feels 
less effortless and more like a chore.  If this is the case, and if my interpretation of James 
is correct, whenever the religious excitement fades, the active consent to their religious 
ideal would still remain—only requiring a more concentrated effort to hold it in focus.  If 
this were not the case, if behind the emotion and enthusiasm was an inert, passive will, it 
would seem as though one would be in a very strange predicament whenever the 
excitement dissipates.  To put it another way, if the religious emotion is all, what does 
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one do if they lose it?  By contrast, if there is an actively consenting will along with the 
emotion, there is still the possibility of continuity if and when the emotion fades until the 
time it (hopefully) returns.   
In any case, as James would be the first to admit, mystical and other religious 
experiences are typically enigmatic and messy.  An adequate account of their general 
nature that aligned seamlessly with his research in psychology and philosophy would 
have been a miracle unto itself.  Though I have attempted to align James’s descriptions of 
mystical and religious experience in Varieties with his ideas about the will in his other 
works, I’m still not certain about the closeness of fit.  However, what does seem clear is 
that James did not define the mystical-religious self in terms of possessing a passive will.  
James’s characterization of passivity as neither necessary nor sufficient for a mystical 
experience was consistently carried over to the religious life.  To be sure, the religious 
person surrenders part of their former self, that part which identified with the “creature 
comforts” of this world, but in doing so actively consents to a divine scheme in which 
they actively participate.  And, although this participation feels effortless at times, I have 
suggested that their willing consent remains in place, ready to support their vision should 
the emotions fade.    
 The second clash Gale identifies is considered by him to be the “Big Aporia” in 
James’s philosophy.  According to Gale, this clash arises due to the incompatible kinds of 
claims made by the two selves.  Gale argues that the reality claims of the Promethean 
pragmatist are “advanced in the spirit of fallibilism, as hypotheses to be tested by future 
experiences and thus subject to revision or withdrawal.”52
                                                          
52 Gale, op. cit., 259. 
  Mystical claims, on the other 
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hands, are “claims to absolute certainty” and “are advanced as noetic claims that are 
revelatory of an ultimate or absolute reality—the really real in comparison with which 
everything is a mere illusion or emanation of some sort.”53
The mystic’s conception of the Absolute, the undifferentiated unity, the 
eternal one, God, is not based on how we can ride herd on it, for there is 
nothing that we do to or with this mystical reality, or ways in which it is 
expected to behave if we perform certain operations. . . . It simply is, and 
is just what it appears to be in the immediate experience of the mystic. A 
door-to-door salesman of mystical reality, therefore, would be stymied 
when asked, “But what does it do?” or “What can I do with it?”
  According to Gale, the 
mystic claims that reality is a kind of unity or oneness simpliciter which resists human 
handling: 
54
Gale’s characterization of mystical claims as absolute claims which are infallible, 
ineffable, non-conceptual, non-hypothetical, revelatory of a world ultimately resistant to 
human interests is, I believe, erroneous.  In what follows, I will argue that all of these 
characteristics are falsely attributed to James’s understanding of mystical experience.  
 
 According to Gale, the mystical and the Promethean selves are alike insofar as 
both make reality claims.  On James’s account, if and when mystics do make reality 
claims, they must always come with a set of important qualifications.  If you recall, one 
of the defining characteristics of a mystical experience for James was its “ineffability,” 
meaning that “it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in 
words.” 55  James adds that mystical states are “more like states of feeling than like states 
of intellect.”56
                                                          
53 Gale, op. cit., 259. 
  Consequently, the contents of a mystical state cannot be transmitted 
 
54 Ibid., 260. 
 
55 VRE, 302. 
 
56 Ibid. 
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through language--they must be experienced directly.  In other words, any attempt to 
translate a mystical experience fully into propositional language will fail.  Gale runs with 
this idea of ineffability and, unable to conceptualize the experience, as we saw, gets stuck 
at stage (1) in James’s reflex arc.  What Gale fails to take into account is the noetic 
quality James ascribes to mystical experiences.  That is to say, although mystical 
experiences are unable to be captured in language, they still have a noetic quality which 
James describes as “insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. . . . 
illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they 
remain.”57
Although it is not possible to do complete justice to mystical states when 
we speak or think about them, speak and think about them we clearly do.  
No experience, for James, is fully accessible to words and concepts.  But 
that does not mean they can capture nothing of the reality we use them to 
describe. Mystical experience is particularly difficult to speak and think 
about, but that does not mean that nothing we say or think about it has any 
merit whatsoever.
  Making a similar point, Pawelski comments that: 
58
As James and Pawelski are suggesting, even though a mystical experience resists full 
conceptualization and adequate expression in language, it indicates deeper truths about 
reality which we can partially capture in our report of the experience.  Indeed, James 
appears to have this in mind when he remarks that we can still get a sense of a mystical 
experience’s “theoretic drift.”
 
59
 In any case, according to James, whatever knowledge or insight is imparted 
through a mystical experience is absolutely authoritative for the subject of the experience, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
57 VRE, 302. 
 
58 Pawelski, op. cit., 111. 
 
59 VRE, 329-30. 
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but no “authority emanates . . . [to] those who stand outside of them.”60  Therefore, in 
James’s view, a mystic cannot dogmatically insist that a non-mystic adopt mystical-
religious beliefs.  What is not clear here is whether James’s understands a mystical 
experience’s “authority” as rationally or logically binding, or whether he is making the 
weaker claim that, as a matter of fact, mystics feel these experiences to be authoritative—
or both.  This issue boils down to question of whether James, unlike Gale, understands 
mystical claims to be fallible.  I believe that, although he recognized that mystical 
experiences are, de facto, authoritative for the subject, James never considered mystical 
claims as incorrigible.  For example, James often imagined the wider world as having a 
“mixed constitution” like this world:  “It would have its celestial and its infernal regions, 
its tempting and its saving moments, its valid experiences and its counterfeit ones.”61
That region contains every kind of matter: 'seraph and snake' abide there 
side by side. To come from thence is no infallible credential. What comes 
must be sifted and tested, and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the 
total context of experience, just like what comes from the outer world of 
sense.
 (my 
italics)  About this “transmarginal region” James writes: 
62
In Pragmatism, James repeats the same idea: “The truth of 'God' has to run the gauntlet of 
all our other truths. It is on trial by them and they on trial by it.”
 
63
                                                          
60 Ibid., 335-336. 
  As Richard Niebuhr 
puts it, “the mystic state is like Tolstoy’s faith state; men live by them, but the truths they 
 
61 VRE, 339. 
 
62 Ibid., 338. 
 
63 Pragmatism, 56. 
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proffer are fallible.”64  James names “the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of 
safety, and of rest” as examples of truths offered by mystical experience.  Regarding such 
truths James says, “They offer us hypotheses, hypotheses which we may voluntarily 
ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset.”65  The gauntlet James wanted 
these hypotheses to run in order to determine their value consisted of set of three criteria: 
“immediate luminousness,” “philosophical reasonableness,” and “moral helpfulness.”66  
As you may notice, these criteria roughly correspond to the different stages of James’s 
reflex arc.  “Immediate luminousness” refers to the strength and quality of the original 
sensory experience, “its immediate force, its raw voltage, its direct, tangible feeling,” as 
G. William Barnard describes it.67
As a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensuous meaning to the 
ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the 
  The criterion of “philosophical reasonableness” 
concerns the extent to which the resultant state of mind is logically defensible.  Based on 
this criterion alone, Gale cannot be right when he claims that the experiences of James’s 
mystical self were entirely ineffable and nonconceptual, otherwise, the criterion of 
“philosophical reasonableness” would be inapplicable.  To be sure, James believed that 
mystical experiences involve a different mode of consciousness than our everyday 
rational consciousness, but, nevertheless, he maintained that the two are consistent and 
continuous with one another.  In James’s view, mystical experience does not contradict 
the facts of non-mystical states of consciousness, but, rather, adds new levels of meaning: 
                                                          
64 Niebuhr, op. cit., 232. 
 
65 VRE, 339. 
 
66 Ibid, 23. 
 
67 G. William Barnard, Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy of Mysticism 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 277. 
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emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts 
already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a 
new connexion with our active life. They do not contradict these facts as 
such, or deny anything that our senses have immediately seized.68
In general, then, a philosophically reasonable mystical experience will enhance 
our experience rather than invalidate it.  Lastly, “moral helpfulness” is the criterion which 
considers the overall positive effects the experience has upon one’s character and, 
subsequently, the community.  Using the language of James’s reflex arc we could say the 
final discharge or upshot of mystical experience is moral activity.  According to James, 
these three criteria remain true to “our empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know 
them, not by their roots.”
 
69
In summary, Gale’s divided-self thesis, especially in regard to his characterization 
of the mystical self, appears misbegotten.  I have suggested, along with Pawelski, that 
Gale’s treatment of James resembles an over-intellectualization of James’s psyche and 
philosophy.  In addition, Pawelski highlights Gale’s failure to appreciate James’s reflex 
action theory.  This failure results in a severing of James’s reflex arc, resulting in two 
malfunctioning human organisms.  Further, I argued that Gale’s characterization of the 
mystical self as possessing a passive will is deeply problematic and unsupported by 
James’s text.  Lastly, we saw that, for James, mystical claims are fallible.  James 
considers mystical claims as hypotheses which we test by considering their fruits for life, 
i.e., the extent to which they enrich our understanding and galvanize moral activity.   
  In this way, James insists that the mystical-religious life be 
judged not by its origin, but “by its results exclusively.”  Thus, James would not consider 
authoritative a mystical experience which failed his empiricistic gauntlet.   
                                                          
68 VRE, 338. 
 
69 Ibid., 25. 
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Thus, though certainly a provocative and dramatic presentation of James and his 
philosophy, Gale’s divided-self thesis is ultimately unsuccessful.   
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Conclusions 
There is, Gale tells us, an “obsessive use of the metaphor of leaving all doors and 
windows open” which pervades James’s writings.1  For example, James remarks that 
pluralism accepts “a universe unfinished, with doors and windows open to possibilities 
and uncontrollable in advance.”2  And, similarly:  “When one’s affections keep in touch 
with the divinity of the world’s authorship. . . . It is as if all doors were opened, and all 
paths freshly smoothed.”3  It seems correct to say that one of James’s greatest fears was 
to remain behind artificial enclosures in both life and theory.  “James was an insatiable 
lover of landscape, and particularly of wide ‘views,’” wrote James’s son, Henry.4  This 
preference for expansiveness manifested itself in a lifelong love of hiking and mountain 
climbing.  Richardson observes that James “felt a real craving, a hunger for nature, a 
physical need to spend several months a year in the country.”5  This strenuous activity 
would eventually take a toll on James’s health, causing him to suffer through increasingly 
frequent bouts of angina.  After his death, the autopsy report would conclude that James 
had died from an acute enlargement of the heart.  Commenting on the finding of the 
autopsy report, Alice wrote in her diary:  “He had worn himself out.”6
                                                          
1 Gale, op. cit., 4. 
   The year before  
 
2 SPP, 72. 
 
3 VRE, 373. 
 
4 Perry, op. cit., 175. 
 
5 Richardson, op. cit., 271. 
 
6 Simon, op. cit., 385. 
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James had met with Sigmund Freud at a psychology conference at Clark University in 
Worcester.  In his autobiography, Freud recalled this memorable meeting with James: 
I shall never forget one little scene that occurred as we were on a walk 
together.  He stopped suddenly, handed me a bag he was carrying and 
asked me to walk on, saying he would catch up as soon as he had got 
through an attack of angina pectoris which was just coming on.  He died 
of that disease a year later, and I have always wished that I might be as 
fearless as he was in the face of approaching death.7
 
 
Due to his failing heart condition, Simon is right to claim that James “had not simply 
willed himself to die.”8  Yet, Alice did believe that her husband’s will was a contributing 
factor during his final hours.  “He wanted to go,” Alice told her friend, Pauline 
Goldmark, “and departed swiftly as he always has when he made up his mind to move 
on.”9  James’s brother Henry echoed this sentiment:  “[H]e suffered so & only wanted, 
wanted more & more, to go.”10
Despite the fact that Alice would wear all black clothing for the rest of her life, 
she was more than hopeful about the fate of her husband.  In a letter written to her friend, 
Horace Kallen, Alice acknowledges her belief in an afterlife:  “I believe in immortality,” 
and “[I] believe that he is safe and living, loving and working, never, never to be wholly 
  Thus, like his father, James appeared to welcome 
death—apparently believing that he was about to “move on.”  Although both agreed that 
James has willingly departed, Alice and Henry had quite different reactions in the 
following days. 
                                                          
7 Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1935), 99. 
 
8 Simon, 385. 
 
9 Blum, op. cit., 316. 
 
10 Simon, 385. 
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gone from us.”11  Henry didn’t feel the quite same way:  “My own fears are of the 
blackest,” he wrote to his friend, Grace Norton, “from as far back in dimmest childhood, 
I have so yearningly always counted on him, I feel nothing but the abject weakness of 
grief and even terror.”12  A few days later Henry wrote the following to Thomas Sergeant 
Perry:  “I sit heavily stricken and in darkness. . . . His extinction changes the face of life 
for me—besides the mere missing of his inexhaustible company and personality, 
originality, the whole unspeakably vivid and beautiful experience of him.”13  Thus, 
unlike Henry, Alice seemed to share in her husband’s faith.  After his death, she wrote to 
one of his friends, “He said to me once, many years ago, ‘I am really a religious man’—
and so he was.”14
Evidently, Alice James was not the only person concerned with trying to contact 
James’s spirit.  “Within days,” writes Blum, “newspapers carried multiple claims of 
contacts with the spirit of William James.”
  For the next several months after the funeral, Alice evidently sought 
out mediums and held séances in her home, hoping to receive a message from her 
departed husband.  No messages would arrive.   
15  The New York Times ran with a story from 
a Boston man who claimed that James had “sent a message to his friends from the spirit 
world” during a séance.16
                                                          
11 Simon, op. cit., 385. 
  The discarnate James supposedly told him:  “I am at peace, 
peace—with myself and all mankind.  I have awakened to a life far beyond my highest 
 
12 Henry James, The Letters of Henry James, vol. 2, ed. Percy Lubbock (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 172-173. 
 
13 Ibid., 174. 
 
14 Simon, 387. 
 
15 Blum, op. cit., 317. 
 
16 Ibid. 
175 
 
conception while a denizen of earth.”17  This didn’t convince anyone.  James Hyslop, too, 
claimed to have received some supposed messages from James--but nothing that he could 
count as definitive proof.18  Wanting to settle all of these circulating rumors concerning 
the probability of James’s spiritual return, the Times turned to an “expert” on the matter:  
Thomas Alva Edison.19
In A Pluralistic Universe, James writes: 
   The title of the October 2nd, 1910 article tells the whole story: 
“Human Beings Only an Aggregate of Cells and the Brain Only a Wonderful Machine, 
Says Wizard of Electricity.”  It was settled, according to the “expert,” there was no 
mystery to be solved.   
Our intellectual handling of [things] is a retrospective patchwork, a 
postmortem dissection, and can follow any order we find most expedient. 
We can make the thing seem self-contradictory whenever we wish to. But 
place yourself at the point of view of the thing's interior doing, and all 
these back-looking and conflicting conceptions lie harmoniously in your 
hand.  Get at the expanding centre of a human character, the élan vital of a 
man, as Bergson calls it, by living sympathy, and at a stroke you see how 
it makes those who see it from without interpret it in such diverse ways.  It 
is something that breaks into both honesty and dishonesty, courage and 
cowardice, stupidity and insight, at the touch of varying circumstances, 
and you feel exactly why and how it does this, and never seek to identify it 
stably with any of these single abstractions.  Only an intellectualist does 
that,--and you now also fell why he must do it to the end. 
     Place yourself similarly at the centre of a man’s philosophic vision and 
you understand at once all the different things it makes him write or say.  
But keep outside, use your post-mortem method, try to build the 
philosophy up out of the single phrases, taking first one and then another 
and seeking to make them fit ‘logically,’ and of course you fail.  You 
crawl over the thing like a myopic ant over a building, tumbling into every 
                                                          
17 Blum, op. cit., 317. 
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microscopic crack or fissure, finding nothing but inconsistencies, and 
never suspecting that a centre exists.20
 
 
In this paper I have attempted to heed James’s advice.  The critical task of my paper has 
been to show that Gale’s divided-self thesis is erroneous and misrepresents James and his 
philosophy.  The remaining task was to construct a unified account of James which could 
explain the sort of extreme interpretation which Gale offers.  My positive thesis has been 
that James’s understanding of the self was centered on a deep, personal desire for 
immortality.   Thus, I argue that James's interest in mystical experience, immortality, and 
the “dramatic probabilities of nature” were never in conflict with his other alleged non-
mystical interests.  In Chapter 2, I suggested that the “tremendousness” of this idea first 
occurred to James through an admixture of native temperament, personal tragedy, 
blossoming humanistic ideals, and the “dramatic probabilities” of consciousness 
suggested by abnormal psychology and psychic research.  In Chapter 3, I considered 
James’s account of the self in his magnum opus, The Principles of Psychology, arguing 
that James adopted a methodological dualism, resisting a reductionistic account of the 
self.  Additionally, we saw that, even though psychology was his subject matter, James 
went out of his way to offer a moral justification for immortality while, at the same time, 
engineering a non-substantive model of the self both fit for science, and, in many ways, 
better suited to realize “dramatic probabilities” suggested or called for by our moral and 
religious sensibilities.  In Chapter 4, I considered James’s Ingersoll Lecture, “Human 
Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine,” and his landmark work, The 
Varieties of Religious Experience.  In “Human Immortality,” we witnessed James 
answering common objections to immortality and defending a view of consciousness that 
                                                          
20 PU, 117. 
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is compatible with its possibility.  In Varieties James turns away from dualistic categories 
and begins to employ a consciousness-as-field metaphor, better suiting both his 
psychological descriptions of mystical-religious experience and a metaphysics consistent 
with the possibility of personal immortality.   
Finally, in Chapter 5, I considered James’s most mature, systematic, and 
metaphysical works:  A Pluralistic Universe, Essays in Radical Empiricism, and Some 
Problems in Philosophy.  In these works James further develops the idea that the self is 
ultimately relational and continuous with wider fields of consciousness, the highest and 
most inclusive of which is a redemptive (albeit finite) God.  As we saw, one of the 
problems that arose was how the self can be part of a larger consciousness, yet still exist 
as a distinct consciousness.  This problem eventually led James to devalue 
intellectualistic logic and to stress the importance of intimacy.  James believed that the 
most rational universe was the universe we could feel most at home in.  And I maintain 
that the universe James felt most at home in was one in which death was not our ultimate 
destiny.    
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